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ABSTRACT
A Metaphoric Theory of Creative Change
September 1983
Dan W. Rea, B.A., University of Missouri at Columbia,
MAT, Howard University, Ed. D
. ,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor George E. Forman
Historically, creative change has been viewed by the
opposing theoretical perspectives of "Holism" and "Reduc-
tionism. " Viewed by Reductionism creative change produces a
continuous, incremental composite and therefore is an ex-
plicable trivial novelty. Viewed by Holism creative change
produces a discontinuous, nonincremental gestalt and there-
fore is an inexplicable radical novelty. This theoretical
rivalry has resulted in the impoverished view of creative
change as either "trivially novel in structure" (Reduction-
ism) or "inexplicable in genesis" (Holism) . We are propos-
ing an enriching "Metaphoric" perspective in which creative
change is both "genuinely novel in structure" and "explic-
able in genesis."
|
The Metaphoric perspective itself is a
paradoxical integration of the mutually opposing perspec-
tives of Holism and Reductionism at a higher order meta-
phoric level. From the Metaphoric perspective the creative
process is seen as a paradoxical integration of mutually
vi
opposing concepts producing a higher order metaphoric
perspective. In short creative change is a paradoxical
tension in search of a metaphoric resolution. The goal of
this dissertation is neither to reduce away the paradoxical
tension of creative change ( Reductionism) nor to leave its
generation unexplained (Holism) but rather to demonstrate
the metaphorical beauty of the paradoxical nature of crea-
tive change. This metaphorical beauty aesthetically and
epistemologically resolves the inherently necessary paradox
by showing the greater cognitive unity of opposing concepts
"because of" their contrasting differences and not merely
"in spite of" or from the "lack thereof." Thus, metaphor
functions to creatively resolve the necessary paradoxical
tension by incorporating and transforming it at a higher
level of unity through diversity.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The general goal of this dissertation is to explore
the development of a more adequate conceptualization of the
creative process. We are operating on the fundamental
assumption that all data is "theory laden" either implicitly
or explicitly and furthermore that "theory" strongly influ-
ences the way we interpret and construct datum (Piaget,
1976a) (Polanyi, 1975) . Hence "theory" may inform and
reform as well as misinform and deform our research and
educational practice. As Abraham Moslow has stated, "If all
you have is a hammer then everything looks like a nail"
(Maslow, 1968). Data interpreted from a reductionistic
theory will provide a reductionistic understanding of
creativity. If we are to understand the creative process
better, then a more epistemologically adequate theory of
creativity is necessary. Furthermore a more adequate theory
of creativity would greatly contribute to the development of
a science of education because of its potential implications
for guiding, informing and reforming research, assessment,
curriculum and teacher-student interaction.
1
2Statement of Problem
The explication of the paradoxical nature of the gene-
sis of genuinely novel structures in creative change has
been a perennial problem. Various writers have identified
at least one of three interrelated aspects of the paradoxi-
cal nature of creative change (Barron, 1968) (Bruner, 1962)
(May, 1975) (McMullan, 1976) (Piaget, 1971) (Rothenberg,
1979a). The "structural" aspect is concerned with the
structural integration of mutually opposing images, ideas,
or concepts which are simultaneously equally operative and
valid (Rothenberg, 1979a). As a documented example Rothen-
berg (1979b, p. 41) shows from the metaphoric visualization
that an observer in free fall is both at rest and in motion
at the same time, Einstein was able to postulate the rela-
tivity of motion in coordinate systems. (Note: If the
observer releases any objects, they will remain, relative to
him, in a state of rest and thus the observer is justified
in considering his state as one of rest.) The "process"
aspect is concerned with the holistic creation of novel
gestalts of knowledge which are incomprehensible and nonre-
ducible to the precedent state of knowledge (Piaget, 1970)
(Rothenberg, 1979a) . For example from the metaphoric visu-
alization of the simultaneous integration of the opposites
of "rest" and "motion" for a free falling body Einstein
3derived the novel concept of relativity in physics which was
logically nonderivable and incomprehensible to the preceding
Newtonian theory of classical physics (Kuhn, 1970). Rather,
classical physics is a special limiting case of the more
general theory of relativity. The "purpose" or "intention-
al" aspect is concerned with the simultaneous commitment to
and doubting of a new creation (Barron, 1968) (May, 1980).
An example taken from Einstein's correspondence, "Recently
you have probably received my new publication on relativity
and gravitation which I have at last finished after unending
labor and painful doubts" (Holton, 1973, p. 228). Related
to this is Holton's characterization of Einstein as both the
"wisest of old men" with the ability to critically and
relentlessly question his own concepts and at the same time
"an almost childlike person" who openly and persistently
wondered about incredibly new concepts of space and time
(Holton, 1973, pp. 356-357)
.
In this dissertation, we shall
confront the "structural," "process" and "purposive" aspects
of the paradoxical nature of creative change with a theory
which epistemologically accounts for the paradoxical com-
plexity of creative change as well as provides an intelli-
gible resolution. Toward this end we shall abstract and
elaborate from the constructive theories of Piaget and
others a "metaphoric dialectic" with the functional capacity
to integrate opposites and explicate the holistic creation
4of novel structures of knowledge. Thus we define creativity
as a paradoxical tension in search of a metaphoric resolu-
tion .
From the perspective of various "Reductionistic
Theories" such as Cultural Transmissionism, Behaviorism and
Logical Positivism creative change is the continuous incre-
mental production of a trivially novel composite completely
explicable from its precedent. From the perspective of
various "Holistic Theories" such as Romanticism, Gestaltism
and Neo-Freudianism creative change is the discontinuous
nonincremental emergence of a radically novel gestalt inex-
plicable from its precedent. The theoretical question
arises which of these two opposing views of the creative
process is the right one? According to Maruyama we are
asking the wrong question. "Americans who believe in the
existence of one truth will inevitably ask: If you have
different views which one is right? But consider the fol-
lowing: In the binocular vision it is irrelevant to raise
the question as to which eye is wrong. Binocular vision
works, not because the two eyes see different sides of the
same object, but because the differential between the two
images enables the brain to compute the invisible dimension"
(Maruyama, 1977, p. 84).
We propose that the supposedly mutually exclusive
monocular views of Reductionism and Holism have created a
5conflicting double vision in the form of a false dilemma
that creative change is characterized as either a "trivially
novel" composite with an "explicably ordered" genesis
(Reduction) or a "radically novel" gestalt with an "inexpic-
ably ordered" genesis (Holism) . Paradoxically neither view
is totally wrong nor right. The Reductionistic view is
limited because it can only explain the composite of novelty
in terms of the incremental accumulation of precedent know-
ledge. Hence it trivializes the gestalt quality of genuine-
ly novel knowledge. The Holistic view is limited because it
accepts the gestalt quality of genuinely novel knowledge but
at the expense of leaving unexplained its genesis from pre-
cedent knowledge. Hence the appropriate question is not
which view, Reductionism or Holism, is right or wrong: both
are incompletely monocular. Nor is the question how can we
additively combine the two monocular views to produce a more
complete monocular view. Rather the central question is how
can we integrate the difference of their views to construct
a genuinely novel binocular vision of the creative process
which is paradoxically hidden to either view alone or to
both when additively combined? We propose that binocular
vision metaphorically exemplifies how oppositional differ-
ences are "metaphorically coordinated" toward a higher level
of unity through diversity. Hence the problem of this dis -
sertation is how to incorporate the mutually opposing views
6of Holism and Reductionism into a new metaphoric vision of
creative change. Furthermore to show how this new metaphor-
ic vision paradoxically goes beyond the single sightedness
of Holism and Reductionism to reveal a deepened theoretical
vision which both "is" and "shows how" creative change is
simultaneously characterized by a "genuinely novel structure"
and an "explicably ordered genesis."
Proposal of the Thesis
In order to validate conceptually and corroborate em-
pirically a metaphoric theory of the creative process which
is both "genuinely novel" and "explicably ordered" in gene-
sis we propose the following theses
:
1 . Creativity is fundamentally a paradoxical process.
The paradox of constructing an epistemologically adequate
theory of creative change is that we can neither explicate
the genuine novelty of that which is already created nor
that which is not created previously. That which is already
created is merely a trivially extended novelty of past com-
binations appearing gradually (Reductionism) . That which is
not created previously is an irreducible gestalt inexplic-
ably derived from its precedent (Holism) . If we can neither
explicate the genuinely novel structure of creative change
for that which is "previously created" nor for that which is
"not previously created" then when and how can we explicate
7the creation of a genuinely novel structure? The resolution
of this paradox requires the explication of how the opposing
conceptual differences of Reductionism and Holism are simul-
taneously integrated (structural paradox) to go beyond the
linear sequential conceptualization of creative change as
occurring either "previously" (Reductionism) or "not previ-
ously" (Holism) . We propose that creative change is funda -
mentally a paradoxical process of constructively coordinat-
ing mutually exclusive but equally necessary first-order
oppositional differences to generate a second-order simul-
taneous reintegration of the oppositional differences. We
shall illustrate the "structural" and "process" aspect of
the paradox of creative change with the literary metaphor
"Society is a sea." In this metaphor the primary (society)
and the secondary (sea) categorical subjects are mutually
exclusive first order oppositional differences which create
a paradoxical category mistake when literally identified
with each other by the copula "is." However when metaphor-
ically reinterpreted the oppositional differences between
the separate categories of "society" and "sea are reinte-
grated at a genuinely novel second-order figurative level
which resolves the logical absurdity of the literal inter
oretation of the oppositional differences into an aesthetic
harmony of oppositional differences. At this new figurative
level the oppositional categories are not reduced away to
8pre-existing similarities as in the simile, "Society is like
a sea," but rather are highlighted to novelly enrich the
greater whole of the metaphor itself. Thus in a fundamental
sense the new metaphoric meaning does not represent an
elimination of the oppositional differences of its cate-
gories but rather is a transformative enhancement of the
paradox of their irreducible opposition into aesthetically
contrasting differences which enrich the whole.
Fundamentally creative change is an irreducible
second-order qualitative process shift (process paradox)
generated from the simultaneous integration of structurally
irreducible oppositional differences (structural paradox)
.
Furthermore this second-order shift is a paradoxical leap of
uncertainty out of place and time betwixt and between the
stable structures of two cognitive levels (Rothenberg, 1978-
19 79) . Labouvie-Vief writes "Yet between those two (cogni-
tive) levels, certainty is at its minimum. Werner (1948),
for example, remarks on the moment of behavioral disorgani-
zation or instability which marks stage transitions. To
make the transition requires a leap of faith, a tolerance
for temporary disorganization, a surrendering to uncertain-
ty. Whether it be called ego strength (Gill and Brenman,
1956) , tolerance of intra-self inconsistencies (Duval and
9Wickland, 1972)
, openness to disquietude (Dabrowski, 1970)
or creative discomfort (Gruber, 1973)
,
many writers have
commented on this ability to endure and even embrace uncer-
tainty as a mechanism by which the self creates an impetus
for change" (Labouvie-Vief
, 1982, p. 168). We propose that
the paradoxical uncertainty of the second-order qualitative
shift results from the indeterminate transition between the
de-structuring of the first-order oppositional differences
and the re-structuring of the second-order integration of
oppositional differences. This indeterminate transition is
neither directly predictable nor derivable from the pre-
existing attributes or relations of the first-order opposi-
tional differences any more than the process of binocular
vision is either directly predictable or derivable from the
opposing monocular views either singularly or additively
combined. Furthermore the indeterminate transition is not a
spatial ordination of place but rather a mental coordination
which takes place. Beyond this the coordination which takes
place through the indeterminate shift is "out of time" since
the normal linear sequence of events is suspended with the
simultaneous (nonsequential) integration of differences
which are neither before nor after each other (Rothenburg,
1979a, pp. 336-339). Hence the second-order shift is a
paradoxical leap of uncertainty both nonsequentially "out of
time" and mentally "out of space." Rollo May describes the
10
psychological anxiety inherent to the uncertainty of the
creative act, "The breakthrough carries with it also an ele-
rnsnt of anxiety
. For it not only broke down my previous
hypothesis, it shook my self-world relationship. At such a
time I find myself having to seek a new foundation, the ex-
istence of which I as yet don't know . This is the source of
the anxious feeling that comes at the moment of the break-
through it is not possible that there be a genuinely new
idea without this shakeup occurring to some degree" (May,
1980
,
p. 63)
.
The ability to seek and embrace paradoxical uncertain-
ty can provoke an impetus for change and provide a well-
spring for creativity when further inspired and directed by
a higher order purpose. This is the "purposive" aspect of
the paradox of creative change in which uncertainty and
doubt contribute to a higher order commitment to resolve a
problem and the higher order commitment to resolving the
problem intensifies the crisis of uncertainty and doubt.
Holton in his study of the creative achievements of Einstein
states, "It is precisely their special sensitivity to con-
traries that has made it possible for them (creative scien-
tists such as Einstein) to do so and it is an utter neces-
sity that has made them demand nothing less for themselves"
(Holton, 1973, pp. 375-376)
.
As implied by Einstein, in a
description of Planck, his own inner necessity (higher order
purpose) was "the longing to behold that pre-established
harmony . . ."of which he was a creative part (Holton,
1973, p. 377)
.
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2 . The paradoxical process of creativity is ultimate-
ly resolved by a second-order reconstruction or reframing of
the paradoxical opposition . The creative process is a "re-
construction" or a "re-framing" in that it involves a re-
organization and re-defining of the precedent structure of
knowledge. It is a "second-order" process in that it is not
merely the actualization of existing potential or the recom-
bination of "first-order" possibilities which Reductionistic
theories account for but is the re-creating of potentiality
or the opening up of the "possibility of new possibilities"
at a more coherent level of construction. Furthermore since
the paradoxical problem of irreducible oppositional differ-
ences requires a "second-order reconstructed solution,'
which utilizes and transformatively enhances the irreducible
oppositional differences, we use the terms "problem resolv-
ing" or "paradox resolving" rather than "problem solving" or
"paradox solving" which indicates a first-order reducing
away of the oppositional differences or merely the trivial
recombination of nonopposi tional differences as in the solu-
tion of simple arithmetic problems. In the review of liter-
ature we consider various constructive theories such as
Duckworth (1979) and Petrie's (1979) theories of creative
12
learning, Koestler (1969) and Rothenberg's (1979) theories
of creative production, Piaget's (1977) theory of cognitive
development, and Kuhn (1977) and Hesse's (1980) theories of
"theory change. " The main purpose of the review of litera-
ture shall be to show how each of these constructive theo-
ries resolves the paradox of creative change by a second-
order reconstructive integration of the oppositional differ-
ences of the first-order level.
3 . The second-order reconstruction (reframing) of the
paradoxical process of creativity is essentially a metaphor-
ic process guided by a higher order integrative purpose.
Creativity is a paradoxical process of constructively coor-
dinating oppositional differences toward a second-order
metaphoric reintegration of oppositional differences. In
other words creativity is a paradoxical tension in search of
a metaphoric resolution. Furthermore this intense search
through the paradoxical leap of uncertainty is sustained and
guided by a higher order commitment to some integrative pur-
pose of meaningful coherence which can serve as a greater
context for mediating the metaphorical reintegration of the
oppositional differences. As Perkins states concerning the
creative process, "Purpose shapes process" (Perkins, 1981,
p. 101) . Creative change is not just a special paradoxical/
metaphorical process but also involves a special higher
order integrative purpose which coherently encompasses and
13
directs the oppositional differences while remaining sealed
off from their incoherence. As Parnes states, "The creative
person usually doesn't know what he/she is going to do next,
but most probably knows why" (Parnes, 1977). Furthermore
"purpose" gives the creative process personal relevance
without which novelty may become merely silly or shocking
without significance. The metaphoric resolution of the
creative process is provoked from within by the paradoxical
tension of its oppositional differences and evoked from
without by the lure of a higher order integrative purpose of
meaningful coherence such as "beauty," "goodness," "truth-
fulness," "utility," etc. Furthermore the higher order
commitment to an integrative purpose with personal coherence
is not an absolute commitment but a dynamic commitment that
paradoxically develops best with detachment and doubt. As
May writes, "To believe fully (commitment) and at the same
moment to have doubts is not at all a contradiction: it
presupposes a greater respect for truth, an awareness that
truth always goes beyond anything that can be said or done
at any given moment" (May, 1980, p. 14). In place of
"truth" we could substitute any integrative purpose of
meaningful coherence such as "beauty," "goodness," etc.
The creative resolution is "metaphoric" in that it is
not a homogeneous fusion, an additive composite or a hier-
archy of oppositional differences but rather is the second-
15
Co-ref lexivity is similar to Bohr's concept of "complemen-
tarity" in which the opposing perspectives of "light" as
either a "continuous wave" or a "discrete particle" are
mutually exclusive but equally necessary to a fuller under-
standing of the phenomena of light (Holton, 1973, pp. 115-
161). The difference between "co-reflexivity " and "comple-
mentarity" is that while Bohr maintains the mutually oppos-
ing perspectives of the "continuous wave" and the "discrete
particle" cannot be integrated simultaneously into one
conceptual picture without causing literal ambiguity and so
must be applied sequentially to yield a fuller approximate
understanding "co-reflexivity " allows for the simultaneous
integration of mutually exclusive perspectives into a
greater cognitive perspective which transforms the literal
ambiguity into a metaphoric enrichment. For example binocu-
lar vision may be defined as co-reflexive since the right
eye's object of perception is co-defined in terms of the
left eye's contrasting perspective and vice-versa simultane-
ously. Through the simultaneously cross-referenced differ-
ential of the contrasting monocular perspectives the deeper
more comprehensive perspective of binocular vision is con-
structed. Another example of co-reflexivity is provided
with the literary metaphor "society is a sea." In this
metaphor the primary subject, "society," is explicitly per-
ceived in terms of the secondary subject, 'sea, and
16
implicitly vice-versa simultaneously. Through the differen-
tial of these mutually contrasting perspectives new meta-
phoric insights are generated.
The metaphoric dialectic begins with the non-
dif ferentiated global unity of diffusely related co-
reflexive opposites and hierarchically returns with a
second-order reintegration of the co-reflexive opposites at
a higher level of differentiated unity. The dialectical co-
ordination of the co-reflexive opposites is the process
whereby the opposites become defined and redefined more
coherently in terms of one another. Hence each step of the
metaphoric dialectic involves a progressive delineation of
the oppositional differences of the co-reflexives toward
greater levels of synchronous coherence. The metaphoric
dialectic is different from the Hegelian dialectic in that
it is a "qualitative dialectic" in which the irreducible
qualitative differences are aesthetically transformed into a
harmonious synchrony of contrapuntal qualities rather than
being clashed together in a fused synthesis. (For sources
concerning "qualitative dialectics" to which the author is
indebted see Plato (1964) , Mullen (1981) , Slaatte (1968)
,
and especially Murti (1968) .) We offer a brief outline of
the five steps of the dialectical coordination of the co-
reflexive tendency toward metaphoric resolution which is
followed by examples
:
17
I * Global coordination
. The co-reflexive tendency is ex-
pressed as a global interdependence of diffuse oppo-
sites which are seemingly randomly related. The con-
fusion of this level leads to the absolute fixation of
the next level.
II. Absolute differential coordination
. The co-reflexive
tendency is expressed as the unilateral dependency of
disjoint polar opposites in which one predominates to
the neglect of the Other. The one-sided incomplete-
ness of this level leads to the fuller completeness of
the next level.
III. "Either/or" coordination . The co- reflexive tendency
is expressed as the negative independence of mutually
exclusive opposites which discontinuous ly interact.
The conflicting inconsistency of this level leads to
consistency of the next level.
IV. "Both/and" coordination . The co-reflexive tendency is
expressed as the conditional dependence of relative
opposites which are continuously related to form a
composite. The bland consistency of this level leads
to the enriching coherence of the next level.
V. "Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination . The co-
reflexive tendency is expressed as the second-order
interdependence of metaphoric opposites which are
18
simultaneously reintegrated within a greater context
of synchronous coherence.
Prototypical Examples of the
Metaphoric Dialectic
-
Next we shall consider four prototypical examples
which exemplify the five steps of the metaphoric dialectic.
The first two prototypes are an idealization of the five
steps of progressively complex perception leading to binocu-
lar vision and the five steps of interpretation leading to
full metaphoric insight. The second two prototypes are
psychologically researched examples of the five steps of
Piagetian equilibration leading to the integrated under-
standing of the simultaneous backward spinning and forward
projection of a ping pong ball and the five steps of the
terminally ill patient coming to fully accept dying as an
integral part of living.
In the first example we shall consider how the co-
reflexively opposing perspectives of the front view of a
cylinder as circular versus the side view as rectangular are
dialecticaly coordinated toward the more complex three di-
mensional perspective (binocular vision) of a metaphorically
integrated cylinder:
I. Global coordination : The co-reflexive perspectives of
the rectangular and circular views are diffusely inte-
grated in a blurred vision of the anomalous cylinder.
19
11 * Absolute differential coordination ; The blurred
vision of the anomalous cylinder is absolutely differ-
entiated into a static monocular perception of the
cylinder as a circular shape to the neglect of its
rectangular shape or vice-versa.
111 • "Either/or" coordination : The incomplete "circular"
view of the anomalous cylinder leads to a conflicting
monocular perception of the cylinder as "either"
circular "or" rectangular to the discontinuous mutual
exclusion of each other.
IV. "Both/and" coordination ; The paradox of the conflict-
ing monocular views leads to a relative monocular view
of the anomalous cylinder as "both" circular "and"
rectangular in continuous additive composition.
The anomalous cylinder is monocularly perceived as
merely the additive composite of the two different
flat views of the same object.
V. "Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination . The metaphoric
binocular perception of the anomalous cylinder is
"neither" a flat circular view "nor" a flat rectangu-
lar view either singularly or in additive composition
but rather the simultaneous reintegration of their
interdependent differences within the fuller perspec-
tive of the cylinder's three dimensional depth. The
higher-order commitment to a greater perspective of
20
coherent perception compells the search for a meta-
phoric reintegration of the paradoxically contrasting
perspectives. The second-order perspective of object
depth that is paradoxically invisible to the other
levels of perception is fully visible through a meta-
phoric reintegration.
In the second example we shall consider how the co-
reflexive opposites of "hands" versus "bandage" in the lit-
erary metaphor, "How long can my hands be a bandage to his
hurt?" (Plath, 1971, p. 50) are dialectically coordinated
through a second-order level of genuinely novel metaphoric
insight
:
I. Global coordination . The co-reflexive opposites of
the primary subject, hands, and the secondary subject,
bandage, are diffusely integrated with the initial
global impression.
II. Absolute differential coordination . The primary sub-
ject, "hands," is differentially fixated on to the
neglect of the secondary subject, "bandage," or vice-
versa .
HI. "Either/or" coordination . The differentiated primary
subject category of human "hands" is literally identi-
fied with the differentiated secondary subject cate-
gory of nonhuman "bandage" thus provoking a logical
paradox because of their categorical differences. The
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metaphor is interpreted as "either" hands "or" bandage
in mutually exclusive, discontinuous conflict.
" Both/and " coordination
. The logical paradox of the
previous literal interpretation is rationally reduced
to a simile interpretation in which the pre-existing
hidden points of similarity are merely made more ex-
plicit. The metaphor restated as a simile becomes,
"How long can my hands be like a bandage to his hurt."
This simile interpretation provides for logical con-
sistency but at the expense of reducing the tensive
richness of the metaphor to a bland additive composite
of the common attributes shared by "both" the hands
"and" bandage . For example the hands are interpreted
as like the bandage in terms of the pre-existing
common physical attributes of color and texture and
the abstract functions of holding and protecting.
V. "Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination . The metaphoric
interpretation is not merely reducible to pre-existing
common points of similarity between the "hands" and
"bandage" but rather through their aesthetically
contrasting differences a genuinely novel restructur-
ing of their similarities is provoked. A new meta-
phoric meaning is not created in spite of their
antagonistic differences in category as with the
"both/and" level but because of their highlighted
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differences in category. The "hands" are not merely
like a bandage but rather there is a simultaneous
interpenetration or inter— ref lection of their enhanced
differences at a more coherent aesthetic level in
which "... the hands take on some of the soft,
swathing and encircling qualities of the bandage, and
the bandage takes on the strength and adherence of the
hands" (Rothenberg, 1979, p. 257). Through this
interpenetrating reflection of opposites a genuinely
novel metaphoric identity is conceived which is para-
doxically reducible to "neither" the identity of the
hands "nor" the bandage either separately in discon-
tinuous conflict or together in a continuous additive
composition but rather is the simultaneous reintegra-
tion of their interdependent differences within the
greater context of aesthetic unity. The higher-order
commitment to a greater context of coherent meaning
compels the search for a metaphoric reintegration of
the paradoxically opposing categories. The second-
order figurative insight that is paradoxically invis-
ible to the other levels of interpretation is fully
visible through a metaphoric interpretation.
In the next example we reinterpret an experiment by
Piaget (1976, pp. 46-81) of how five to twelve year old
children come to fully equilibrate the paradoxical movement
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of a pingpong ball which is projected forward with backward
spin, so that it returns to its base once the forward motion
stops :
I* Global coordination (Piaget's equilibration stage IA)
.
The child's pushing and pulling finger action on the
ball are not differentiated. The ball magically
returns by itself.
II. Absolute differential coordination (Piaget's equili-
bration stage IB). The child's pushing is differenti-
ated to the neglect of pulling. The returning of the
ball is somehow connected with the child's pushing.
III. "Either/or" coordination (Piaget's equilibration
stages IIA to IIB) . The differentiation of the
child's pushing and pulling finger action leads to a
paradoxical conflict between the child's action and
the object's motion. The child's description of the
supposed forward roll of the ball is in contradiction
with the description of the actual pulling back of the
fingers which causes a backward spin on the ball. In
the beginning the subject distorts this conflict by
continuing to misperceive the motion of the ball as
rolling forward to the neglect of its forward slide
with a backward spin. As the child perceives how
their fingers pulling back action causes a back spin
on the ball the conflict between "either" the actual
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backward spin "or" the supposed forward roll in mutual
exclusion becomes apparent.
IV * "Both/and" coordination (Piaget's equilibration stage
IIB) . The further coordination of the child's pushing
and pulling leads to the reciprocal influence of the
child's action on the object's motion. The child
causally understands that the pushing and pulling
action results in "both" a sliding forward "and" a
sliding backward motion which are combined in continu-
ous succession by the turning around of the ball at
its furthest outreach. The ball successively spins
backward, slides forward, turns around and finally
slides back in one continuous movement.
V. "Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination (Piaget's equi-
libration stage III) . In the final coordination the
subject's pushing and pulling are understood as two
simultaneously opposing aspects of one cojunct action.
The movement of the ball is "neither" a sliding for -
ward "nor" a sliding backward in discontinuous con-
flict or continuous succession but rather the per-
ceived backward spin of the ball is simultaneously
reintegrated with the perception of the forward
sliding within the greater context of a singularly
conserved movement. We further maintain that the
child's higher order commitment to the meaningful
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coherence of the applied motion to the ball, implied
within the context of the experiment, compels the
search for a metaphoric resolution to the paradoxical
movement of the ball. The second—order cognitive
insight that is paradoxically invisible to the other
cognitive levels is fully visible through a metaphoric
reconstruction.
The final example is a reinterpretation according to
the metaphoric dialectic of the stages of dying taken from
Kubler-Ross ' s research with terminally ill patients (Kubler-
Ross, 1969). This example depicts how patients developmen-
tally coordinate the oppositional differences between their
attitudes of living versus dying to a final stage of accept-
ing dying as an integral part of living:
I. Global coordination (Kubler-Ross ' s stage 1A, shock).
"Oh no!" When the patients first receive the over-
whelming news of their terminally ill disease they go
into a state of shock, confusion and numbness.
II. Absolute differential coordination (Kubler-Ross '
s
stage IB, denial). "No, not me, it cannot be true."
The patients deny dying and cling to living. The
patients may maintain that there is a mistake in the
diagnosis or a case of mistaken identity. The aware-
ness of dying is isolated or split off from the
awareness of living. At one time the patients
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acknowledge dying and at another time unconsciously
forget it.
HI* "Either/or" coordination (Kiibler-Ross
' s stage 2,
anger). "Oh yes, it is me, it is not a mistake, but
why me?" The patients angrily confront the discon-
tinuity of the seemingly mutually exclusive conflict
that "either" they are dying "or" they are living .
The patients displace their anger with resentment that
others will remain healthy and alive while they must
die prematurely. God is a special target for the dis-
placed anger, since He is regarded as imposing, arbi-
trarily, the death sentence.
IV. "Both/and" coordination (Kiibler-Ross ' s stage, bargain-
ing). "Yes me, but." The patients accept "both" the
desire to live "and" the fact of dying but strike bar-
gains to postpone dying. They want the convenient
sequential continuity of first extending their life
then lastly facing the inevitability of death.
V. "Neither/nor" metaphoric coordination (Kubler-Ross '
s
stage 4, preparatory depression, stage 5, acceptance),
"yes, me ... my time is very close now and it's all
right." First the patients mourn past losses, things
not done, wrongs committed. But then they enter a
state of "preparatory depression," mournfully letting
go of all attachments and getting ready for the
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arrival of death. This preparatory phase of letting
go allows the second-order shift from bargaining to
the full acceptance of death. With acceptance there
is "neither" a clinging to life "nor" a postponement
of death . Kubler-Ross describes it as "not a happy
stage, but neither is it unhappy. It's devoid of
feelings but it's not resignation, it's really a vic-
tory" (1975, p . 10). The patients at this final stage
accept dying as an integral part of living. They
contemplate their coming end with a quiet expectation
that allows them to die with peace and dignity.
Throughout the stages and especially important for the
shift from bargaining through preparatory depression to ac-
ceptance the patients maintained a higher-order commitment
to a meaningful resolution to their conflict. This higher-
order commitment takes on many forms such as hoping for a
miracle cure by a greater power such as medical technology
or God or trusting in the greater fullness of life or the
fulfillment of God's greater will. Within the greater con-
text of this higher order commitment the patients came to
accept dying as a precondition for fully living.
Kiibler-Ross (1975, p. 145) further writes, "The stages
of dying that I have described apply equally to any signifi-
cant change (e.g., retirement, moving to a new city, chang-
ing jobs, divorce) in a person's life and change is a
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regular occurrence in human existence." We may experience
the stages of shock, denial, anger, bargaining and finally
creative acceptance of change for any significant change.
In a deep structural sense the stages of dying may be taken
as symbolic of all creative change. Kiibler-Ross along with
Imara (1975, pp. 147-167) writes that in order to creatively
change and grow we must continuously die to the old and be
reborn to the new, much as a caterpillar becomes a butter-
fly. Thus in coming to creatively accept our ultimate
physical death as the final stage of earthly growth we can
also learn to creatively accept the lesser symbolic death of
an old way of being or doing as a key to a new way of life.
We must die to stereotypical conditioning and societal
expectations that we may become more fully our uniquely
original selves. Furthermore the qualitative shift from the
destruction of an old form to the restructuring of a new
form requires creative courage especially when that form is
central to our self-construct. This creative courage is a
higher-order commitment to a more meaningfully coherent
resolution which allows detachment from the old conflicting
differences and the reintegration of a new form which
embraces the differences. We propose that the creative
process of symbolic death (de-structuring) and rebirth (re-
structuring) may be delineated and explicated according to
the metaphoric dialectic. The metaphoric dialectic
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maintains that we are simultaneously dying to the old and
being reborn to the new each moment but do not actively
realize this creative capacity. The five steps of the meta-
phoric dialectic offer a developmental path for realizing
the higher-order nature of our creativity . From the naive
global awareness of the incoherence of living and dying to
an old way of being (awakening of the urge for creative
change)
,
to the denial or neglect of the need to die to an
old way of being (resistance to creative change), to the
conflict of living versus dying for an old way of living
(confronting the inherent conflict of creative change) , to
the reductionistic compromise of postponing dying to the old
way of being (rationalizing away the conflict of creative
change)
,
to the final reintegration of dying to an old way
of being while simultaneously living or being reborn to a
new way of being (fully accepting the conflict of creative
change)
,
much as a baby dies to the womb of the mother and
is reborn to the mother's open embrace.
Rationale
The vital significance of the study of creativity for
education has been documented by various researchers
(Parnes, 1967) (Torrance, 1965, 1967) (Guilford, 1967).
Guilford stresses that the educational implications of crea-
tivity go beyond the mere transmission of the given culture
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with its growing problems to the transformation of culture
and the ongoing resolution of its societal problems.
Guilford states, Thus creativity is the key to education in
its fullest sense and to the solution of mankind's most
serious problems" (Guilford, 1967, p. 13).
Whitehead acclaims the fundamental epistemological im-
portance of creativity as, ".
. . the ultimate behind all
forms, inexplicable by forms, and conditioned by its crea-
tures . . . . ' Creativity ' is the universal of universals
characterizing ultimate matter of fact" (Whitehead, 1960,
pp. 30-31). Creativity as the "universal of universal"
epistemological form cannot be reduced to or explained by
other forms than its own. Rather creativity itself is the
fundamental epistemological form by which the creation of
all knowledge is explicated.
Concerning the epistemological genesis of novel crea-
tions Piaget writes
:
. . . I consider the main problem of genetic epistemol-
ogy to be the explanation of the construction of novel
—
ties in the development of knowledge. . . . The central
problem of genetic epistemology concerns the mechanism
of this construction. ... A great deal of work remains
to be done in order to clarify this fundamental process
of intellectual creation, which is found at all the
levels of cognition, from those of earliest childhood to
those culminating in the most remarkable of scientific
inventions (Piaget, 1971, pp. 77-78).
The main rationale for doing this dissertation is to "clari-
fy this fundamental process of intellectual creation," that
is, provide an explication of the epistemological mechanism
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of the construction of novelties by further abstracting the
metaphoric process inherent to the constructive theories of
Piaget and others.
Method of Inquiry
The method of this inquiry shall be the theoretical
construction and validation of a more epistemologically ade-
quate theory of the creative process. Various researchers
have proposed the need for a more comprehensive epistem-
ologically adequate theory of creativity rather than piece-
meal reductionistic approaches (Bateson, 1979) (Maslow,
1971, chapter 5) (Pascal-Leone, 1974, p. 89) (Piaget, 1970).
We shall construct an epistemologically comprehensive defi-
nition of the central paradox of the creative process and
propose a general metaphoric resolution. Literature con-
cerning the creative process of learning, production,
development and theory change shall be reviewed to further
exemplify the epistemological paradox of creativity in terms
of the polarization of theories into Reductionistic and
Holistic camps and the resolution of this paradoxical
controversy by various constructive theories which are
essentially metaphoric in nature.
The validity criteria for a more epistemologically
adequate theory of the creative process are: (1) the coher-
ent resolution of the paradox of the creative process
,
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(2) the generalizability of the resolution across the di-
verse domains of creative learning, production, development
and theory change as indicative of a higher order unitary
process with diverse expressions, and (3) the self-
consistency of the formulation of the "metaphoric theory"
with its own formulation of the "metaphoric process." More
concisely the criteria of conceptual validity are "coher-
ence," "comprehensiveness " (generalizability) and " self -
consistency . " In order to provide a "coherent resolution"
of the epistemological paradox of the creative process the
proposed theory shall account for both "genuine novelty" and
"explicable order" in the creative process. We shall pro-
pose a theory of creativity which coherently accounts for
both "genuine novelty" and an "explicable order" and is
general izable across diverse domains of creativity. Fur-
thermore this theory is self-consistent in that it is a
"metaphoric theory" about a "metaphoric process." Both the
"metaphoric theory" and the "metaphoric process" satisfy the
same metaphoric requirements of coherently integrating
oppositional differences. Just as the formulation of the
"metaphoric theory" is a coherent integration of the opposi-
tional differences of Holism and Peductionism the formula-
tion of the "metaphoric process" is a coherent integration
of the oppositional differences of conceptual opposites.
The self-consistency requirement allows us to explicate the
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metaphoric form of creativity according to its own metaphor-
ic form without reducing it to a lesser explanatory form
which is epistemologically inadequate (Whitehead, 1960, pp.
30-31) . Additionally we shall provide an interpretive
application of the metaphoric dialectic to various domain
examples to indicate its functional utility and empirical
corroboration. The goal of the proposed method of inquiry
is neither to "Reductionistically " eliminate nor "Holistic -
ally" mystify the fundamental paradox of the creative pro-
cess but rather to transformatively resolve and enhance the
paradox with a more elegant, metaphoric theory which is co-
herent, comprehensive and self-consistent.
CHAPTER I I
PROPOSAL OF THE PARADOX AND CONSTRUCTIVE
RESOLUTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
A central question concerning creative change is, "How
does genuinely novel knowledge come into being?" This
question has created a fundamental paradox in epistemology
and psychological theory (Kaplan 1981) (Piaget, 1971, pp
.
77-78) (Plato, Meno 80E; Jowett translation). To Plato be-
longs the classical statement of this paradox:
You argue that a man cannot enquire about that which he
knows or about that which he does not know; for if he
knows, he has no need to inquire; and if not, he cannot;
for he does not know the very subject about which he is
to inquire. (Plato, Meno 80E, Jowett translation)
This has been called the mystery/mastery complex by modern
psychologists (Kaplan, 1981) for it appears to be a mystery
as to how radically new knowledge is mastered.
Consider the following restatement of Plato's paradox
in terms of the creative process
:
We can neither inquire into the genuine creativity of
that which is already created nor into that which is not
yet created. If it is already created then all we can
do is make trivial recombinations and extensions which
are not genuinely novel. If it is not created in some
pre-existing form then it is created "ex nihilo" and
hence is a radical novelty resulting from happy coinci-
dence or mysterious inspiration into which we can not
further inquire. Hence we can neither inquire into the
genuine creativity of that which is already created for
it is merely a trivially novel composite nor into that
which is not created previously for it is an inexplic-
able radically novel gestalt.
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This paradox of the creative process may be further
elaborated in dilemma form:
The creative process is either continuous (Reductionism)
or discontinuous (Holism)
. If continuous then it is an
explicable but trivial extension or recombination of its
precedent. If discontinuous then it is a radical novel-
ty but inexplicably related to its precedent. There-
fore, the creative process is either a trivially novel
composite with an explicable transitional order or a
radically novel gestalt with an inexplicable transition-
al order.
This dilemma is similar to Zeno's dilemma of "motion"
in which the arrow either trivially never reaches the target
because it is always sequentially halfing the remaining dis-
tance (Reductionism) or it simultaneously merges with the
target and its transition is inexplicable (Holism) (Le Guin,
1975) .
The ancient controversy of "Reductionistic Continuity"
versus "Holistic Discontinuity" appears to represent comple-
mentary themes which cut across a variety of disciplines
concerned with the conceptualization of creative change such
as geology ( uniform! tarianism versus catastrophism)
,
physics
(uniform wave distribution versus indeterminate quantum
jumbs)
,
biology (gradual adaptation versus spontaneous muta-
tion)
,
political science (gradual progress versus revolu-
tion) and the history of science (accumulation of knowledge
versus paradigm shift) (Bochner, 1973) (Holton, 1973) . Most
recently Brim and Kagan (1980) have revived this controversy
with the new book. Constancy and Change in Human Development
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which argues that "continuity" and "discontinuity" are con-
venient cultural constructs not necessarily inherent to the
phenomena of human development itself.
Before going further it is important to clarify the
different conceptual implications of the "paradox" statement
and "dilemma" statement concerning the problematic nature of
the creative process. The dilemma is a "damned if you do,
darned if you don't" condition. Whether we conceptually
chose "continuity" or "discontinuity" we are caught by one
of the dilemma's horns of "trivial novelty" or "inexplicable
genesis." We suffer a negative consequence by either choice
but at least we have a choice. On the other hand the para-
dox rejects the limited choice and states neither possibil-
ity is tenable and thus provokes the search for a higher
order possibility which is a more adequate reconstruction of
the problem.
Given the logical soundness of the dilemma, ironical-
ly, both positions are "true" and correct in their respec-
tive criticisms of each other. However, their "either/or"
relationship becomes "false" with the arbitrary assumption
that the creative process is absolutely limited to a dicho-
tomous relationship between continuity and discontinuity
which is mutually exclusive and totally exhaustive. We re-
ject the absolute limitation of the dilemma and accept the
validity of the paradox which provokes the consideration of
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a higher order possibility which is not merely a "both/and"
compromise of middle range possibilities between the incom-
mensurate extremes of continuity and discontinuity but is a
genuine second-order reintegration of their irreducible
oppositional differences. This second-order possibility
which we shall term "constructive" creativity is neither
absolutely continuous nor absolutely discontinuous. Hence
it is neither a mere "trivial novelty" with an "explicable
generation" nor an absolute "radical novelty" with an "inex-
plicable generation. " Rather constructive creativity
escapes the horns of the dilemma of either "trivial novelty"
or an "inexplicable generation" by constructively harnessing
the paradoxical bull of a "genuinely novel structure" with
an "explicable generation."
The new definition of the theory of "constructive"
creativity is itself a "reconstruction" of the opposing
theories of "Reductionistic Continuity" and "Holistic Dis-
continuity." Hence the theory of constructive creativity is
self-consistently defined by its own process of constructive
creativity. This is not a vicious circularity but rather a
confirmation of the adequacy of the definition to account
for its own constructive creation. As Whitehead states
creativity is the "universal of universals" explanatory
forms (I960, p. 31). It cannot be reduced to a more funda-
mental explanation but rather must be explained in its own
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terms. In the review of literature we shall consider vari-
ous constructive theories of creativity from the domains of
learning, production, development and theory change which
represent a paradoxical reconstruction of the theoretical
dilemma of Reductionism versus Holism within their respec-
tive domain.
Piaget in conclusion to the Genetic Epistemology
stresses the fundamental importance of providing an explana-
tion for the construction of novelty, "... I consider the
main problem of genetic epistemology to be the explanation
of the construction of novelties in the development of know-
ledge" (Piaget, 1971, p. 77). Furthermore, the explanation
of novelty presents certain dilemmas concerning "genesis"
(Piaget, 1970, pp. 8-9) and the irreducible structural
property of knowledge (Piaget, 1970, pp. 60-62). Basically
these dilemmas elaborate the dilemma of the creative process
already presented. They are concerned with how to under-
stand the coming into being of genuinely novel structure
without reducing the creative process to a novelty which is
explicably trivial and structureless in genesis (Empiri-
cist)
,
trivial and nonexplainable by genesis (Nativist and
Maturationis t ) , or radical and inexplicable in genesis
(Radical Emergentist)
.
The empiricist explains novelty as the genesis of
atomistic associations. However this novelty is trivial and
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structureless. Piaget states, "From the empiricist point of
view, a 'discovery' is new for the person who makes it, but
what is discovered was already in existence in external
reality and there is therefore no construction of new
realities" (Piaget, 1971, p. 77).
The nativist and maturationis t assume the preformation
of structure. For instance, Plato posits universal ideas,
Kant--a priori ideas, Husserl—essences, and Chomsky—innate
syntactic laws genetically hard wired. However, these
structures are nonexplainable by genesis and hence are tri-
vial novelties with a predetermined nature. Piaget states,
"The nativist or a priorist maintains that the forms of
knowledge are predetermined inside the subject and thus
again, strictly speaking, there can be no novelty" (Piaget,
1971
,
p. 77) .
The vitalist and emergentist explain novelty in terms
of the radical emergence of new knowledge. For instance the
Gestaltists such as Kohler and Wertheimer assume the pre-
existence of perceptual and cognitive wholes which emerge in
totality from a complex field without preparatory genesis.
This process is equivalent to the radical emergence of a
preformed hidden figure from a figure/ground complex. Now
you don't see it, now you do. Concerning the Gestaltist
Piaget writes, ". . .by viewing the whole as prior to its
elements or contemporaneous with their 'contact,' they
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simplified the problem to such an extent as to risk bypass-
ing the central questions—questions about the nature of a
whole's laws of composition" (Piaget, 1971, p. 8). For the
"radical emergent" theory of Foucault's archeology of ideas
Piaget writes, "The message of this 'archaeology' of reason
is, in short, that reason's self-transformations have no
reason and that its structures appear and disappear by for-
tuitous mutations and as a result of momentary upsurges
"
(Piaget, 1971, p. 134). Piaget further likens this fortui-
tous process to the early vitalist theories of evolution.
Hence the theories of emergence reduce the creative process
to a radical novelty which is either inexplicable or left
unexplained.
In contrast to the previous theories Piaget writes
concerning constructivism:
. . . for the genetic epistemologist
,
knowledge results
from continuous construction, since in each act of
understanding, some degree of invention is involved; in
development, the passage from one stage to the next is
always characterized by the formation of new structures
which did not exist before, either in the external world
or in the subject's mind. The central problem of gene-
tic epistemology concerns the mechanism of this con-
struction of novelties . . . (Piaget, 1971, pp. 77-78)
Hence for Piaget the creative process is essentially char-
acterized by a genuinely novel structure which did not
previously exist in the world or the subject's mind and an
explicable mechanism of genesis. For Piaget this explicable
mechanism of construction is a dialectical process of
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"equilibration" or "reflexive abstraction. " Piaget dis-
tinguishes the dialectics of equilibration from the Hegelian
dialectic (Vuyk, 1981, pp. 183-4). Whereas the Hegelian
dialectic is concerned with the clash of opposites and their
synthesis the Piagetian dialectic is more concerned with the
fusion of integrated differences which may not necessarily
clash. For example, according to Piaget numbers are con-
structed by the integrative fusion of the different schemes
of class-inclusion and ordering. This "fusion" of two
different but nonclashing schemes creates an integration of
differences which goes beyond the characteristics of the
previous relation of the schemes. Hence genuinely novel
structures are constructed by the explicable mechanism of
dialectical equilibration. Furthermore, according to Piaget
all structures are fundamentally characterized as logico-
mathematical (Piaget, 1971, Chapter II).
Thus far we have reviewed the fundamental problematic
nature of the creative process in terms of the paradox and
falsely limiting dilemma that it presents for theorists. We
have proposed a theory of constructive creativity which
escapes the horns of the "false dilemma" of "trivial novel-
ty" and "inexplicable sequential genesis." Negatively
defined constructive creativity is the generation of genuine
novelty which is neither reducible to the trivial novelty of
repetition, displacement, recombination, extension,
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addition, cumulation, or discovery nor the opposing terms of
radical novelty such as rupture, replacement, mutation,
emergence, substitution, sporadic episode, or invention.
Positively defined constructive creativity resolves the
paradox of creativity by proposing the essential precondi-
tions of both ""genuinely novel structure" and an "explic-
able genesis." We shall next consider the functional nature
of this explicable order.
The Second-Order Resolution of
the Paradox of Creativity
-
As Piaget states constructive creativity is essentially
a second-order process of reconstructing previous structures
or recreating previous creations (Piaget, 1972, p. 17).
This second-order process of recreating does not merely
actualize a given potential for creativity but rather dynam-
ically creates new potential for creativity. Furthermore,
according to Piaget constructive creativity is an "interac-
tive" relation between the subject and environment (Piaget,
1969, pp. 703-4). Recreating our relation with our environ-
ment, personal or impersonal, is the " central act " of crea-
tivity. Through the central act of recreating our relation
with our environment we and our environment are recreated.
This recreating is not a creation ex nihilo, rather it is a
recreation of a previous creation. Moreover, it is not the
mere discovery of pre-existing patterns, rather it is the
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recovery and reconstruction of patterns through interacting
with our environment.
Next we will examine how second-order recreating is
constructed through and beyond first-order creating. First-
order creating constitutes the creative possibilities for
change within a first-order system. Second-order recreating
constitutes the recreating or expanding of the creative pos-
sibilities of the first-order system. Second-order recreat-
ing opens up the possibility of new possibilities that did
not exist previously. Hence the second-order recreating
appears paradoxically impossible from the perspective of
first-order creating because a new order of possibilities is
opened up. Genuine creativity is not merely a matter of low
probability or low frequency but rather is an impossible
second-order occurrence unpredictable in its originality
from first-order antecedent conditions. Hence we can begin
to account for the qualitative discontinuous changes in
"aha" experiences, cognitive transitions and paradigm shifts
in science in terms of second-order recreating. This
second-order recreating is not a linear sequential ordering
of trivial novelty nor an inexplicable rupture of radical
novelty but rather an explicable second-order of genuine
novelty. The full explanation of this second-order recreat-
ing will need to await our consideration of dialectics and
metaphor.
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Figure 1. Nine dot problem.
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A simple example of second—order recreating is given
by Watzlawick (1974, p. 24) in terms of the nine dot problem
(see figure 1) . The problem is to connect the nine dots by
four straight lines without lifting the pencil from the
paper. The reader who is not familiar with this problem may
find it instructive to try the solution on a piece of paper
before reading on, and especially before turning to the
solution (see Figure 2).
As Watzlawick states:
Almost everybody who first tries to solve this problem
introduces as part of his problem-solving an assumption
which makes the solution impossible. The assumption is
that the dots compose a square and that the solution
must be found within that square, a self-imposed condi-
tion which the instructions do not contain. His fail-
ure, therefore, does not lie in the impossibility of the
task, but in his attempted solution. (1974, p. 25)
Hence, based on a limited interpretation of this open ended
problem the problem solver may try all the possible combina-
tions within the square and yet always finish with one un-
connected dot. This means that all the first-order creative
possibilities generated by this limited interpretation are
insufficient to resolve the problem. Furthermore, as
Watzlawick states the attempted solution has become the
problem and merely attempting more of the same first-order
change keeps one from recreating the problem which is neces-
sary for the resolution. Through sensitivity to and a re-
construction of the conflicting ambiguity of the instruc-
tions concerning the limits of the solution within the self-
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Figure 2. The solution of the nine-dot problem.
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imposed square versus not just within the square there is a
shift from attempting impossible first-order problem solu-
tions to constructing possible second— order problem resolu-
tions. This second-order shift represents a breaking out of
the square of inadequate possibilities into a new field of
possibilities outside the square. The possibility of new
possibilities is opened up with the second-order "reframing"
of the problem and hence resolution becomes possible at this
new more inclusive level.
As Watzlawick states
:
The analogy between this and many a real-life situation
is obvious. We have all found ourselves caught in com-
parable boxes, and it did not matter whether we tried to
find the solution calmly and logically or, as is more
likely, ended up running frantically around in circles.
But, as mentioned already, it is only from inside the
box, in the first-order change perspective, that the
solution appears as a surprising flash of enlightenment
beyond our control. In the second-order change perspec-
tive it is a simple change from one set of premises to
another of the same logical type. The one set includes
the rule that the task must be solved within (assumed)
square; the other does not. In other words, the solu-
tion is found as a result of examining the assumptions
"about" the dots, not the dots themselves. (Watzlawick,
1974
, pp. 25-6) .
Through a second-order reframing of the ambiguous opposi-
tional differences of the assumptions "about" the limiting
square of dots versus the nonlimiting dots "themselves" a
new field of possibilities is opened up which integrates the
inner square with the outer expanse. What is impossible
from the first-order assumed possibilities becomes possible
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with a second-order reframing of the ambiguous terms of the
problem. For a further discussion of how the exploration
and reframing of inherent ambiguities in the meaning of sup-
posedly absolute terms such as "parallel lines" and "solid
mass" may lead to new higher order creations such as non-
Euclidean geometry and the mathematical equivalence of
"mass" and "energy" with Einstein's E=mc see Bronowski
(1971, pp. 126-128) .
We may conclude that constructive creativity as a
second-order process of recreating (reconstructing) the in-
herent conflictive ambiguities of first-order structures is
neither trivially novel nor inexplicably radical. Rather
constructive creativity resolves the paradox of creativity
by opening up the possibility of new possibilities with a
genuinely novel structure which is explicable by a second-
order process. What is paradoxically impossible from the
combinatorial possibilities of the first-order becomes
explicably possible and genuinely novel with the second-
order transformation of constructive creativity.
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE PARADOX AND CONSTRUCTIVE
RESOLUTION OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
In this chapter we shall examine how theories of crea-
tive learning, creative production, cognitive development
and scientific theory change have fallen prey to the false
dilemma of the creative process as either "trivial novelty"
( Reduct ionism) or "inexplicable radical novelty" (Holism).
Furthermore, we shall examine how the paradox of this false
dilemma is resolved by various theorists with constructive
models of the creative process. The main purpose of this
review of literature is to show that essentially all the
constructive resolutions of genuine creativity involve the
functional coordination of first-order opposites leading to
a second-order reintegration of the opposites .
More specifically in section "A" we shall review how
the Romantic open school and the traditional cultural trans-
mission school have reduced "creative learning" to either
radical self-knowledge or trivial conditioning respectively.
Then we shall consider how the Progressive school inclusive-
ly resolves the paradoxical one-sidedness of the preceding
theories with constructive theories of learning such as
Duckworth's (1979) which proposes the constructive interplay
of conflicting differences between perceptions, actions, and
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words and Petrie's (1979) which proposes the constructive
interaction of metaphoric words and applied actions in tri-
angulating anomalies.
In section "B" we shall review how the psychological
theories of Behaviorism, Neo-Freudian and Gestaltism have
reduced "creative production" to trivial remote association,
radical irrational production, and radical emergent produc-
tion respectively. Then we shall consider how the paradoxi-
cal one-sidedness of the preceding theories is resolved by
constructive theories of creative production such as Koest-
ler's (1969) which proposes the coordination of the oppo-
sites of bisociation or the intersection of incompatible
frames of reference which generate multiple levels of meta-
phoric insight and Rothenberg's (1979a) which proposes the
active conception of opposites simultaneously in the Janu-
sian thought processes and the assisting of homospatial
processes which generate new metaphoric integrations of the
Janusian opposites.
In section "C" we shall review how the developmental
theories of the Maturationists and Behaviorists have reduced
creative development to either radical spontaneous unfold-
ment or trivial incremental accumulation. Then we shall
consider how the developmental theory of Piaget (1972) in-
clusively resolves the paradoxical one—sidedness of the
preceding theories with a constructive theory of development
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which proposes the progressive equilibration of asynchronous
schemes leading to a second-order reconstruction.
In section "D" we shall review how the theories of
scientific change of the Logical Positivist and the Histori-
cal Gestaltist have reduced scientific theory change to
either a trivial incremental change or a radical gestalt
shift. Then we shall consider how the paradoxical one-
sidedness of the preceding theories is resolved by construc-
tive theories of "theory change" such as Kuhn's revised
theory (1977) which proposes the "essential tension" between
old and new paradigms and propaedentic role of thought ex-
periments in exposing and harnessing the paradoxical anoma-
lies of old paradigms and Hesse's (1980) which proposes the
functional explanation of metaphor to account for the neces-
sary conflict of meaning in theory change.
Creative Learning
In this section on creative learning we raise the
question, "How is it possible to learn something genuinely
new?" We shall consider this question of creative learning
in terms of Plato's Paradox:
You agree that a man cannot inquire either about that
which he knows or about that which he does not know; for
if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he
cannot; for he does not know the very subject about
which he is to inquire. (Plato, Meno 80E; Jowett trans-
lation)
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This is a classical statement of the essential paradox of
the creative process posed in terms of the learning of new
knowledge. In terms of this paradox genuinely new learning
is reduced to either some trivial form of new learning such
as rote memorization or more generally associative learning
which is just a trivial extension however complex of what we
already know or some radical form of new learning such as
inspiration or more general gestalt types of learning which
emerge suddenly and totally without explainable precedence.
The Traditional and Romantic Schools
The educator's quest for intelligible principles and
techniques for understanding, stimulating and guiding the
creative learning process has become polarized by this
dilemma into two groups : the Traditional teacher-centered
classroom with its externally reinforced learning and
emphasis on cultural transmission and the Romantic student-
centered classroom with its subjective freedom for personal
discovery and emphasis on individuation. The image of the
first classroom is that the pupil is an empty vessel pas-
sively waiting to be filled with new knowledge from the
master teacher. The opposite image of the second classroom
is that the pupil is a flower which the teacher waters but
all the growing and learning comes from within. In other
words the teacher may supply the pupil with what he is al-
ready interested in but the pupil is his own teacher and
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learning takes place through an internal process of self-
discovery. These two extreme theories appear to create an
unbridgeable dichotomy between the learning of new knowledge
as a passive impression imposed externally and as a subjec-
tive experience personally discovered from within.
The extreme one-sidedness of either of these theories
renders them incapable of explaining or developing an ade-
quate pedagogy for genuine creativity. The "traditional"
school eliminates genuine creative learning and replaces it
with rote- memorization which is externally reinforced by the
authority of the teacher. The "free" school practically
eliminates the teacher and reduces creative learning to a
vague subjective process of following one's inner impulses.
Plato's paradox indicates that if we only have what we sub-
jectively know then how can we know what we don't already
know, unless we admit unexplainable radical learning result-
ing from mysterious intuition. In this case the paradox is
created by the conceptually contrived split between the sub-
jective and objective worlds. In other words the Rousseau-
ian pupil cannot get out of his subjective world to learn
what is objectively new. How can we intelligibly bridge
this conceptual gap between the extremes of the externally
determined objective world of the "traditional school and
the self-directed subjective world of the "Free" school?
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(For a related paradoxical problem of "freedom" versus "dis-
cipline" in education see Schumacher (1979, pp. 120-128).
Neither school alone is able to account for truly cre-
ative learning because of their conceptual inadequacies.
Both perspectives of the inner and outer world are partially
valid and necessary for a genuine theory of creativity. The
question remains as how to conceptually accommodate both
these contrasting views into an interactive theory of
(genuine creative) learning that goes beyond merely objec-
tive rote memorization or subjective imagination.
Because we have presented a very concise review of the
distinguishing qualities of the Romantic and Traditional
schools it might be argued that we have contrived a simplis-
tic polarization which serves as an easily demolished
strawman not really true to the complex nature of either
theory. The purpose of the review is not to provide an
exhaustive account of the complexities and variations of
each theory but to focus on the essential qualities of each
and to show that these essential qualities when consistently
applied result in a false dilemma which is incapable of re-
solving the paradox of creative learning. Eclectic theories
which merely mix both qualities of the Romantic and Tradi-
tional theories result in epistemologically confused the-
ories of learning which are inconsistent with themselves.
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The Progressive School
Kohlberg and Mayer (1972, pp. 449-93) in "Development
as the Aim of Education" offer a third educational ideology,
"progressive," following Dewey (1938) which resolves the
dilemma of the Traditional school's trivially new complex
learning versus the Romantic school's radically new but un-
explainable learning. Kohlberg and Mayer quote Dewey:
Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages
in the development of the psychical functions can insure
the full maturing of the psychical powers. Education is
the work of supplying the conditions which will enable
the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to
mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and
fullest manner. (Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 207).
Kohlberg and Mayer go on to comment:
In the progressive view, this aim requires an education-
al environment that actively stimulates development
through the presentation of resolvable but genuine prob-
lems or conflicts. For progressives, the organizing and
developing force in the child's experience is the
child's active thinking, and thinking is stimulated by
the problematic, by cognitive conflict. Educative ex-
perience makes the child think--think in ways which
organize both cognition and emotion. Although both the
cultural transmission and the progressive views empha-
size "knowledge," only the latter sees the acquisition
of "knowledge" as an active change in patterns of think -
ing (italicized) brought about by experiential problem-
solving situations. (1972, pp. 454-5)
For progressives genuinely new learning is "an active
change in patterns of thinking" which arises through cogni-
tive conflict with problematic situations. Where the tradi-
tional cultural transmissionists are primarily concerned
with the content of the "patterns of thinking" the progres-
sives are concerned with second-order recreating of the
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"patterns of thinking" themselves. This second-order re-
creating of the "patterns of thinking" is genuinely new
since it entails an abrupt and total restructuring of the
thinking process which cannot be accounted for by gradual,
piecemeal, associative chaining. However, this second-order
creative learning is not radically unexplainable from previ-
ous learning. Rather it arises from the recreating of the
previous "pattern of thinking. " Furthermore the locus of
emergence is from cognitive conflict with a problematic
situation which challenges the old "patterns of thinking.
"
The Progressive School According to Duckworth
Duckworth (1979, pp . 297-312) offers a restatement of
the creative learning dilemma in terms of applying Piaget's
theory of cognitive development to education and provides
several excellent examples of genuinely creative learning in
the progressive sense. The dilemma as Duckworth states it
is, "Either We're Too Early and They Can't Learn It or We're
Too Late and They Know It Already ..." (1979, p. 297)
.
For Duckworth this dilemma of matching a specific closed
ended learning task with a diagnosed level of readiness is
futile not only because of the unmanageable complexities of
adequately accessing the child's readiness but because it
rests on falsely limiting assumptions about what "It" is and
how "It" is they should learn. (The "It" refers to new
knowledge.) Whereas American educators, especially of the
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cultural transmission ideology, are primarily
concerned with how fast we can help intelligence grow,
"
Piaget is more concerned with "how far we can help it grow"
(1979, p. 303)
.
Whereas the cultural transmissionists
attempt to engineer complex learning tasks that externally
reinforced preset rules of learning the progressivist a la
Duckworth style provide open ended problems which challenge
the child to generate their own new rules of learning. For
Duckworth's open ended tasks the child is neither too early
to learn it nor too late and already knows it. Rather they
find their own optimum level of entry from which to explore
multiple paths of resolution. This stimulates the child to
"think of thinking about" the problem in alternative ways
and to generate new questions and rules from the interaction
of these alternative interpretations. These various inter-
pretations may result from "the interplay among the various
access routes to knowledge--perception , actions, and words
or formulas" (Duckworth, 1979, p. 311) . The interplay
between these various accesses broadens and deepens the
child's knowledge.
The process of stimulating the child to "think of
thinking about" the task in alternative conflicting inter-
pretations which broaden and deepen the child' s knowledge is
well illustrated by a learning experiment of Greco's (1959)
as cited by Duckworth (1979, pp. 301-3). The task set-up
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consisted of three colored beads, black, white, and red,
threaded on a stick and inserted into a tube from left to
right. Through clinical interviewing questions were posed
to stimulated cognitive conflict. The children were asked
if red goes in first, which color is at the right-hand end;
if the tube is rotated 180 degrees which color is at the
right-hand end, if the tube is rotated 180 degrees twice
which color is at the right-hand end? Of course the ques-
tion which generated the cognitive conflict concerned the
double rotation since it brought the tube back to the origi-
nal position with no change as opposed to the single rota-
tion which reversed the order of the beads. The children
were stimulated to think of thinking about why the double
rotation and single rotation were opposite and why the
double rotation and nonrotation were the same. The learning
experiment was carried out with four and five-year-olds who
did not initially understand the relationship between the
number of rotations and the positions of the beads.
Duckworth contrasts the children who trivially learn
the rule for double rotation with a child who genuinely
learns the rule
:
Since the data are so simple, all the children finally
do manage to get the rule. But for many of them, the
rule for double rotation remains just that--a rule.
They see no sense in it. The one rule they understand
is that, when the tube is turned once, the color changes
.
The double- rotation is learned only as an exception to
this rule, for some reason when you turn it twice, it
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doesn't change. It is not a matter of changing twice,
and thus coming back to the original position. It is—
for some inexplicable reason— a matter of not changing
at all. The rule is formulated and remembered without
understanding
.
Other children do come to understand, but their un-
derstanding is clearly the result of their own struggle
to make sense of the data. Dan (5 years, 5 months)
makes six wrong predictions in seven items of double
rotation. He himself counts his mistakes on his fin-
gers, and he declares, "I still made six mistakes."
"You haven't got it yet?" "No, because when you turn
once, I know it changes color; but when you turn two
times, it's the same color, so I don't get it." At the
next session, the whole series is answered correctly,
and Dan exclaims: "Oh yeah, when you turn two times
it's the same color 1" At the end of the session, Greco
asks him why. "Because the black that came there (to
the left end) comes back here (to the right end) when
you turn it the second time" (Greco, 1959, p. 129)
(Duckworth, 1979, pp. 301-2).
In this learning experiment Dan's conceptual predic-
tion is in conflict with his perceptual assessment of the
double rotation. In the beginning this discrepancy no doubt
evokes surprise but with repetition the surprise gives way
to a memorized rule for the double rotation. Forman and
Fosnot (1982, pp. 196-7) explain that mere surprise is not
in itself sufficient (as this case also illustrates) to pro-
voke cognitive restructuring. Rather the child must exper-
ience" the task as a paradox unresolvable from the "given"
rules and structures of understanding. Dan s learning of a
verbal rule was not sufficient to resolve this paradox. He
"hadn't gotten it yet." He had merely learned the verbal
rule for double rotation as an exception to the rule for the
single rotation. The paradoxical conflict between the
60
verbal rule that he memorized and his conceptual understand-
ing brought him to the self-realization, "I don't get it."
He was still grappling with the discrepancy of how it is
possible for a double rotation to not change the order of
the beads when only a single rotation totally reverses the
order. How can the beads be rotated so much yet remain
the same as before ?
By the beginning of the next session he had made a
second-order shift in his understanding of the rule. Dan
had creatively gone beyond making correct predictions to a
deepened understanding of why it "ought" to be that way.
This new knowledge incorporated both the verbal formula
which represented the perceptual assessment of the double
rotation and his initial conceptual prediction into a new
integrated scheme which was transferable to similar tasks.
According to Duckworth, in a later series of experiments
Greco showed that those who accomplished the second-order
learning were better able to transfer their learning to
similar tasks than those who merely memorized the rule.
In the first-order verbal learning the children merely
learned the double rotation as an exception to the rule of
the single rotation. In the second-order learning Dan
learned the rule for the exception to the rule of the first
order rule.
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Second-order creative learning is not merely the
learning of new rules as the traditional cultural transmis-
sionists propose. Rather it is the learning of second-order
rules for the exceptions to the 1st order rules which result
from paradoxical conflicts in their interpretation and
application . Dan "got it" when he made this second-order
creative learning. This second-order creative "got it with
understanding" resolves and goes beyond the dilemma posed by
the first-order associatively chained "it" of the tradition-
alists and the inexplainable "aha" of the Romanticist.
The Progressive School According to Petrie
Another proponent of the progressive school, Petrie,
offers the following response to the dilemma of creative
learning.
It can be claimed that the very possibility of learning
something radically new can only be understood by pre-
supposing the operation of something very much like
metaphor. This is not just the heuristic claim that
metaphors are often useful in learning, but the epistem-
ic claim that metaphor, or something like it, renders
intelligible the acquisition of new knowledge. (Petrie,
1979, p. 439)
.
He further indicates the constructive nature of metaphor:
"Thus understanding the process involved in construing meta-
phor is what makes intelligible the ability to learn some
thing new while admitting we must always start with what and
how we already know" (Petrie, 1979, p. 461)
.
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According to Petrie most learning occurs within a
"context of rules or schemata" (Petrie, 1979, p. 442) and
genuinely novel learning changes the context of understand-
ing itself. Thus genuinely novel learning is a second-order
recontextualizing of the first-order rules or schemata of
learning. Furthermore, metaphor or something functionally
like it is used to perform the second-order recontextuali za-
tion of learning. For example, from the point of view of
the student just beginning atomic physics, the metaphor,
"the atom is a miniature solar system" may create a new con-
text for understanding both the atom and the solar system.
The literal interpretation of the metaphor creates an anom-
aly which either can or cannot be assimilated to the stu-
dent's cognitive structure. If it can be assimilated to the
student's pre-existing cognitive structures then it is mere-
ly a comparative metaphor (or first-order learning) which
extends or transfers the literal features and analogical
relations of the orbits of the sun to the orbits of the
atom. However, if it cannot be assimilated its anomalous
character may entail an interactive recreating of the cogni-
tive relation of the atom and solar system. For the inter-
active metaphor the similarities between "atom" and "solar
system" are not pre-existing. Rather the similarities are
created and restructed through the interaction of both the
concept of "atom" and the concept of "solar system. " This
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interaction leads to a second-order recreating of the anom-
alous contextual relation of "atom” and "solar system" into
a genuinely new metaphoric context of understanding. This
new expanded metaphoric context incorporates both "atom" and
"solar system" into a higher order cognitive integration
without losing their distinctiveness.
According to Petrie the creative process of learning
something genuinely new in science is similar to the way
that a scientist resolves the anomalies of the traditional
paradigm with a new metaphoric exemplar or model. Petrie
states :
The main difference between the scientist on the fron-
tiers of knowledge and the student is that in the
student's case the metaphor provided by the teacher, if
it is a good one, is likely to be more immediately help-
ful than are the variants tried out by the scientist.
(Petrie, 1979, p. 445).
The student's learning of relevant scientific metaphors is a
reenactment of the creative process the scientist used to
make the original discovery.
Stressing the interactive nature of metaphor Petrie
offers five steps in the contriving of an educational meta-
phor which leads to new knowledge:
1. Sensing the problematic situation or anomaly.
2. Providing the appropriate metaphor.
Conceiving the problematic situation in terms of the
provided metaphor.
3 .
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4. Acting on the problematic situation in terms of the new
metaphoric characterization.
5. Modifying the provided metaphor to find a better fit.
These steps may be exemplified with the creative learning of
the scientific metaphor of "frames of reference. " The stu-
dent is initially introduced to the two opposing conditions
that on earth a chair may be understood as not moving yet
the chair is on the earth's surface and the earth is moving,
so isn't the chair moving. How can the chair be moving and
not moving at the same time becomes the anomaly. Of course
it is only an anomaly to the student provided the student
understands both of the conditions separately, and together
is not able to resolve the discrepancy given his current
conceptual scheme. To intensify the discrepancy the anoma-
lous situation may be generalized to other examples such as
how can a book be at rest on the seat of a car yet moving
from the point of view of someone outside the car. Next the
student is provided with the metaphor, "frame of reference."
Thirdly the anomalous situation is conceived in terms of the
metaphor as "the book's moving and not moving seem strange
only because the book is being observed from two different
frames of reference." Fourthly, to creatively grasp the im-
plications of the metaphor and not merely memorize a verbal
formula the student will need to interact with the anomalous
situation using the new metaphor as a guide. This may
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require thought experiments in imaging the chair on the
earth's surface and the book on the car's seat as moving.
Or it may lead to an actual experiment of riding in a car
with a book. Driving up a steep hill may cause the book to
slide back on the seat. However from the frame of reference
of the outsider the car may merely appear to have moved
forward to where the book was. This discrepancy between the
"book falling back on the seat"and "the car lunging forward"
will demand that the student decenter from his own frame of
reference and recognize the outside frame of reference also.
This may be further clarified with the thought experiment of
riding upward in an elevator and dropping a book. Does the
book fall or does the floor of the elevator merely rise?
Through the student's guided interaction provided by the
metaphor of "frames of reference" with the anomalous situa -
tion of "dropping" a book in a "rising" elevator genuine new
knowledge is generated which resolves the anomaly. The stu-
dent may say, "Ah, it depends on how you look at it."
This interactive process is more than the literal ap-
plication of the explicit definition of "frame of reference"
which assumes the student already grasps the concept of
"frame of reference" as an alternative point of view.
Rather it is a metaphoric application of the partial under-
standing of "frame of reference" which is reconstructed in
the process of interacting with the anomalous situation.
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Essentially this is a process of triangulating the anomalous
experience with the conceived metaphor and applied action.
This interactive process of metaphoric construction of new
knowledge may be judged not according to its truth or fals-
ity but rather according to its success in resolving the
anomaly
.
Duckworth and Petrie in Comparison
Both Duckworth and Petrie propose interactive second-
order processes of resolving cognitive conflict and con-
structing new knowledge. Duckworth stresses the construc-
tive interplay of differences between perceptions, actions,
and words in resolving cognitive conflict while Petrie
similarly stresses the interaction of metaphoric words and
applied actions in triangulating the anomaly. For Duckworth
the constructive interplay of differences broadens and deep-
ens knowledge while similarly for Petrie the interaction of
metaphor and applied actions expands the context of know-
ledge. For Duckworth the broadening and deepening of know-
ledge causes the child to "think of thinking about the
world" in new ways. For example in Greco's learning experi-
ment Dan learned to think of a new rule to the exception of
the old rule of thinking. Specifically he learned to simul-
taneously coordinate the opposition of the changing order of
the beads with a single rotation with the nonchanging order
of the beads with a double rotation in terms of the second-
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order novel construction of the reversibility of double
rotation. For Petrie the expanded context of knowledge is
termed a new metaphoric construction. For example the
physics student learned to simultaneously coordinate the
opposition of the falling book with the rising elevator in
terms of the second-order metaphor of the relativity of the
double frame of reference .
Both Duckworth and Petrie propose functionally similar
processes of constructing second-order knowledge. We may
term this creative learning process the paradoxical inter-
play of differences between perceptions, actions and words
through which a second-order reintegration of these differ-
ences is constructed.
Creative Production
In this section on creative production we raise the
question, "How is it possible to produce something genuinely
new?" We shall consider this question in terms of the
dilemma of the creative process. Various psychologists in
their quest for theoretical principles and techniques for
understanding, stimulating and controlling creative produc-
tion have fallen prey to the false dichotomy of this dilem-
ma. They have either reduced creative production to a tri-
vial process of remote association of pre-existing, hidden
similarities (Behaviorists) , or a radical involuntary state
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of regression during which totally new ideas may irrational-
ly emerge from the unconscious (Neo-Freudians), or a radical
gestalt shift of abrupt and total appearance of a new pro-
duction without explicable genesis (Gestaltist)
. We shall
contrast the indequacies of these three psychological
theories and present two other alternatives consistent with
the constructive definition of creative production.
The Behaviorists According to Mednick
According to Mednick of the behaviorist school an
associative interpretation of creativity may be given as
follows
:
We may proceed to define the creative thinking process
as the forming of associative elements into new combina-
tions which either meet specified requirements or are in
some way useful. The more mutually remote the elements
of the new combination, the more creative the process or
solution. (Mednick, 1962, p. 221)
From this perspective creative production is the making of
new combinations with remote association. Hence creativity
is generally reduced to the uncovering of hidden similari-
ties or terms of mediation between elements which are not
frequently associated. For instance Mednick has developed a
test for measuring this ability called the Remote Associate
Task (RAT)
,
which is based on the ability to find a particu-
lar associate that is related on a purely associative basis
to each of three words which are presented (e.g., (1) rat,
blue, cottage; (2) go, poke, molasses; (3) teen, heart,
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cookies. Answers: (1) cheese, (2) slow, (3) sweet.) Ac-
cording to Mednick the ability to find remote or obscure
similarities between these terms is a measure of creative
production. Mednick theorizes that the ability to fluently
generate multiple associates to each word increases the
likelihood of deriving a continuous chain of associations
which lead to a remote association.
From this behaviorist perspective creative production
is specifically reduced to measures of associative fluency
and uniqueness. Associative fluency is the ability to re-
combine elements in multiple ways or the ability to break
old connections and make new connections and associative
uniqueness refers to the ability to find combinations which
are remote or statistically infrequent. Hence creative pro-
duction is essentially a process of producing large quan-
tities of associations from which may be derived various
continuous chains which lead to remote associations with
pre-existing attributes of similarity. The content of these
remote associates are judged to be unique based on some sta-
tistical measure of frequency of selection. While the num-
ber and length of these continuous associative chains may be
quite large and complex they are unable to adequately
account for qualitatively discontinuous productions such as
the abrupt emergence of full blown insights from periods of
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incubation. For an account of these discontinuous produc-
tions we turn to the Neo-Freudian school.
The Neo-Fredudians According to Kris
The Neo-Freudian School as expounded by Kris attempts
to explain creative production as a "regression in the ser-
vice of the ego."
Central to artistic--or indeed, any other— creativeness,
is a relaxation ("regression") of ego functions. The
word "fantasy" conveys just this disregard of external
stringencies in its reference to the process and product
of creative imagination. In fantasy and dreams, in
states of intoxication and fatigue, such functional
regression is especially prominent; in particular, it
characterizes the process of inspiration. (Kris, 1952,
p. 253)
The inspiration process appears similar to the other regres-
sive processes; however, in "creative" regression the ego is
not overwhelmed by the id forces while the other forms of
regression are. Hence, Kris has identified it as "regres-
sion in service of the ego" because of its adaptive func-
tion .
May (1980, pp. 36-7) argues that the concept of "re-
gression in the service of the ego" reduces creativity to a
lesser process associated with neurosis. Kubie (1975)
argues that the primary processes of the unconscious tends
toward instinctual fixations and biases which are not con-
ducive to the clear flexibility of the creative process.
Arieti makes the following criticism of Kris's theory:
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My main difficulty in accepting Kris’s formulations con-
cerns the way he tries to explain how this "service of
the ego" takes place. To me, it is not enough to say
that such mechanisms as displacement and condensation
occur or are made congruous with ego functions; we must
understand how this congruity is carried out. (Arieti
1976, p. 24)
Kris fails to give a functional account of the interaction
of the ego and the primary processes. Hence the production
of creative insights is no more clear than the production of
dreams. Furthermore the functional dynamics of how the pri-
mary processes such as condensation, displacement, and
symbolism constructively coordinate to produce a dream or
insight are not explained. Rather creative insights appear
to sporadically emerge full blown and radically shift like
episodic dream sequences.
The Gestaltists According to Wertheimer
Gestaltists such as Wertheimer (1945) offer a struc-
tural account of the sudden total emergence of insight solu-
tions. Wertheimer argues that the structure of a solution
is a gestalt whole which is more than the sum of the given
parts. Furthermore this gestalt structure is pre-existent
to or co- temporaneous with the parts it forms. Problem
solving begins with a "problem" which has an unstable
gestalt structure. The problem is solved when the unstable
structure of the problem radically shifts to a more stable
structural solution. This radical shift is exemplified in
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the equivocal figural gestalt of a profiled vase (see Figure
3) . We shall assume that the initial condition for this
visual problem is the unstable perception of the equivoca-
tion as a "vase." With the visual search for a more stable
structure tension builds up in the unstable structure until
suddenly a radical gestalt shift occurs resulting in the
more stable perception of the "profiled faces." With this
abrupt shift a new way of perceiving the gestalt yields
radically new insights not previously seen from the previous
unstable structure.
Piaget (1971, p. 8) criticizes the Gestaltist for
assuming the greater whole (more stable structure) pre-
exists in the greater field prior to or cotemporaneously
with the parts of the unstable structure. Thus the Gestalt-
ist are unable to "explicate" the developmental genesis of
the whole from the parts. For example in the equivocal
gestalt example the more stable structure of the "profiled
faces" is assumed to co-exist in the background with the
lesser structure of the "vase. " Thus the radical gestalt
shift of the (pre-existing) profiled faces from the back-
ground to the foreground lacks an explicable functional
genesis
.
Although the Behaviorist, Neo-Freudians and Gestalt-
ists appear partially valid for the limited area of creativ-
ity which they address, they are inadequate to explicate how
73
Figure 3. Gestalt prof iled-vase
.
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genuinely new productions are generated. The Behavorists
skirt the question of genuinely new production by reducing
it to the trivial novelty of remote association. The Neo-
Freudians evade the question of functional genesis with gen-
eral explanations of inspired regression which fail to
account for how the unconscious generated the full-blown
solution in the first place. The Gestaltist are unable to
explicate this question of functional genesis because they
assume the pre-existence or co-temporaneous existence of the
greater structural solution with the parts of the lesser
structure of the problem.
Productive Creativity According to Koestler
Next we shall offer two alternative formulations of
"genuine" creativity by Koestler (1969) and Rothenberg
(1979a) which resolve the dilemma of creative production.
Both propose paradoxical second-order definitions of crea-
tivity which involve the coordination of opposites. Accord-
ing to Koestler the creative birth occurs through the crea-
tive act of thinking on two mental planes simultaneously or
what he calls the process of bisociation which is defined
as :
. . . the perceiving of a situation or idea "L, " in two
self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of
reference "Ml" and "M2." The event in which the two in-
tersect is made to vibrate on two different wavelengths
as it were. While this unusual situation lasts, "L" is
not merely linked to one associative context, but biso-
ciated with two. (Koestler, 1969, p. 35)
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He further states that this bisociative process is, "a
double-minded, transitory state of unstable equilibrium
where the balance of both emotion and thought is disturbed"
(Koestler, 1969, p. 36)
.
Hence for Koestler creative production begins with the
paradoxical intersection of two diverging frames of refer-
ence or matrices which may denote any two seemingly incom-
patible abilities, habits, skills or patterns of behavior,
each of which is governed by its own code of fixed rules.
Normal associative processes are carried on within one frame
of reference but creative production involves the paradoxi-
cal intersection of two frames of reference which generate
new insights not reducible to either frame alone. Koestler
proposes this general bisociative process as the fundamental
process underlying the three domains of creativity: scien-
tific discovery, artistic originality, and comic inspira-
tion. Each of these three creative processes begins with an
unstable intersection of diverging frames of reference which
are meaningful to the particular creative process and which
evoke an appropriate response of gratification according to
the type of process. Hence within the context of humor the
relevant paradoxical bisociation evokes "HA-HA, " within the
context of science the relevant paradoxical bisociation
evokes "AHA" and within art the relevant paradoxical bisoci-
ation evokes "AH ..." Through the interplay or clash of
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the incompatible frames of reference creativity is initially
®^P^®ssed as a comic simile in humor, as a hidden analogy in
science, as a metaphor in art. Each of these bisociations
(e.g., comic simile, hidden analogy, metaphor) are intersec-
tions of incompatible matrices of thought which allow the
creator to experience reality on several planes at once.
The elaboration and evaluation of these bisociations takes
different forms according to the specific requirements of
the domain but all three domains of creativity share a com-
mon birth in the paradoxical bisociative process. Further-
more the common bisociative process of the three domains
varies along a bipolar continuum from "self-assertiveness"
or self-differentiation to "self-transcendence " or integra-
tion (see Figure 4) (Koestler, 1978, p. 110). Each domain
of creativity is a Janus faced joining of both bipolar ten-
dencies but humor accentuates "self-assertiveness" and art
accentuates "self -transcendence " and science lies in be-
tween .
An example of the bisociation of two frames of refer-
ence or matrices of thought within comic inspiration may be
presented as follows: "A convict was playing cards with his
jailers. On discovering that he cheated, they threw him out
of jail." The comic effect of this joke results from the
paradoxical interplay of two systems of rules. Rule System
(1) : a convict is serving time in jail and is guarded by
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Humor 4 Science + ± Art
HA-HA < > AHA < > AH
comic simile < Chidden analogy < > metaphor
Sel f-assertiveness Self-transcendence
Figure 4. Koestler's bipolar continuum of three
domains of creativity.
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jailers. Rule System (2): for some reason they play cards;
the convict cheats, and the other players expel him from the
gaming hall. This would be quite plausible if the first
part of the joke did not tell us that the gaming hall is a
jail and the convict's fellow players are his wardens. A
cheater can be thrown out of a card game but a convict can-
not be released from prison for committing a criminal
offense. Each of the rules taken alone is normal and self-
consistent and evokes no laughter. However the paradoxical
interplay of the two rules within a humorous situation pro-
vokes comic inspiration.
Koestler illustrates the bisociative process with
other creative processes such as the example of KoKo, the
chimpanzee, locked within a cage trying to grasp a banana
outside of arm's reach. Finally in a moment of inspiration
KoKo breaks off the branch of a tree to extend his reach to
the banana. Koestler hypothesizes: "Before the chimpanzee
actually broke off the branch there must have been a moment
when he perceived it as a member of 'both matrices at the
same time' --still a part of the tree but already a detached
tool" (Koestler, 1969, p. 104). Through the ambiguous
interplay of branch as both "part of the tree" and "detached
tool" emerged the solution to the practical problem.
Another example of the bisociative process within the
domain of science concerns the story of Archimedes
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discovering how to measure the volume of an irregularly
shaped crown. Reportedly Archimedes was given the assign-
ment to determine whether an alleged crown of pure gold had
been adulterated with silver. He knew the weight per volume
of gold but didn't know how to find the volume of the
irregular crown. Of course he figured he could melt down
the crown into a regular shape but that was not permissible.
After trying a number of different ways to measure the
volume of the crown he finally gave up for the day and
decided to relax with a hot bath. While immersing himself
in the basin he noticed the change in the water level-
-
Eureka! He made the bisociation between the finding of the
volume of the crown and the rise of the water level with the
immersion of his body. Through that bisociation emerged
some verbal interpretation such as, "rise of water-level
equals melting down of my solid body just as it would the
melting down of the solid crown. " During that equivocal
moment of bisociation his body became a melted down object
just like the crown. Later came the mathematical expression
and verification of the tenuous insight. Before the biso-
ciation the matrix of thoughts concerning the habitual
attempts to find the volume of the crown were on an indepen-
dent plane different than the matrix of thoughts for ex-
periences related to taking a bath. According to Koestler
they are not just remote associates but represent divergent
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planes or frames of reference which equivocally intersect in
the act of bisociation. No doubt Archimedes had some
practical knowledge of how much water to pour into the basin
before it would overflow with the immersion of his body but
until that knowledge was bisociated with the habitual
attempts to measure the volume of the crown neither matrix
of thought was sufficient to make the creative leap which
changed the habitual approach to the problem.
Productive Creativity According to Rothenberg
Next we shall consider Rothenberg' s paradoxical con-
cepts of janusian aned homospatial thinking which are simi-
lar to Koestler's bisociative process and to Kris's primary
processes although they are more functionally defined and
substantiated. For more than fifteen years Rothenberg
(1979a) carried out a series of psychiatric interviews and
experiments with fifty-seven individuals who were selected
as being highly creative in either science, literature, art
or music. Rothenberg' s evidence led him to propose that the
creative process is a special secondary process which mir-
rors or is the obverse of the primary dreaming processes.
While dreaming uses primary processes to keep the dreamer
asleep by disguising and censoring anxiety provoking wishes
of the unconscious, the creative process uses similar pro-
cesses to keep the creator wide awake in the anxiety ridden
process of giving birth to new insights. By emphasizing the
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intentional anxiety stimulating process of creativity he
distinguishes it from the involuntary anxiety disguising
processes of dreaming. Although creativity utilizes pro-
cesses which are structurally similar to the primary process
they are distinctively more intentional and abstract in
their functioning. According to Rothenberg the creative
processes are not identical with or directly caused by the
primary processes as claimed by Kris in his theory of
regression rather they structurally mirror each other. This
is a critical difference which helps distinguish the primary
processes of mere wishful thinking and schizophrenic fantasy
from genuine creativity.
Going beyond simplistic definitions of the primary-
like processes of creativity as merely symbol, ambiguity,
multiple implication, condensation or displacement he pro-
poses two functionally complex processes central to creativ-
ity: "janusian" thinking involving an atemporal use of
opposites, and "homospatial " thinking involving a spatial
super imposition.
More specifically, "Janusian thinking consists of ac-
tively conceiving two or more opposite or antithetical
ideas, images, or concepts simultaneously" (Rothenberg,
1979a, p. 55). This paradoxical structure of antagonistic
opposites is the seed structure from which genuinely new
ideas are born. The distinctive qualities of this janusian
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process are that the opposites maintain their individual
identities and are actively opposed simultaneously. Some
examples which Rothenberg (1979a) gives are, "Einstein con-
cluded that a person falling from the roof of a house was in
motion and at rest at the same time" (p. 56), and "O'Neil
(playwright) was obsessed by the suicide of a friend whose
wife had been unfaithful— and he had wanted her to be" (p.
58), and "... Pasteur need to formulate the concept that
the surviving animals were both diseased and not-diseased at
the same time" (p. 124)
.
Each of these examples of janusian
thinking served as the initial seed structure from which
either scientific theories or artistic productions were
developed.
Rothenberg defines, "Homospatial thinking consists of
actively conceiving two or more discrete entities occupying
the same space, a conception leading to the articulation of
new identities" (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 69). Homospatial
thinking is the spatial integration of images to produce
genuinely new complex images. The distinctive qualities of
the homospatial process is that the individual images are
reciprocally transformed into a new whole without losing
their distinctiveness. Furthermore for Rothenberg the
imagetic space may either be visual , auditory , kinesthetic
,
etc. Some examples of the homospatial process are "In
(Picasso) first sketch of 'Guernica, ' a female figure was
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looking into a room and out to a courtyard at the same time"
(p. 60)
,
and "Shifting segments of a DNA molecule in his
hands, Watson realized it could consist of identical but
spatially opposed chains" (p. 62) and Poincare's personal
account of a mathematical discovery, "A host of ideas kept
surging in my head; I could almost feel them jostling one
another, until two of them coalesced, so to speak, to form a
stable combination" (p. 117) . These examples indicate how
homospatial thinking gives an integrated imagetic expression
to discrete entities.
According to Rothenberg the janusian process and the
homospatial process are functionally related in the creative
process
:
Either at the moment of formulation or at some later
time, homospatial thinking operates in conjunction with
janusian thinking to produce integrated entities such as
artistic and scientific metaphors or more fully devel-
oped paradigms and models. By means of homospatial
thinking, opposites and antitheses in a janusian con-
struct are superimposed or otherwise fused in space and
integrations are produced. (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 268)
An example of the concomitant interaction of Janusian think-
ing and homospatial thinking is how Einstein's janusian con-
cept of how a person can be in motion and rest at the same
time is expressed in the spatial image of "a man falling
from the roof of a house" (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 269).
Using material from an ongoing interview of a poet in the
process of constructing a poem Rothenberg documents the
emergence of a kernel janusian concept, a horse as both
84
beastly and human, followed by the homospatial representa-
tion of a riderless horse together with the horse and
rider— "His rider— he had never had a rider" (Rothenberg,
1979a, p. 68) the functional relation of janusian processes
and homospatial processes is such that janusian thinking
serves to capture the paradoxical tension of a problematic
situation which homospatial thinking in turn surmounts and
expresses in metaphoric terms.
Janusian and homospatial thinking as distinguished
from Hegelian dialectics is a simultaneous integration of
opposites rather than a succession of opposites (Rothenberg,
1979a, pp . 255-56) . It is an integration which incorporates
and maintains the opposition rather than reconciling and
synthesizing the opposition. These qualities of homospatial
thinking may be illustrated with Rubin's double profiles
(see Figure 5). "According to gestalt principles, the two
faces in this drawing can only be seen successively. The
homospatial perception involves seeing both on the same
visual plane, and interacting with one another" (Rothenberg,
1979a, p. 275). Another example is Sylvia Plath's poetic
metaphor, "How long can my hands be a bandage to his hurt?"
As Rothenberg comments
:
. . .
there is interaction between, and mutual modifi-
cation of elements: the hands take on some of the soft,
swathing and encircling qualities of the bandage, and
the bandage takes on the strength and adherence of the
hands. (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 257)
Figure 5. Rubin's double profile
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In both examples the opposites are simultaneously integrated
and maintained thus enriching the whole.
Rothenberg further explains that this simultaneous
integration is a genuine discontinuity with what preceded
it
:
When two or more elements are conceived as operating
simultaneously, they come neither before nor after.
Nothing in this is repeated, but all occurs at once.
When two or more elements operate simultaneously, they
are outside the continuing process of repetition,
change, and flux we refer to as "time"; the janusian
conception is out of time. (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 339)
Perhaps this accounts for the sense of timelessness reported
by many highly creative people during intense creative per-
iods (Ghiselin, 1952). As conceptualized and documented the
janusian and homospa tial processes are the generative struc-
tures and processes which account for "genuine" creativity.
Once the homospatial metaphor has been expressed other
processes such as dialectics and analysis may come into
operation to elaborate, refine and evaluate the new recrea-
tion.
Koestler and Rothenberg in Comparison
Rothenberg distinguishes his janusian and homospatial
processes from Koestler' s bisociative process on the follow-
ing points: where Koestler is concerned with a single act
Rothenberg is concerned with a process, while Koestler
emphasizes the association of incompatibles Rothenberg
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emphasizes the reciprocal interaction of opposites, where
Koestler posits merely two incompatibles Rothenberg examines
a complex of interacting opposites, where Koestler talks
about diverging incompatibles on different planes Rothenberg
is concerned with opposites which are specifically different
and resistant within the same category, and where Koestler
posits a random concatenation of incompatibles Rothenberg
hypothesizes an active intentional process of constructing
opposites (Rothenberg, 1979a, p. 12). While Koestler's
definition of the creative process is not as functionally
elaborate as Rothenberg' s it would be a mistake to label the
bisociative process as merely a remote association. Biso-
ciation is the equivocal intersection of two incompatible
systems of thought. It is not merely an association by
contiguity, similarity or mediation within a single stable
system of thought. Rather bisociation is the transitory
experience of reality on several planes simultaneously which
is much more like the Janusian process than association.
Koestler writes, "There is no point-to-point correspondence
between the two places; they are bisociated as wholes . . ."
(Koestler, 1978, p. 141). Hence we are not talking about an
associative process of finding pre-existing similarities but
rather a bisociative process that recreates the relationship
between the planes without destroying their distinctiveness.
The most notable difference between the bisociative process
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and janusian thinking is that the bisociative process is
described as the equivocal intersection of two incompatibles
and janusian thinking as a polar continuum of opposites.
Perhaps these are two ways of describing the same paradoxi-
cal process. However, Koestler's notion of bisociation
which could be interpreted as an equivocal intersection of
diverging continua appears more interesting and inclusively
useful than a single "hot-cold" type of continuum. In any
case both Koestler and Rothenberg's concepts of the creative
process are compatible and mutually enriching. Koestler
stands to gain from Rothenberg's functional conception and
detailing of the creative process and Rothenberg from
Koestler's more complex notion of intersecting planes of
opposition rather than a single continuum of opposition.
In conclusion both Koestler and Rothenberg explain the
creative process as a second-order transformation which is
generated by the mutual coordination of first-order oppo-
sites. Koestler terms this mutual coordination of first-
order opposites the bisociation or intersection of incompa-
tible frames of reference which generate multiple levels of
metaphoric insight. Rothenberg terms this mutual coordina-
tion of first-order opposites the Janusian active conception
of opposites simultaneously. Janusian works in conjunction
with homospatial processes to generate genuinely new meta-
phoric integrations. Thus both Koestler and Rothenberg
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provide functionally similar explications of the second-
order generation of genuinely novel productions in terms of
the metaphoric integration of opposing concepts.
Cognitive Development
In this section on cognitive development we raise the
question, "How is it possible for genuinely novel cognitive
development to occur?" In this section the paradoxical
dilemma of the creative process takes on the form of the
nature-nature controversy in which two mutually exclusive
developmental theories, nativism and behaviorism, offer al-
ternative explanations of how creative development primarily
occurs. Nativism as the underlying psychological theory of
the Romantic pedagogy reduces creative development to
primarily a spontaneous unfolding of a fixed genetic poten-
tial according to a preset time table. Whereas behaviorism
as the underlying psychological theory of the traditional
school of cultural transmission reduces creative development
to primarily a cultural engineering of continuous chains of
associated skills which become incorporated into higher
order skills. Basically the dilemma is that creative devel-
opment is reduced to either the behavior ist ' s trivial
novelty of incremental cumulation or the nativist's radical
novelty of spontaneous unfoldment of prefabricated genetic
potential. (Although Piaget defines Nativism as a
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structural theory of preformation and thus trivial novelty
we shall primarily be concerned with how it spontaneously
unfolds and not its preformed nature.) While the behavior-
ist's concept of trivial novelty is insufficient to explain
genuine novelty the nativist concept of radical novelty is
merely a genetic addition or substitution which does not
account for the constructive order of genuine creative
development
.
Nativist Development According to Gesell
According to the Nativist creative development is fun-
damentally a process of biological maturation in which
behavior matures just as we physically grow. Hence creative
development is a spontaneous unfolding of instincts, emo-
tions, sensori-motor
,
perceptual and language patterns
according to a predetermined genetic time table. Each new
development is merely an addition or substitution of what
went before. For instance the more advanced motor skill of
walking may become substituted for crawling and walking
additionally enriched with the skipping pattern. Some be-
haviorists have accused Piaget of reducing development to a
maturational process where a more primitive stage is merely
replaced or substituted for by a more advanced stage. True
developmental nativists such as Gesell (1974) are concerned
with chronological checklists of development in which there
is a first year stage, second year stage and so on.
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Development or maturation proceeds according to a genetical-
ly preset schedule in which the environment merely activates
and nourishes the spontaneous unfoldment of biological po-
tential. The lack of environmental nourishment may frus-
trate or fixate this natural unfoldment. However the
enrichment of the environment merely serves to integrate and
consolidate what has already unfolded. Hence Gesell is pri-
marily concerned with maturational checklists which indicate
biological readiness for behavioral tasks such as reading.
For example one indicator of reading readiness is the
visual-motor ability to copy a diamond shaped figure.
Gesell would maintain this is a genetic-physical potential
that unfolds spontaneously and can be consolidated by behav-
ioral training but cannot be trained beyond the maturational
level of readiness. Hence creative development is primarily
a "natural" process in which the "nuturement" of the envi-
ronment plays an interactive role during the consolidative
period of readiness but a limited secondary role during the
spontaneous unfolding of maturation to the next level of
genetic readiness.
Behavioral Development According to Gagne
On the other hand behaviorist claim that the behavior-
al nuturement of the environment plays a predominant role in
creative development and that the natural biological poten-
tial is merely a supportive resource to be culturally
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exploited. Where according to the matura tionists develop-
is spontaneous, preset and fixed for the behaviorists
it is controllable, directable and malleable. Behavioral
developmentalists such as Gagne (1968, pp. 177-91) claim
that children can learn any intellectual thing we want them
to learn, provided they have learned the prerequisites.
According to Gagne creative development is a behavioral
engineering task of connecting a continuous chain of
associated skills into a more complex higher order skill.
Creative development is fundamentally an incremental cumula-
tive process moving from simple stimulus-response connec-
tions to chains to multiple discriminations to concepts to
simple rules to more complex rules. Each incremental step
incorporates the previous step into a more inclusive com-
plexly associated whole. For instance to teach the concept
of the area of a rectangle Gagne would behaviorally rein-
force prerequisite concepts of length, width and rectangle.
With the mastery of these prerequisite skills the child is
prepared to recall and additively associate them into a more
complex concept that the area of a rectangle is determined
by length and width. According to Gagne the vertical trans-
fer to superordinate concepts results from overlearning or
high repetition of the additive integration of the subordi-
nate concepts. Where for the nativist creative development
is limited by fixed genetic structures which unfolds
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spontaneously according to preset schedules for Gagne crea-
tive development is limited only by the prerequisite mastery
of the additive components of the composite structure of the
learning task itself.
The nature-nature dilemma of the Nativist and behav-
iorists dichotomizes the nurturing environment and the
natural organism. Furthermore it reduces genuine novelty to
either the behavior ist ' s trivial novelty of gradual modifi-
cation and continuous incremental cumulation or the nati-
vist 's radical novelty of spontaneous genetic unfoldment of
prefabricated structures which lack constructive order.
Piaget resolves the superficial split of the nature-nature
dilemma by postulating a fundamental interaction between the
natural organism and the nurturing environment and goes be-
yond its reductionism with a theory of development which is
both genuinely creative and constructively ordered. In
resolving this dilemma Piaget provides the underlying psy-
chology for the progressive pedagogy just as Nativist and
behaviorism provide the underlying psychology for the roman-
tic and traditional pedagogies (Kolhberg, 1972, pp . 449-95).
Constructive Development According to Piaget
According to Piaget one of the central goals of a the-
ory of cognitive development is to explain the construction
of both genuine novelty and order. It is the genius of
Piaget's revised theory of equilibration (Piaget, 1977) to
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attempt to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for
both these factors of creative development. Development is
the novel transcendence of "natural contradictions" toward
higher levels of logical coherence. These natural contra-
dictions, i.e., conflicts or oppositions, do not merely
arise through a probabilistic encounter with the environ-
ment, as Piaget had previously supposed, but rather through
the "central act" of equilibration itself. For example
Piaget previously viewed the equilibration of conservation
of clay as the child's chance centration on some overt
attribute such as length. Another chance encounter with the
clay might lead to a centration on another attribute such as
width which would conflict with the previous centration.
These two conflicting variables would require coordination
at a higher level of equilibration. According to Piaget's
revised theory of equilibration the focus is not on the
mental coordination of two separate variables but rather the
necessary polarization of the central act itself into an
affirmation and negation. The central act of a child
transforming a piece of clay can take on many states where
one dimension of the clay such as height is affirmed as
"tall" at the expense of its negation "not tall," the
dimension of width. This inherent imbalance of the central
act leads to a progressive equilibration toward conservation
where the affirmation of height is finally compensated by
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the negation of width in a necessarily reciprocal relation.
Where the old notion of equilibration merely emphasizes the
increasing probabilistic complexity of coordination the new
theory emphasizes the progressive compensation of the inher-
ent polarity of the central act toward a novel and necessary
balance of the affirmation and negation. This novelty of
equilibration is genuine because it constitutes a second-
order recreating of the opposites of affirmation and nega-
tion at qualitatively higher levels according to the laws of
formal logic.
According to Piaget (1972, pp. 15-17) cognitive sys-
tems function through three forms of equilibration:
(1) those between the subject and object which lead to the
assimilation of schemes of action and the accommodation of
these to the objects; (2) those between the differentiated
schemes of the partial subsystems which lead to reciprocal
assimilation and accommodation (or a horizontal integra-
tion) ; and (3) those between the partial subsystem with
their differentiations and the total system with its inte-
gration which results in the vertical reintegration of the
differentiations of the partial subsystems into a genuinely
new totality.
These three forms may be interpreted as three dimen-
sions of the ongoing equilibration process. The first form
refers to the adaptive coordination of the subject with the
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object (for instance a child attempting to judge the rela-
tive lengths of two sets of sticks)
. The second form refers
to the horizontal coordination of various asynchronous
schemes involved in adaptive coordination (for instance the
discrepancy between a child's perceptual estimation scheme
and counting scheme in judging the relative lengths of the
two sets of sticks) . The horizontal integration of these
differentiated schemes may lead to the vertical reintegra-
tion of the differentiated schemes with the totality (for
instance the horizontal integration of the scheme of percep-
tual estimation and number counting may lead to the vertical
reintegration of the two schemes into a generalized scheme
of conservation of length) . The new vertical reintegration
establishes a new level of adaptive coordination with the
subject and object.
Hence equilibration moves from a global coordination
of subject and object to a differentiation of this coordina-
tion into asynchronous schemes which in turn are horizontal-
ly integrated through the ongoing coordination of subject
and object and finally vertically reintegrated with the
totality thus establishing a new recoordination of subject
with object (see Figure 6) . Thus equilibration appears to
be a shifting balance between the differentiations of the
child's interaction with the environment and the reintegra-
tion of these differentiations into a new totality.
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I. Global Coordination of Subject and Object
II
.
Differentiated Schemes (Asynchronous)
Coordinating Subject with Object
i
Horizontally Integrated Schemes (Reciprocal
Assimilation and Accommodation) Coordinating
Subject and Object
III. Vertically Reintegrated Schemes Recoordinating
Subject and Object
Figure 6. The three dimensional phase of the
Piagetian equilibration cycle.
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According to Piaget the third form of equilibration which
vertically reintegrates the differentiated schemes into a
new totality is the source of genuine creative development:
At the level of cognitive functions, there is a funda-
mental form of equilibrium because integration, as afunction of differentiation, poses new problems. These
new problems lead to the construction of new actions
upon the previous actions, or new operations upon the
previous operations. The construction of operations
upon operations is probably the secret of development
and of the transition from one stage to the next
(Piaget, 1972, p. 17)
This construction of operations upon operations constitutes
a second-order recreating of the cognitive operations. This
is a genuine creativity because it constitutes a discontinu-
ous qualitative shift in the structural system which is
constructively generated out of what preceded. Thus the
preceding structures are transformed and incorporated into
the second-order structure. This process of second-order
inclusion is quite distinct from Gagne's inclusion by verti-
cal transfer. Gagne's "vertical transfer" is a continuous
cumulation of collective horizontal components into more
complex superordinate composite structures resulting from
repetitive overlearning. Piaget's "vertical reintegration"
is a discontinuous integration of horizontal first-order
conflicting schemes into qualitatively novel second-order
structures resulting from equilibrating interaction.
Piaget (1977, Chapter I) further explains the process
of constructing operations on operations in terms of
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reflexive abstraction. Reflecive abstraction is a process
which does not necessarily require the presence of physical
objects. It is based on the coordination of actions or
operations and is therefore constructive. There are two
fundamental characteristics of reflexive abstraction:
1. Projection or reflection in the physical sense, that is,
a transposing to a higher level of what was borrowed
from a lower level.
2. Reflection in the sense of mental organization or recon-
struction of what has been projected to the higher level
in order to incorporate it into the new totality.
We may more fully understand the process of coordinat-
ing conflict in terms of reflexive abstraction. The con-
flict coming from the contradictioon between the (horizon-
tally integrated) subschemes propels the projection up to a
higher endogenous level where a process of vertical integra-
tion or reflection occurs in order to subordinate the new
scheme to the higher level. According to Piaget it is at
this higher level that the construction of genuine novelty
appears. What exactly causes the conflict in the first
place is not very important to Piaget. He attributes the
initial nonbalance to the deficiency of the early structures
and the spontaneous attraction to overt properties of ob-
jects (affirmations) (Piaget, 1977, p. 15) and to the tem-
poral lags or asynchrony between the schemes (Piaget, 1977,
p. 9). With these considerations of the initial nonbalance
the central task becomes to explain how the conflicting
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disturbances are brought into equilibrium at a higher level
by reflexive abstraction. Furthermore this equilibrium of
reflexive abstraction is defined as converging toward the
higher level of formal non-contradiction (Piaget, 1980, p.
304) .
In order to more clearly understand the process of
reflexive abstraction as expressed through the three dimen-
sions of equilibration we shall consider an example of the
equilibration of the conseration of length taken from the
learning experiments of Inhelder, Sinclair, and Bovet
(1974). In this learning experiment they made two lines of
match sticks: one a shorter zigzag line with eight matches
and the other a longer straight line with only seven matches
(see figure 7). The children were asked if the lines were
the same length or if one was more, or less, than the other.
When non-conservers of length responded that that bottom
line was longer, the experimenters asked them to count the
match sticks. Thus they were both saying b is longer be-
cause "it goes out further" and a is longer because "eight
is more than seven." This polarization of the children's
interaction with the match sticks was successful in facili-
tating conservation of continuous length in those who were
at the transition level.
Drawing upon Piaget's terminology of affirmation and
negation and his analysis of the reciprocal equilibration of
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Figure 7 . Presentation of conservation of length
learning experiment.
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asynchronous schemes we shall further consider the learning
experiment of conservation of length. According to Piaget:
. . . although the accommodation of schemes to the outer
reality is interrupted by many unexpected obstacles, the
reciprocal assimilation of two valid subsystems and
their reciprocal accommodation succeed sooner or later
and lead to mutual conservation. ... To coordinate the
two subsystems, and S ~
,
is to discover a common
operative part, S, *S
2 ,
which is opposed to S,*non-S
2
and
to S
2
'non-S,. Hence, we see that partial negations are
indispensable to the coherent stability of this coordi-
nation. (Piaget, 1977, p. 9)
The child has two subsystems or schemes, a number counting
system (S^) and a system for measuring length (S
2 )
which is
based on perception. Therefore
,
in this task, is polar-
ized into an affirmation that a is longer than b since eight
is more than seven (a>b by counting) and its negation, b is
not longer than a since seven is not more than eight (b<a
by counting) . is polarized into an affirmation that b is
longer than a since b goes out further (b>a by perception)
and its negation, b is not longer than a since seven is not
more than eight (a<b by perception). When the experimenter
suggests that the child make a correspondence between and
S
2 ,
the child's "central" interaction with the match sticks
is paradoxically cross-polarized with the simultaneous con-
sideration of both opposing systems of and S 2 . Through
the simultaneous consideration of the contradictory affirma-
tions of (a>b by counting)
,
and S
2
(b>a by perception) , a
new common operative S^'S
2
is generated from the cross-
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polarized intersection of the two schemes (see Figure 8).
This cross-polarized interaction is the horizontal integra-
tion (reciprocal assimilation and accommodation) of the two
conflicting systems which projects them to a higher level of
vertical reintegration (reflection) with the totality as the
new mutual conservation of length. This new mutual conser-
vation of length is not merely the simple composite rela-
tionship between the collaterals of S
1
and S
2 .
Rather it is
a second-order process of reflexive abstraction which para-
doxically projects the contradictory differences to a higher
level of reorganized common operativity. This common
operativity is opposed to the contradictory differences of
S^'non-S
2
and S
2
*non-S^ yet it incorporates their trans-
formed commonality at a second-order level. Hence the
common operativity of S^*S
2 P
ro<3uces a new affirmation that
a is longer than b and new negation that b is not longer
than a not merely by counting but by the mutual conservation
of number and length. In essence the number counting sys-
tem, S
1 ,
and the perceptual measurement system, S 2 , are
paradoxically cross- integrated and reflectively reintegrated
at a higher vertical level of conservation of discontinuous
length.
An additional example of reflexive abstraction and the
three dimensions of equilibration may be given with another
learning experiment by Inhelder et al. (1974) . Young
Figure 8 . Cross polarization of the central act os
S]_*non S2 and S^’non through which the common operative
S^*S2 is generated.
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children unable to do the classical conservation of clay
task were selected for the learning task. These children
were shown a ball of clay. A piece of the clay was taken
from the top of the ball and they were asked if it was still
the same amount. They responded that no it was less. The
piece of clay was put back on one of the ends and they were
asked if it was the same amount now? They responded yes
(see Figure 9) . This was a judgement by correspondence
between the subtracted piece and the added piece. In this
experiment the children understood that the negative space
which was subtracted and the newly added affirmation were in
balance by a one-to-one correspondence. This process of
taking from the top and adding to the sides continued with
the children maintaining the correspondence until the clay
ball had been transformed into a cigar shape. At this point
most of the children experienced a conflict from the polari-
zation between the gradual build up of the one to one corre-
spondence scheme and their perceptual estimation scheme.
The correspondence scheme implied equivalence and the per-
ceptual estimation scheme implied inequality because the
cigar shaped clay appeared to have more clay than the ball
shaped clay. The conflict experienced with the polarization
of these two schemes was successful in advancing children,
even three years, in some cases. Three quarters of the
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Figure 9
by-bit into a
. A "ball"
"cigar.
"
of clay being transformed bit-
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children from five and one-half years on learned to conserve
and generalize to the classical experiment of conservation.
Using Piaget's terminology we may further analyze this
learning experiment. Through the intervention of the exper-
imenter a paradoxical polarization was induced in the chil-
dren's multi-schematic interaction with the clay task. The
children were simultaneously confronted with the conflicting
correspondence scheme (S.^) and the perceptual estimation
scheme (
S ^ )
• The affirmation of the correspondence scheme
indicated that the cigar shaped clay was equal in quantity
to the negated ball shaped clay. The affirmation of the
perceptual estimation scheme indicated that the cigar shaped
clay was more in quantity than the negated ball shaped clay.
Hence many children experienced a cross-polarized contradic-
tion between the affirmation and negation of the two schemes
(see Figure 10). Most of the children were able to experi-
ence the paradoxical polarization of the cross-integrated
schemes and to vertically reintegrate the schemes at a new
second-order level of conservation of continuous quantity.
At this new level both the scheme of one-to-one correspon-
dence and the scheme of perceptual estimation were trans-
formed and incorporated into a new scheme of functional
compensation between the affirmation and negation.
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perceptual estimation)
Figure 10. Cross polarization of conservation of
"continuous quantity" as S]/non S 2 and S 2 'non Sj through
which the common operative Si*S2 is generated.
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Of course not all the children achieved conservation.
Perhaps those children who did not achieve conservation
negotiated the confrontation with the cross-polarization in
different ways. Piaget (1977) explains three ways in which
children negotiate or regulate cognitive conflict. The
"alpha" regulation of conflict is simply to reject, neglect
or suppress the conflict. Hence some of the children who
did not achieve conservation in the learning experiment may
have merely rejected, neglected or suppressed the conflict
between the correspondence scheme and the perceptual scheme.
These children probably made no advancement in terms of bet-
ter understanding conservation. The next level of regulat-
ing conflict is "beta" behavior which takes the discrepancy
into account but can only partially coordinate it. Children
using "beta" regulation of the conflict were probably able
to partially coordinate the conflicting schemes of corre-
spondence and perceptual estimation into a functional
relationship without understanding exact compensation of the
functional relationship. The final level of regulating
conflict, "gamma" behavior, anticipates the conflict and is
able to fully coordinate the differences within a system of
interrelated possibilii tes . The children using the "gamma"
regulation of the conflict between the correspondence and
perceptual estimation scheme were able to fully recognize
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the implications of the conflict and recoordinate the dif-
ferences into a new scheme of functional compensation.
In order to further consider children's regulation of
cognitive conflict which appears to result from cross-
polarized schemes we may examine Forman's fine grain analy-
sis of the developmental levels leading to conservation of
continuous substance (Forman, 1981) (see Figure 11)
.
Developmental Levels for Conservation of Clay
:
1. Absolute differences : The child transforms A into an
oblong shape which he assumes is completely different
from B. The child compares the two shapes but does not
see any similarity (affirmation) between A and B. This
creates the perception that both are absolutely differ-
ent (alpha regulation by neglect)
.
2. Opposition ; At this level the incomplete affirmation of
absolute differences of the previous level leads to the
negation of absolute differences resulting in a new
affirmation of the transformation of tall and not tall
(the initiation of "beta" regulation)
.
3. Discrete degrees: At this level the incomplete affirma-
tions of tall and not tall are further negated resulting
in the construction of a new affirmation of "a little
tall A."
4. Variations: The incomplete affirmation of "a little
tall " Is further negated resulting in a continuum of
affirmations of continuous variation. Affirmations of
variation are constructed for both height and width but
are not coordinated until the next stage.
5. Function: At this level the child negates the incom-
plete affirmation of height and width and accepts their
functional relationship. The child understand the more
width the less height and vice-versa but not simultane-
ously (end of beta regulation)
.
6. Exact compensation: Finally the incomplete affirmations
of the inverse functional relations of height and width
are negated resulting in exact compensation or conserva-
tion of clay. This last level results in the complete
Ill
Opposition CIO
not-tall A
Discrete Degrees
tall A
Variations
Function Height
not-short
Height
( s
a little
tall A non-tali A
A
more short ACOO
^ not-tall A
less
le ss
more * 030
Figure 11. Forman's Developmental Levels.
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and necessary compensation of affirmation and its nega-
tion by reciprocity. (Gamma regulation anticipates the
incompleteness of the functional relations and coordi-
nates them into a functional compensation.)
This analysis illustrates how natural contradictions
or incomplete compensations of affirmation and negation are
regulated and transcended at each level. The interpretation
of affirmation and negation and their relationship changes
at each level. The affirmations are portrayed as overgen-
eralized absolutes that progressively become more qualified.
The negations are weak in the beginning but progressively
become more self-compensatory. The relative relation of
affirmation and negation moves from affirmation dominating
and leading negation through the early levels of absolute
differences, opposition and discrete differences to the
mutual assistance of both in the levels of variation and
function to finally the necessary coordination of affirma-
tion with negation in exact compensation or reversibility.
In summary, equilibration is progressively regulated
by the alpha, beta and gamma regulators which result in dif-
fering coordinations of cognitive conflict according to
developmental level. Equilibration is not merely an escape
from the tension of natural contradiction, rather it is a
novel and necessary transcendence toward the coherence of
complete compensation. The cognitive conflict resulting
from the cross-integration of asynchronous schemes such as
one-to-one correspondence and perceptual estimation creates
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^ paradoxical tension or imbalance which is progressively
coordinated by beta regulations until gamma regulation takes
over to achieve a complete vertical reintegration of the
opposing schemes into a new second-order scheme of exact
compensation
.
Creative Paradigm- Shi ft
In this section on the creative paradigm-shift we
raise the question, "How is it possible for a genuine
paradigm-shift to occur?" Various scientists, historians of
science and philosophers of science have sought orderly and
intelligible methods for creating and critiquing new advance-
ments in scientific theories. This quest has led to two
polarized theories of scientific development. One tradi-
tional theory of science development claims that the crea-
tive advancement of science is a gradual accumulation of
knowledge which is methodically checked at each point. Kuhn
( 1970 ) calls this the puzzle building phase where the gaps
in the structural framework of a theory are deductively
filled in with the missing puzzle pieces. However, when
this structural framework is called into question with a
growing number of anomalies unexplainable by the current
theoretical framework a paradigm shift or restructuring of
the theoretical framework may occur. This paradigm shift
114
creates a radical departure from the previous theory such as
the shift from Newtonian physics to Einsteinian physics.
This polarization of theories of science development
has created a controversial dilemma in terms of understand-
ing the creative process of theory change. Logical empiri-
cist or positivist such as Carnap (1936) and Hempel (1948)
maintain that all theory change in science may be explained
as a gradual cumulative process characterized by a static
deduc tive-nomological structure which provides for "consis-
tency," "meaning invariance" and "objective evaluation."
Opposing the logical positivist are writers such as Kuhn
(1970) and Feyerabend (1977) who maintain that major theory
changes in science may be explained as non-cumulative
paradigm shifts characterized by a changing gestalt struc-
ture which creates "incommensurability," "meaning variance"
and "theory-laden evaluation. " The polarization of these
two explanations of theory change poses a dilemma for under-
standing the creative process. The logical positivists pro-
vide a rational explanation of theory change but reduce it
to a trivial process of gradual cumulation by hypothetico-
deductive methods. Kuhn (1970) provides an account of
theory change as a radical process of paradigm shift but
characterizes this radical shift as an irrational subjective
conversion experience according to his critics (Shapere,
1964), (Kordig, 1971) and (Siegel, 1980). Hence creative
theory change is reduced to either a trivial change of
rational accumulation or a radical change of irrational
replacement.
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Kuhn maintains that his critics have misinterpreted
his following statements on theory change and choice: "The
conversion experience that I have likened to a gestalt
switch remains, therefore, at the heart of the revolutionary
process" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 204); "Scientific revolutions are
. . . non-cumulative episodes in which an older paradigm is
replaced in whole or part by an incompatible new one (Kuhn,
1970, p. 11); and "That process is persuasion (theory
choice)
,
but it presents a deeper problem. Two men who per-
ceive the same situation differently but nevertheless employ
the same vocabulary in its discussion must be using words
differently. They speak, that is, from what I have called
incommensurable viewpoints" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 200). Kuhn re-
sponds, "My critics respond to my views . . . with charges
of irrationality, relativism, and the defense of mob rule.
There are all labels which I categorically reject" (Kuhn,
1970, p. 234). Kuhn goes on to explain his controversial
concept of "incommensurability":
Most readers of my test have supposed that when I spoke
of theories as incommensurable, I meant that they could
not be compared. But "incommensurability" is a term
borrowed from mathematics, and it there has no such
implication. The hypotenuse of an isosceles right tri
angle is incommensurable with its side, but the two can
be compared to any required degree of precision. What
is lacking is not comparability but a unit of length in
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terms of which both can be measured directly and exact-
ly. (Kuhn, 1976, pp . 190-1)
Kuhn goes on to explain, "In applying the term 'incommensur-
ability' to theories, I had intended only to insist that
(there was) no common language within which both could be
fully expressed and which could therefore be used in a
point-by-point comparison between them" (Kuhn, 1976, p.
191) .
He further elaborates on this lack of a common neutral
language
:
. . . I simply assert the existence of significant
limits to what the proponents of different theories can
communicate to one another. The same limits make it
difficult or, more likely, impossible for an individual
to hold both theories in mind together and compare them
point by point with each other and with nature. That
sort of comparison is, however, the process on which the
appropriateness of any word like "choice" depends.
(Kuhn, 1977, pp. 338-9)
In addition to the limits of communication and the impossi-
bility of a neutral comparison language Kuhn maintains that
"good reasons" such as accuracy, scope, fruitfulness, sim-
plicity and consistency are not absolute arbiters in theory
choice. Rather Kuhn states, "... such reasons constitute
values to be used in making choices rather than rules of
choice" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 262). Hence two scientists may
share the same value of "simplicity" but differ as to the
"simplicity" of competing theories.
Kuhn's replies to his critics provide more than a
simplistic view of theory change as an irrational,
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uncommunicable conversion experience. Rather he defines
certain limits to the strictly rational rules of discovery,
communication and evaluation in theory change and choice.
His critics (Siegel, 1980, p. 373) agree that there are no
rational rules or algorithms for making discoveries. How-
ever, they object to the radical "meaning-variance" of
common terms from theory to theory since it poses a problem
for strictly rational communication and to the value laden
characterization of "good reasons" such as accuracy, fruit-
fulness, scope, simplicity and consistency. Kuhn does not
reject the intelligibility of the discovery process nor the
discussability of "meaning variance" nor the comparison of
competing theories in defending the process of paradigm
shift. Rather he rejects any formally defined logic of
discovery, the "neutral invariance of meaning" in paradigm
shifts and the absolute evaluation of competing theories.
Kuhn maintains that the discovery process, the variance in
meaning and the evaluation of this variance constitute a
genuine shift in the theoretical structure of knowledge.
Furthermore this structural shift is characterized by an
"essential tension" which cannot be reduced to either mere
irrationality or strict formal rationality. We shall fur-
ther consider Kuhn's account of this paradoxical essential
tension" of the discovery process and later Hesse's account
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of "meaning variance" which provides a metaphoric explana-
tion for paradigm shifts.
In addressing a conference on the identification of
creative scientific talent Kuhn states
:
. . . both my own experience in scientific research and
my reading of the history of sciences lead me to wonder
whether flexibility and open-mindedness have not been
too exclusively emphasized as the characteristics
requisite for basic research. I shall therefore suggest
below that something like "convergent thinking" is just
as essential to scientific advance as is divergent.
Since these two modes are inevitably in conflict, it
will follow that the ability to support a tension that
can occasionally become almost unbearable is one of the
prime requisites for the very best sort of scientific
research. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 226)
Kuhn goes on to write that this essential tension of the
joining of convergent and divergent thinking characterized
the scientific revolutions of Copernicus, Darwin, Einstein
and many others. These great creators were able to make
divergent discoveries which contributed to a paradigm shift
by virtue of being great convergent thinkers in the tradi-
tional paradigm that preceded the revolution. Through their
firm commitment to the old paradigm they were able to
detect the tension provoking anomalous gaps which could not
be filled by any of the currently possible convergent puzzle
pieces and to flexibly and openmindedly confront this
"essential tension" to divergently reframe the puzzle to
accommodate the anomaly. Kuhn further states:
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. . . only investigations firmly rooted in the contem-porary scientific tradition are likely to break that
tradition and give rise to a new one.
. . . Very often
the successful scientist must simultaneously display the
characteristics of the traditionalist and the icono-
clast. (Kuhn, 1977, p. 227)
Hence paradigm shifts do not arise "de novo." Rather they
emerge from the traditional paradigm and are characterized
by the essential tensions of commitment and open mindedness,
convergent and divergent thinking, traditionalist and icono-
clast which must be balanced and reconciled both within the
individual and group.
Kuhn (1977, pp. 240-65) further explores the creative
dynamics of the "essential tension" which characterizes
paradigm shifts in terms of the paradox provoking "thought
experiments" which creative scientists have historically
utilized. According to Kuhn "thought experiments" such as
Einstein's train struck by lightning at both ends, Bohr-
Heisenberg's microscope and Galileo's dialogue on falling
bodies have historically functioned to transform vaguely
felt anomalies within the traditional paradigm into vividly
explicit paradoxes which call for a new paradigmatic reso-
lution. The explicit paradox of these thought experiments
have both served to express the conflict implicit in the
scientist's thought and also as an "essential propaedeutic"
to the elimination of this conflict (Kuhn, 1977, pp. 260-1).
Kuhn presents an extended example of Galileo's
"thought experiment" expressed as an imaginary dialogue on
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the implicit contradictions involved in the Aristotelian
velocity of falling bodies and compares it with a similar
example of Piaget using dialogical questioning to provoke
cognitive conflict in children's concept of velocity. Both
the learning experiment and the "thought experiment" show
how paradox pushes conflicting opinions to their extreme and
provokes a new understanding of velocity. Thus according to
Kuhn both examples present the same dynamics of learning.
The main functional difference being that for Galileo his
questions were self-generated and for Piaget's learning
experiment the questions were generated through a clinical
interview (Kuhn, 1977, p. 243).
We shall present Piaget's example and then Galileo's
for comparison. In a series of learning experiments Piaget
(Piaget, 1946, Chapters 6 and 7) asked questions designed to
induce cognitive conflict in the child's undifferentiated
cognitive schemes concerning the comparative speed of a red
and blue car. In the first experimental condition the blue
car left the starting line first but the red car arrived at
the finish line at the same time as the blue car. The child
was asked if one of the two was faster or if the same. The
child responded that the blue car went more quickly. Kuhn
calls these the "goal-reaching" criterion for the applica-
tion of faster.
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In the second experimental condition the apparatus was
readjusted so that the red car started very late and had to
move especially rapidly to catch the blue car at the goal.
In this case the child responded that the red car moved more
quickly because he watched it. This direct perception of
motion Kuhn calls "perceptual blurriness."
If the child had employed either criterion of velocity
singly and consistently there would have been no conflict.
However with these two experimental conditions the child's
cognitive criterion for velocity are brought into conflict.
The red and blue cars finish at the same time in both condi-
tions but paradoxically the red car is both faster, slower
or the same as the blue car depending on whether the percep-
tual blurriness or goal reaching criterion is used. In the
beginning the children attribute the differences to minor
differences in the experiment arrangement and in the wording
of the questions. Those at the transition level finally
become aware of their arbitrary oscillations and construct a
more advanced concept of "faster" which clearly differenti-
ates instantaneous velocity from average velocity
.
In Galileo's "thought experiment" Galileo constructed
an imaginary dialogue which brought the previous Aristotel-
ian paradox concerning velocity to a fore. Previously
Aristotle had defined velocity as equal when the same change
is accomplished in an equal time. However, on occasion
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Aristotle made direct judgements of velocity without regard
to endpoints, distance covered or time elapsed. On those
occasions he appeared to be confusing instantaneous velocity
with his main definition of velocity as an average. Galileo
sensed this anomaly and constructed a "thought experiment"
to fully generalize its paradoxical conditions.
In this "thought experiment" two bodies are rolled
along the frictionless surface of "CB" and "CA" (see Figure
12) . It is assumed that when the falling bodies reach A and
B they will have acquired the same speed to carry them back
to their starting positions. When asked which body is
faster the untutored response is usually the one along the
perpendicular. It appears quicker because it is "more
blurred" in its movement and reaches its goal first. How-
ever, the dialogue reminds us that the faster of two motions
is usually defined as the one that covers the same distance
in a lesser time. Hence we cannot directly compare "CB" to
"CA" because "CB" is shorter. We must mark off an equal
distance of "CB" along the incline of "CA" in order to make
a comparison. Paradoxically if we mark off the distance of
"CB" from the beginning point "C" then the perpendicular
body is faster and if we mark off the same distance from the
end point of "A" then the incline body is faster and if we
mark it off in the appropriate place in between then the
perpendicular and incline body are the same speed. Hence
BFigure 12. Galileo's incline plane.
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motion along the perpendicular is simultaneously faster
than, equal in speed to, and slower than the motion along
the incline. The impact of this paradox was to make the
reader realize that speed ought not be attributed to the
whole as Aristotle and everyone else had done up until that
time but rather to its parts. In effect it magnified the
anomaly of the undifferentiated concepts of average velocity
and instantaneous velocity into a full blown paradoxical
conflict which prepared the way for clearly differentiating
the two.
Both Galileo's "thought experiment" and Piaget's
learning experiment function to magnify the vaguely felt
anomaly, if sensed at all, of the undifferentiated concept
of instantaneous velocity and average velocity. Through
appropriately posed questions a paradoxical condition was
constructed which confronted both the child and the adult
with the conflict inherent in their interaction with the
phenomena. This paradox served to prepare the way for the
construction of a more advanced concept of velocity which
differentiated average velocity and instantaneous velocity.
Kuhn appears to propose that the development of the child's
concept of velocity recapitulated the historical development
of the concept in that both shared a similar paradoxical
quality of discovery.
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Kuhn goes on to discuss how a brilliant logician and
physicist such as Aristotle could have proposed such an
undifferentiated concept of velocity. While his concept of
velocity may appear confused and self-contradictory to us it
was quite consistent with his world view of motions which
were uniform or quasi- uniform. In Aristotle's world of uni-
form motion his definition of average velocity functioned so
successfully that conflict rarely occurred. Hence no in-
trinsic defect existed in the concept itself. Kuhn states:
Its defect lay not in its logical consistency but in its
failure to fit the full fine structure of the world to
which it was expected to apply. That is why learning to
recognize its defects was necessarily learning about the
world as well as about the concept. (Kuhn, 1977, p.
258)
Hence the paradoxical defect or inadequacy was not inherent
in the concept itself but in the interactive application of
the concept to the varied conditions of the world. Both
Galileo's increased experimental scrutiny and paradoxical
"thought experiment" appear to have been necessary condi-
tions for reformulating a new concept of velocity and
acceleration. This reformulation constituted a new way of
seeing the world in more depth.
Kuhn's discussion of the "essential tension," "anom-
aly," "paradoxical thought experiment," and gestalt "new way
of seeing" all serve to more adequately conceptualize the
creative process of paradigm shift. However, the criticism
raised earlier concerning "meaning variance between
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theories has not completely been answered. Kuhn maintains
that with the radical gestalt shift from one paradigm to
another a radical translation occurs in the common vocabu-
lary between paradigms such as "force," "mass," "inertia,"
"motion," "length," "space," "time," etc. For example the
term "motion" developmentally shifts from Aristotle's global
term of "average velocity" to Galileo's more complete term
of "average velocity" and "instantaneous velocity" on to the
even more complete advances of Newton's concept of absolute
acceleration and Einstein's concept of relative accelera-
tion. Aristotle's concept of "average velocity" and Gali-
leo's concept of "average velocity" may seem comparable.
However, Aristotle's concept of "average velocity" was in-
terpreted more globally in terms of a different world view.
Hence there is no one-to-one literal correspondence between
the two. Rather it was the genius of Galileo to show
through an imaginary "thought experiment" the paradoxical
implications which occur when Aristotle's global concept of
average velocity is translated into a new world view. The
same may be said of Piaget's children. They did not merely
learn a more precisely differentiated definition of velo-
city, rather they constructed a qualitatively new meaning of
velocity which incorporated and redefined the preceding con-
cepts .
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Kuhn's critics (Achinstein, 1964, pp . 497-509)
(Shapere, 1964
, pp . 383-94) maintain that theory laden radi-
cal shifts in "meaning" from theory to theory pose the irre-
solvable paradox of "unintelligibility." The paradox of
unintelligibility is:
. . . that if meaning variance is taken literally to be
true, then it would be impossible to understand a new
theory since the new terms in it would be unrelated to
the meanings they had in previous theories. The mean-
ings of these terms rested upon their context in the
theory but one could never understand the theory without
first knowing the meaning of the constituents terms and
this is impossible without understanding the theory.
(MacCormac, 1971, pp. 145-59)
In other words, if we accept that the meaning of a theory's
basic vocabulary is theory dependent then a radical shift in
the theory would create a qualitative variance in the mean-
ing of the basic vocabulary which in turn would make precise
literal communication impossible.
According to Hesse (1980, pp. 111-25) and MacCormac
(1971, pp. 145-59) metaphoric meaning serves the explanatory
function of providing "meaning variance" and hence resolves
the paradox of unintelligibilty in paradigm shifts:
If the interaction view of scientific metaphor or model
is combined with the claim that the referent of the
metaphor is the primary system (that is, the metaphor is
true of the primary system) , then it follows that the
thesis of meaning-invariance of the literal observation-
descriptions of the primary system is false. For, the
interaction view implies that the meaning of the origi-
nal literal language of the primary system is changed by
the adaption of the metaphor. (Mary Hesse, 1980, p.
119)
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In other words we have no direct perception of nature as the
realist would claim. The primary observational referent of
"nature" is always understood in terms of an implicit or ex-
plicit secondary metaphoric model. Plato conceived of
nature in the likeness of a human organism. Newton con-
ceived of nature in the likeness of a machine. The adoption
of the Newtonian metaphor of "machine" no doubt helped to
resolve many of the anomalies created by the Platonic meta-
phor of "nature as a human organism." With the advent of
the Newtonian metaphor of "nature as a machine" the primary
observational language system we used to describe "nature"
was changed. However it would be false to say that nature
literally became a "machine" any more than we would say it
was a "human organism." To do so would be to falsely reify
the metaphor and reduce it to a static myth. There is no
one-to-one correspondence between "nature" and "machine" nor
can we deduce the laws of nature a priori from the laws of
the machine as the logical positivist claim. Rather there
is an interaction between the meanings of both the primary
observational language system of "nature" and the secondary
model of "machine." Hesse states, "Nature becomes more like
a machine in the mechanical philosophy, and actual, concrete
machines themselves are seen as if stripped down to their
essential qualities of mass in motion" (Hesse, 1980, p.
117). In other words the secondary model, "machine," is
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redefined in terms of "nature" and the primary observational
language of "nature" is redescribed in terms of the "ma-
chine." Hence with the adoption of the scientific term of
"machine" as a metaphor not only does its new metaphoric
application change our world view but the old usage of
"machine" is redefined as well. Thus the metaphoric re-
definition of the old usage of "machine" and its new inter-
pretive redescription of "nature" accounts for "meaning-
variance" in paradigm shifts. Hence the word "machine"
takes on a qualitatively new meaning compared with its old
animistic meaning. There is no one-to-one correspondence
between the new usage and the old usage. However, they are
not "unintelligibly unrelated. " Rather their relation
constitutes a metaphoric transformation which is intel-
ligible and empirically testable. Hesse argues that from
the deductive view of the logical positivist there is no
strong sense of prediction because they cannot account for
the addition of new correspondence laws between the primary
observation system and the secondary theoretical system for
a developing science. She states:
In the metaphoric view, on the other hand, since the
domain of the explanation is redescribed in terminology
transferred from the secondary system, it is to be ex-
pected that the original observation language will both
be shifted in meaning and extended in vocabulary, and
hence that predictions in the strong sense will become
possible. They may not of course turn out to be true,
but that is an occupational hazard of any explanation or
prediction. They will however be rational, because,
rationality consists just in the continuous adaptation
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of our language to our continually expanding world and
metaphor is one of the chief means by which this is
accomplished. (Hesse, 1980, p. 123)
The concept of interactive metaphor allows us to
account for intelligible "meaning variance" in paradigm
shifts. The paradigm shift from understanding motion as
Aristotle's velocity to Galileo's velocity was a metaphoric
transformation of the meaning of "motion as velocity."
Galileo both exposed the paradoxical anomaly of Aristotle's
metaphor of velocity and proposed a new metaphoric resolu-
tion which incorporated and redefined the paradoxical ele-
ments of Aristotle's metaphor. Likewise Piaget's children
constructed a new metaphor for velocity which resolved the
paradoxical conflict of their previous concepts. This new
metaphoric construction of velocity incorporated and rede-
fined the previous paradoxical concepts of "goal reaching"
and "perceptual blurriness." Both Piaget's children and
Galileo's metaphoric constructions of velocity resolved
paradoxical anomalies with genuine novelty and intelligible
order.
Summary
In final summary of the review of literature we shall
briefly recapitulate the constructive theories presented.
For learning, production, development and theory change we
have presented the theoretical poles of "trivial and radi-
cal" creativity which are expressive of the general dilemma
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of the creative process and various second-order resolutions
of "genuine" creativity. Essentially all the constructive
second-order resolutions of genuine creativity involve the
functional coordination of first-order opposites leading to
a second-order reintegration of the opposites . Concerning
creative learning Duckworth proposes the constructive inter-
play of conflicting differences between perceptions, ac-
tions, and words. Petrie proposes the constructive interac-
tion of metaphoric words and applied actions in triangulat-
ing anomalies. Concerning creative production Koestler
proposes the coordination of the opposites of bisociation or
the intersection of incompatible frames of reference which
generate multiple levels of metaphoric insight. Rothenberg
proposes the active conception of opposites simultaneously
in the Janusian thought processes and the assisting of
homospatial processes which generate new metaphoric integra-
tions of the Janusian opposites. Concerning creative cogni-
tive development Piaget proposes the progressive equilibra-
tion of asynchronous schemes leading to a second-order
reconstruction. Concerning creative theory change Kuhn
proposes the "essential tension" between old and new para-
digms and the propaedeutic role of thought experiments in
exposing and harnessing the paradoxical anomalies of old
paradigms. Hesses proposes the functional explanation of
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metaphor to account for the discrepancy of meaning variance
in theory change.
In the next chapter we shall further develop a general
model of constructive creativity which incorporates and ex-
tends the reviewed theories. More specifically we shall de-
fine constructive creativity as the functional coordination
of first-order opposites leading to a second-order reinte-
gration of opposites. Furthermore we shall essentially
characterize the second-order reintegration of opposites as
a metaphoric process.
CHAPTER I V
THE METAPHORIC RESOLUTION OF THE
PARADOX OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS
In this chapter we propose that the process of "meta-
phoric reframing" coherently resolves the paradox of crea-
tivity by providing an explicable genesis for the "genuine"
novelty of second-order recreating. Many writers have
expounded upon the fundamental importance of metaphor and
analogy as symbolic vehicles for the creative process in
science and art (Aristotle, 1941) (Bronowski, 1975) (Bruner,
1973) (Gordon, 1973) (Koestler, 1969) (Samples, 1976).
Aristotle praises the importance of metaphor for expressing
the similarity of the dissimilar, "... the greatest thing
by far is to be a master of metaphor; it is the one thing
that cannot be learned from others; and it also a sign of
genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive percep-
tion of the similarity of the dissimilar" (Aristotle,
Poetics, 1459a). Bronowski maintains that metaphors and
analogies are the stepping stones of every creative mind.
Kepler's mind, we know, was filled with just such fanci-
ful analogies; and we know what they were. Kepler
wanted to relate the speeds of the planets to the musi-
cal intervals. He tried to fit the five regular solids
into their orbits. None of these likenesses worked, and
they have been forgotten; yet they have been and they
remain the stepping stones of every creative mind. . . .
To us, the analogies by which Kepler listened for the
movement of the planets in the music of the spheres are
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farfetched. Yet are they more so than the wild leap by
which Rutherford and Bohr in our century found a model
for that atom in, of all places, the planetary system?
(Bronowski, 1975, p. 12).
Koestler speaks to the metaphoric process of intersecting
frames of reference common to the creative process of both
scientist and poet:
... I have spoken at length of the close relatedness
between the scientist seeing an analogy where nobody saw
one before, and the poet's discovery of an original
metaphor or simile. Both rely on the mediation of
unconscious processes to provide the analogy. In the
scientist's eureka process two previously unconnected
frames of reference are made to intersect, but the same
description may be applied to the poet's travaille--the
discovery of a felicitous poetic comparison. The dif-
ference between them is the character of the frames of
reference, which in the first case are of a more ab-
stract, in the second of a more sensuous nature; and the
criteria of their validity differ accordingly. But the
difference, as we have seen, is a metter of degree; and
often the two overlap. (Koestler, 1969, p. 320)
While these writers and others have made laudable efforts in
documenting the importance of metaphor as a symbolic vehicle
of the creative process they have not provided a comprehen-
sive theory of creativity which adequately explicates the
functional structure and the dialectical dynamics of meta-
phor. This dissertation will attempt to explicate the func-
tional structure and the dialectical dynamics of metaphoric
reframing and to show the fundamentally common role it plays
in creative learning, creative production, cognitive devel-
opment and scientific theory change.
Next we shall review three theories of metaphoric com-
prehension: (1) comparison, (2) tension, (3) interaction.
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We shall argue that the comparison theory reduces metaphor
to an explicably trivial novelty and that "tension" and
interaction" are essential functions of metaphor which
account for genuine novelty but are in need of further
explication
.
Comparison Theory of Metaphor
According to the proponents of the comparison theory
(Aristotle, 1941) (Henle, 1958) (Ortony, 1975) all metaphors
are implicit similes in disguise and may be reduced to di-
rect comparison. For example the metaphor "society is a
sea" is reducible to the simile "society is like a sea. "
Thus we may find one-to-one points of similarity between the
pre-existing salient attributes and relations of the primary
referent of "society" and the secondary referent of "sea."
Hence in comprehending this metaphor we transfer the more
familiar attributes and relations of "sea" over to the less
apparent common attributes of "society." We could entirely
bypass indirect expressions such as "society is a sea" and
replace them with literal paraphrases such as "society is
large." This is the substitution view of metaphor which is
a special case of the comparison theory. The more general
view of the comparison theory states that we may totally
exhaust the meaning of metaphor with direct literal para-
phrases of similarity as "society is 'fluid,' 'flexible,'
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' fuil ' • • • like the sea." The weaker version of the com-
parison theory looks for physical attributes of similarity.
The stronger version of the comparison theory looks for
abstract relations and structures of similarity. In either
case the comprehension of metaphor is a systematically rule
governed process of directly comparing the well-defined
characteristics of both referents. Although the comparison
theory clearly explicates the comprehension of metaphor it
also, no matter how complex and abstract the corresponding
structures, reduces it to a trivial novelty of merely trans-
ferring pre-existing points of similarity.
Tension Theory of Metaphor
According to the proponents of the tension theory
(Beardsley, 1962) (Berggren, 1962) (Khatchadourian , 1968)
(Ricoeur, 1977) non- trivial metaphors are characterized by
an essential tension between the primary and secondary sub-
ject. For example with the metaphor "society is a sea" the
literal identity of "society" with "sea" created by the
copula "is" results in logical absurdity and emotional
shock. Goodman (1968) calls this a "calculated category
mistake." Beardsley (1962) calls it the "metaphoric twist
of logical opposition. Burke (1950) calls it "perspective
by incongruity." Berggren (1962) calls it the essential
tension of "stereoscopic vision." Ricoeur (1977) calls it
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the tensive "intersection of separate semantic fields." The
primary term, society," is derived from a "cultural" cate-
gory while the secondary term "sea" is derived from a
natural category. The tension between their identity and
difference suspends the normal rules of comparison and
evokes new meanings not exhaustively reducible by direct
comparison. While the comparison theory stresses similari-
ties the tension theory stresses dissimilarities which
necessitate restructuring for comprehension. The literal
meanings of "society" and "sea" are figuratively redefined
and incorporated into a new integrated meaning without
losing their tensive distinctiveness.
As the previous example suggests, the tension between
the referents can neither be too little or too bland if the
metaphor is to construct a surprising novelty. On the other
hand the paradoxical tension must not be too much for then
it may lose its meaningfulness. For example the metaphoric
sentence "society is a paper" creates an absurd discrepancy
between the referents of "society" and "paper" which is nei-
ther very meaningful nor aesthetically pleasing. Of course
within a different context for a particular purpose even
this metaphor may become meaningfully apt. For example a
newspaper writer may use this metaphor to express a new in-
sight about the relation of the media and society. However,
even within this situation the metaphor will depend upon
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some appropriate level of aesthetic tension for conveying
both meaning fulnes s and the surprise of genuine novelty.
Hence the aesthetic tension must neither be too little for
it lapses into a bland comparison of trivial novelty nor too
great for it ruptures the meaningful relation with a freak-
ish novelty.
Because of metaphor's irreducible aesthetic tension it
is able to express compacted vivid new meanings not expres-
sible by more elaborate direct comparisons or abstract defi-
nition. Through this generative tension metaphors such as
"society is a sea" may spawn new metaphors with divergent
meanings such as "life is an ocean of tribulation" or
"life's brightest treasures are discovered in the dark
depths of the sea. " In some fundamental sense the rich aes-
thetic tension of metaphor can never be completely reduced;
it can only be revisioned or reimagined in a different meta-
phoric form. Hence metaphor begets metaphor and ultimately
can only be understood through its own terms . This presents
inherent theoretical limitations for writers trying to
explicate metaphor in the reductionistic terms of direct
comparison or tensionless abstraction. The theory of ten-
sion accounts for the genuine novelty of metaphor. However,
the aesthetic tension of the primary and secondary system of
meaning must needs be further explicated in terms congruent
with its rich multi— leveled opposition. Dialectics offsrs a
distinct possibility for explicating the coordination of
these opposites.
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Interaction Theory of Metaphor
According to proponents of the interaction theory
(Black, 1954-55) (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980) (Ricoeur, 1978)
(Richards, 1936) non-trivial metaphors are comprehended
through an interaction between the primary referent and the
secondary referent. The weaker version of this theory pro-
poses that the secondary referent acts as a "filter," "lens"
or "screen "for reorganizing the meaning of the primary re-
ferent. For instance in the metaphor "society is a sea" we
may view "society" through the "lens," "screen" or "filter"
of sea's system of meaning. This "screening" causes certain
aspects of "society" to be suppressed and new insights to be
highlighted in terms of "sea." In other words "society" be-
comes more like the "sea. " This may produce new insights
into the fluid interrelatedness of "society." Hence this is
not merely a transference of attributes but rather a fil-
tered reorganization of the primary system of meaning.
The "weaker" filter version of the interaction theory
may be criticized for its static one-way account of inter-
action. The "stronger" version of the interaction theory
proposes a mutual interaction between the primary and sec-
ondary system of meaning. Hence in our example "society"
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becomes more like the "sea" but also "sea" becomes more like
a society.' Hence there is no specially privileged "lens"
or "filter" of detached observation. The "filter," that is,
the secondary referent, is mutually changed also. According
to the strong interaction theory the similarity of the
primary and secondary referent is not a pre-existing impli-
cit correspondence to be discovered rather the similarity is
synchronously created through interaction. Burke (1950) ex-
presses this interaction as understanding "this" in terms of
"that" and "that" in terms of "this." Hence "society"
becomes defined in terms of "sea" and "sea" becomes defined
in terms of "society." This is not a vicious circle of
contradiction or repetition but rather a double spiral of
constructive new meaning which is neither completely reduc-
ible nor expressible by direct comparison.
The filter theory rightfully emphasizes the asymmetri-
cal relation of tending to view the primary referent in
terms of the secondary referent. The secondary referent is
usually more familiar and tangible and hence may be useful
in explaining the less familiar or tangible aspects of the
primary referent. For instance "sea" provides tangibly
familiar attributes and relations through which to vividly
portray "society." Admittedly this asymmetry is one of
metaphor's fundamental qualities which cannot be reduced to
logical symmetry (de Man, 1978). However, the "strong"
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version of interaction incorporates this and goes beyond it
to include the mutual asymmetry of viewing the secondary
referent in terms of the primary referent also. While the
asymmetry of explicitly viewing the primary referent in
terms of the secondary term tends to make the unfamiliar or
strange more familiar the asymmetry of implicitly viewing
the secondary referent in terms of the primary referent
tends to make the familiar somewhat strange. The primary
referent of "society" viewed in terms of the secondary
referent of "sea" tends to assimilate to the more tangible
aspects of "sea," while the secondary referent of "sea" seen
in terms of the primary referent of "society" tends to ac-
commodate to the more abstract qualities of "sea." The
mutual contrast of these views creates a binocular perspec-
tive which goes beyond the one-way monocular view of the
filter or lens theory. Hence "society" seen in terms of
"sea" takes on the familiar tangible qualities of fluidity
and interconnectedness while simultaneously "sea" seen in
terms of "society" takes on the strange abstract qualities
of communica tional and transporta tional networks. This
intersection of contrasting views creates a two-way asymme-
trical interaction which goes beyond the one-way asymmetry
of filter theory by both making the strange familiar and the
familiar strange simultaneously.
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Gordon (1973) has argued that these are separate func-
tions of metaphor. Scientific metaphors tend to make the
unfamiliar or strange more familiar and artistic metaphors
tend to make the familiar or commonplace strangely new. The
strong interaction view of metaphor incorporates the simul-
taneous interaction of both these functions. Although the
scientific metaphor may be weighed toward making the strange
familiar its genuine novelty arises from the reciprocal pro-
cess of making the familiar strange. The artistic metaphor
may be weighed toward making the familiar strange but its
comprehensible order comes from making the strange familiar.
These are not separate functions but their mutual interac-
tion is necessary to account for both the explicable
order of making the strange familiar and the genuine novelty
of making the familiar strange simultaneously.
Before summarizing the three theories of metaphor we
must consider the meta-cognitive factors of "intention" and
"context. " The interpretation and creation of metaphor is
partially a function of "intention" and "context. " The
metaphor "society is a sea" will be interpreted differently
according to whether the context is the English classroom or
the sociology classroom and whether it is intended as a test
question or a free discussion subject. For the interpreta-
tion of comparative metaphors "context" and "intention
guide the selection of pre-existing similarity. For tension
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and interactive metaphors "context" and "intention" play an
even more important role because the metaphor's contrasting
differences lead to a restructuring of meaning which is con-
gruent with "intention" and "context."
The theory of comparative metaphor even in its strong-
est version only provides for an explication of the trivial
novelty of pre-existing complex structural similarity. The
tension theory of metaphor provides a general account of
genuine novelty but is in need of further explication as to
how the irreducible aesthetic tension interacts to provoke a
restructuring of the genuine novelty. The interactive theo-
ry in its weaker "filter" version is inadequate to explicate
genuine novelty because of its static one-way interaction.
The stronger version of mutual interaction is adequate to
account for genuine novelty but needs further explication of
how the interaction balances the aesthetic tension. Thus
both theories of "tension" and "interaction" appear to be
necessary to the fuller explication of genuine novelty.
Furthermore it must be noted that both functional
qualities of "tension" and "interaction" are found in
Piaget's concept of "reciprocal equilibration" leading to
reconstructions (Piaget, 1972) . The reciprocal equilibra-
tion of the primary system of "society" and the secondary
system of "sea" would be the reciprocal assimilation and
accommodation of "society" with "sea." In other words the
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system of meaning of "society" would cross assimilate and
accommodate the system of meaning of "sea" and vice-versa.
Those points of direct comparison would be readily assimi-
lated to each other. Those points of dissimilarity would
require mutual accommodation and thus restructuring to
create a new second-order reintegration. For Piaget this
new integration would be subsumed by logico-mathematical
structures which converge toward formal non-contradiction
(Piaget, 1980, p. 304). However, metaphor is aesthetically
structured with an irreducible contrasting tension of cross-
typed categories. It will be argued that Piaget’s charac-
terization of cognitive development as converging toward
formal non-contradiction reduces the metaphoric richness of
his own theory and precludes the development of advanced
metaphoric operations beyond formal operations. While
Piaget's logico-mathematical structures may be appropriate
approximations for closed structures under first-order equi-
librium states they are not appropriate for open structures
equilibrating second-order transition. Thus we will argue
the primacy of metaphoric operations in the genesis of
genuinely novel structures and the constructive advance of
metaphoric operations beyond formal operations.
At this point we may offer a preliminary definition of
metaphoric reframing and further elaborate it with examples.
Metaphoric reframing as a dialectical process is the
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horizontal first-order coordination of the opposition of the
primary and secondary system through which is constructed a
vertical second-order recoordinating of the opposition.
This vertical second-order recoordinating broadens and deep-
ens the world with genuine novelty and an explicable order
which is aesthetically certain and contextually sensitive.
In simpler terms metaphoric reframing is the generation of
unity through diversity since it begins with the paradoxical
diversity of opposites and ends with the metaphoric unity of
opposites
.
Visual Experiment of the Profiled Vase
We may illustrate the dialectics of metaphoric refram-
ing with the following visual experiment using the equivocal
gestalt of profiled faces and vase (see Figure 13) . Within
the context of this simple visual experiment we may perform
a variety of visual exercises. Beginning with an initial
visual orientation to the equivocal figure we may then abso-
lutely differentiate the "faces" to the neglect of the "vase
or we may absolutely differentiate the "vase" to the neglect
of the "faces." Not too difficult a task. In fact it seems
quite easy to sporadically fixate on one aspect of the equi-
vocal figure to the indifference of the other. Next we may
actively shift the equivocal figure back and forth between
the mutually exclusive fixations of "either" the faces "or"
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Figure 13. Visual experiment with profiled faces.
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vase ^- n alternation
. Sense the conflicting tension
which comes with the discontinuous shifting between the
mutually exclusive fixations. Experimental studies have
shown that self-perceived creative people spontaneously
alternate equivocal figures at a higher frequency than non-
self-perceived creative people (Bergum, 1979) . Next we may
resolve the conflicting tension by reducing the equivocal
shifting to merely an abstract composite of the collective
set of lines of "both" the faces "and" vase. After all
isn't the conflicting tension just an illusion in our mind?
The lines are not actually moving on the paper are they?
Isn't it just an abstract pattern of static lines into which
we read the shifting illusion? Quite rationally we may per-
ceive the equivocal figure as merely an abstract set of
lines devoid of the conflicting tension previously per-
ceived.
Finally for the most difficult task, we may attempt to
resolve the conflicting tension of the equivocal figure not
by rationally reducing it to an abstract composite of lines
merely on the paper but by actively interacting with the
figure to construct an integration of both the faces and
vase shifting into a common space simultaneously. According
to Rothenberg (1979a, p. 274) the metaphoric ability to
integrate equivocal gestalts simultaneously in space exem-
plifies the type of visual thinking that highly creative
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people use in problem solving. Usually this attempt at best
speeds up the shifting perception to a rapid alternation
around their indeterminate point of meeting. We hover back
and forth dialectically through the indeterminate visual gap
of a shifting illusion. Yet the common ground of their
intersection eludes us. The simultaneous recoordination of
the equivocal gestalt is "neither" in the faces shifting to
the vase "nor" in the vase shifting to the faces but rather
is generated through the co-reflexive intersection of their
cross-shifting (see Figure 14)
.
Through the co- reflexive
intersection we see what is neither in the vase reflecting
the faces nor the face the vase but rather is constructively
imaged through the allusory interference pattern mutually
reflecting both . Through the common point of an indetermi-
nate visual intersection arises the genuinely novel percep-
tion of a metaphoric integration. What was an illusory
shifting point becomes the pivot of a metaphoric recoordina-
tion .
If you feel defeated by the "normally" impossible vis-
ual exercise of the last task then try recontextualizing
your expectations of the rigid rules of the experiment with
the flexible rules of an imaginative game. Imagine the
equivocal gestalt as "twins kissing a flower vase." Through
this metaphoric image the shifting illusion is brought into
a coherent focus (hopefully!). Through the neither
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Faces Vase
Figure 14. Co-reflexive intersection of profiled
faces
.
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foreground "nor" background point of the kisses the elusive
illusion is transformed into an enduring allusion. The
metaphoric transformation is a dialectical shift from a
vaguely felt indeterminate gap of perception to the felt-
meaning of a focal moment. Within the context of a meta-
phoric thought experiment new metaphoric meanings are
constructed through the co-reflexive intersection of a
shifting illusion.
The visual experiment of constructing a metaphoric
image may be developmentally summarized and elaborated
according to five dialectical steps of progressive coordina-
tion: (1) global perception, (2) absolute differentiation
of faces and vase, (3) "either" faces "or" vases , (4) "both"
faces "and" vase
, (5) "neither" faces "nor" vase metaphoric
integration. The "global perception" is the initial visual
orientation to the strange figure. The "absolute differen-
tiation" is the disjoint fixation on one aspect of the
equivocal figure to the indifference of the other. From
this one-side indifference we dialectically move to the more
complete coordination of "either" faces "or" vase . At this
level of perception we confront the conflict of the discon-
tinuous shifting between the mutually exclusive fixation
points. The equivocal inconsistency of this perception dia-
lectically leads to the rational consistency of "both" the
faces "and" vase as merely an abstract composite of lines on
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the paper. However the abstract class inclusion of this
level is statically incomplete because it lacks the dynamic
interaction between the "vase" and "faces." The "vase" and
"faces" have become objectively detached lines buried in the
paper. A more sophisticated extension of the "both/and"
coordination attempts to account for the interaction by
reducing the discontinuous gap between the two opposing
fixations to a continuous sequence of intervening static
positions. The additive summation of these successive posi-
tions becomes a more sophisticated composite of discrete
degrees by which to view the equivocal figure. However this
more sophisticated composite is still statically incomplete
because it does not capture the dynamic unity of the inter-
secting differences of the "faces" and "vase." It is merely
a rationalistic overlay of a static grid for reducing the
conflicting differences to a bland consistency. The dynamic
unity is "neither" in the faces "nor" in the vase taken
singly or as an additive composite. Rather the dynamic
unity is metaphorically displayed as a "quivering kiss"
which takes place through the intimate intersection of
"twins kissing a flower vase." The "quivering kiss" is
continually regenerated anew to repeatedly remake the un-
making of the contrasting differences and not to continu-
ously reduce the conflicting differences to a bland consis-
tency. The unity of this dynamic intersection is generated
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because of" the contrasting differences and not merely "in
spite of" as with the "both/and" coordination.
Next we may interpret the literary metaphor "Society
is a sea" according to the metaphoric dialectic as we did
for the previous visual metaphor. At the global level of
coordination we initially orient ourselves to the new sen-
tence. Next we may absolutely differentiate the subject of
"society" to the neglect of "sea" and/or vice-versa. Soon
the incompleteness of this interpretation leads to the more
complete but inconsistent literal interpretation of "either"
society "or" sea in discontinuous interaction. At this
level the logical absurdity of the literally fused identity
created by the copula "is" provokes the search for hidden
similarities to reduce the conflicting differences. This
search for a reduction of the conflicting differences leads
to the next level of consistent similarities between "both"
society "and" sea . At this level we reduce the metaphor to
a simile "Society is like a sea" in order to find common
points of correspondence and degrees of resemblance. With
the "both/and" interpretation we successively view society
from the relative perspective of sea and then sea from the
relative perspective of society searching for a pre-
established continuity between the two. However, this is
like shifting from viewing the world with one eye to the
other in rapid succession trying to behold the greater
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dimension of binocular depth. This relative oscillation of
the two monocular perspectives is not enough to additively
generate the extra dimension of the binocular perspective.
The incompleteness of the flat consistency of the "both/and"
level leads to the next level. The meaning of metaphor
is "neither" in the perspective of viewing society in terms
of sea "nor" in the complementary perspective of viewing the
sea in terms of society . Rather the generation of metaphor-
ic meaning takes place through the co-reflexive intersection
of the two contrasting perspectives simultaneously (see
Figure 15) . Through the focal coordination of both first-
order perspectives integrated simultaneously we construct
the second-order co-reflexive perspective. This is analo-
gous to binocular vision which allows us to construct the
extra dimension of depth which is invisible to either eye
alone
.
Co-Reflexive Perspectives
The distinction between "relative" perspectives and a
"co— ref lexive " perspective may be further clarified. Thus
far we have indicated that the "relative" perspectives of
the "both/and" level are like an alternating double monocu-
lar vision while the "co-reflexive" perspective of the
"neither/nor" level is a single binocular vision. Thus the
"relative" perspectives are temporally dependent and
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Figure 15.
a Sea.
"
Co-reflexive intersection of "Society is
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continuously summed for consistency while the single co-
reflexive perspective is structurally interdependent and
constructively multiplied for fuller coherence. The "co-
reflexive" perspective generates irreducible tensive inter-
pretations such as "the sea is submerging society's ever
emerging reefs" while the "relative" perspective merely
reveals "society's" pre-existing "fluid" like attributes.
While the "relative" perspective reveals a bland, flat,
tensionless abstraction of attributes and static relations
the "co-reflexive" perspective displays a rich, textured,
tensive image of opposites uniting through their contrasting
differences
.
The concept of "co-reflection " may be further differ-
entiated by contrasting it with the related mathematical
concept of "reciprocity." In mathematics given a group the
reciprocal of an element is its opposite which when combined
with it produces the identity element. Furthermore, the
reciprocal operation is closed under transformation, that
is, it always comes back to the original identity. For
example given the group of rational numbers with the trans-
formational operation of multiplication we may pick any ra-
tional number such as "five" and multiply it by its recipro-
cal of "one-fifth" to result in the original identity ele-
ment of "one." Given the visual system of the equivocally
profiled vase we may begin with the vase and shift to the
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faces. The reciprocal of this transformational shift is the
reverse shift from the faces back to the vase, that is, back
to the origin or identity. The reciprocal operation is a
first-order operation closed under transformation. it
always comes back to where it began. At the "both/and"
level of coordinating the relative perspective and its
reciprocal perspective there is the ongoing oscillation of
perspectives which shifts back and forth through their inde-
terminate intersection yet always returning to the origin.
The reciprocal transformation confirms and maintains the
identity of the first-order system but it is not productive
of a new second-order identity such as the visual metaphor
of the "twins kissing the vase." The relative perspective
and its reciprocal shift back and forth through their inde-
terminate intersection yet they miss the essential point of
their focal coordination . The co-reflexive perspective is
neither the relative perspective nor its reciprocal rather
it is their simultaneous focal coordination through which is
generated a new second-order identity.
Co-reflexivity may be further clarified by explicating
the "reflexive" quality. A system is reflexive if it refers
to itself, that is, it is self-referential (Bronowski, 1966,
p. 129) (Hughes and Bruecht, 1979, p. 1). For example some
direct tautological examples of ref lexivity are: "This sen-
tence has five words," "This is a sentence," and "This is a
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true sentence." A paradoxical form of reflexivity is
exemplified in the following form, "This sentence is false."
While the tautological examples are self-evident truths the
paradoxical form is more thought provoking. If the sentence
is false then it is true by virtue of what it says "about"
itself and if it is true then it is false by virtue of what
it says it "is" (Gardner, 1982, p. 5) . The original form of
this thought provoking "reflexivity" is the classical para-
dox stated by Epimenides of Crete in 5th century B.C., "All
Cretans are liars." As Watzlawick states, "If it is true
that all Cretans are liars, then Epimenides spoke the truth,
but then the truth is that he is lying. He is therefore
truthful when he lies and lying when he is truthful" (Watzla-
wick
,
1974, p. 66 )
.
Some have argued that this type of paradox is a mean-
ingless absurdity which should be eliminated (Russell 19 25) .
Others have argued that it is a meaningful indeterminacy
which serves to dereify our rigid concept of an absolute
two-value logic ((Brand, 1974). Spencer-Brown (1979, xiv-
xv) has shown that "imaginary" numbers in mathematics have
the same logical form as this reflexive paradox. Consider
the imaginary number equation x =-l. Just as the Liar's
paradox may be assigned the following mutually exclusive
truth values of "true," "false" and "meaningless" the equa-
tion x 2=-l in its translated equivalent form of x=-l/x may
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be assigned the mutually exclusive numerical values of "1,"
-1 and 0.' If x=l then +1=-1/+1=-1 is clearly paradoxi-
cal. This is equivalent to saying if the paradoxical state-
ment "I am a liar" is true then it is true that I am lying.
On the other hand if x=-l then -1=-1/-1=+1 which is equiva-
lent to saying if the paradoxical statement "I am a liar" is
false then it is false that I am telling the truth. Fur-
thermore mathematicians consider setting x=0 a nonproductive
deadend which creates a faulty division by zero. This is
equivalent to assigning the truth value of "meaningless" to
"I am a liar" and creating a nonproductive resolution which
is faulty. Of course mathematicians did not prohibit equa-
2tions such as x =-l just because none of the ordinary values
worked. Rather they constructed a new class of numbers
called "imaginary" numbers which are essential to the solu-
tion of many electrical engineering and quantum mechanics
problems. Just as mathematicians constructed a new class of
"imaginary" numbers logicians are beginning to construct new
systems of logic which utilize reflexivity (Spencer-Brown,
1979) (Varela 1975).
While the previous versions of the Liar's paradox are
direct one-level forms we may consider an equivalent indi-
rect two— level form of the Liar's paradox which is closer to
the co-reflexive form of metaphor. Consider the following
imaginary conversation:
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Aristotle: "What Plato is saying is false."
Plato: "What Aristotle is saying is true.
"
This is a "two-level" statement because of the two different
speakers and it is "indirectly" reflexive because each
speaker refers to their self through the other. Hence we
term this mutual reflexivity a "co-reflexivity " because it
is the indirect self-reference of two or more terms . Fur-
thermore, this co-reflexive statement is "paradoxical"
because they are conflicting opposites . It is important to
note that they are not merely saying what each other is say-
ing is false, a mutual denial, rather they are both denying
their affirmation and affirming their denial of each other
(simultaneously) . More specifically this "imaginary" co-
reflexive conversation implies, "It is true that what
Aristotle is saying through Plato is false and false that
what Plato is saying through Aristotle is true. " They must
be talking about the paradox of creativity or better yet
their dialectical dialogue exemplifies the paradoxical qual-
ity of the creative process.
Next we may consider how this form of paradoxical co-
ref lexivity is exemplified in metaphor. In metaphor the
primary system is becoming defined in terms of the secondary
system and the secondary system is becoming defined in terms
of the primary system. For example in the metaphor, Soci-
ety is a sea," the primary system, "Society," is becoming
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defined in terms of the more familiar, tangible secondary
system of the "sea" and the secondary system "sea," is be-
coming defined in terms of the strangely more abstract
primary system of "society." In the Gordian terms (Gordon
1973) of how metaphor serves to make the "strange familiar"
and the "familiar strange" we may eavesdrop on the following
imaginary conversation between the primary and secondary
characters of the metaphor, "society is a sea,"
Sea: "What ’Society' is saying is strange."
Society: "What 'Sea' is saying is familiar."
This imaginary co-reflexive conversation implies that, "It
is familiar that what 'society' is saying through the 'sea'
is strange and it is strange that what 'sea' is saying
through 'society' is familiar." In the creative process of
constructing new meanings for the metaphor, "society is a
sea," the primary system, through interaction with the sec-
ondary system, sea, becomes "strangely familiar" and the
secondary system, sea, through interaction with the primary
system, society, becomes "familiarly strange" (see Figure
16. Hence the meaning of the metaphor is deepened and
broadened simultaneously.
In the Piagetian terms of "assimilation" and "accommo-
dation" we may imagine a similar metaphoric conversation as
before. Jimenez (1976) has explained that "assimilation" is
essentially a metaphoric process of making the "strange
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Figure 16. Co-reflexive coordination of metaphor,
"Society is a sea" in Gordian terms.
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familiar and that "accommodation" is a process of making
the familiar strange." In the following imaginary conver-
sation both functions of "assimilation" (strange familiar-
ity) and "accommodation" (familiar strangeness) are co-
reflexively coordinated.
Sea: "What 'Society' is saying is accommodating."
Society: "What 'Sea' is saying is assimilating."
This imaginary co-reflexive conversation implies that, "It
is very assimilating that what 'society' is saying through
the 'sea' is oddly accommodating and it is oddly accommodat-
ing that what 'sea' is saying through 'society' is very
assimilating." In the creative process of constructing new
meanings for the metaphor, "Society is a sea," the primary
system, society, through interaction with the secondary
system, sea, becomes "accommodatingly assimilated" and the
secondary system, sea, through interaction with the primary
system, society, becomes "assimi lating ly accommodated" (see
Figure 17) . Thus genuinely new metaphoric meaning is
reconstructed through the co-reflexive interaction of the
reciprocal opposites of the primary and secondary system.
The co-reflexive coordinating of reciprocal opposites
is a "dialectical double spiral" of the primary system
becoming "accommodatingly assimilated" through the secondary
system and the secondary system becoming "assimilatingly
accommodated" through the primary system simultaneously (see
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Primary System, Sea Secondary System,
in background Society in background
Figure 17. Co-reflexive coordination of metaphor,
"Society is a sea" in Piagetian terms.
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Figure 18). (The author is indebted to Pratt (1979) for the
concept of the "dialectical double spiral.") This "dialec-
tical double spiral" broadens and deepens the solidity of
knowledge as opposed to a single vertical spiral which is
ever ascending to greater heights of abstract knowledge.
While the abstract spiral constructs general forms indepen-
dent of context the metaphoric spiral constructs aesthetic
forms which are increasingly sensitive and integrated with
the context. For instance the metaphor "society is a sea"
shifts meaning depending on whether the context is a poetry
classroom or a sociology classroom. The formula E=mc has
the same static general form regardless of the context.
The paradoxical co-reflexivity of metaphor is very
difficult to explicate because it cannot be reduced to the
analytical concepts of isomorphic comparison, relativity or
reciprocity. Rather metaphor with its own explicable form
of co-reflexivity encompasses and dereifies these static,
rationalistic terms in order to go beyond them to express
the germ of an ambivalent form in the process of becoming
integrated. The creative process as a form in the process
of becoming bursts through all static forms.
Furthermore even "set- theoretic " relations of union,
intersection, subset and supraordinate set are inadequate
because their relational boundaries are relatively fixed.
The relational boundaries of metaphor are indeterminantly
165
Broadening «<-
Secondary System
} Broadening
Primary System sy Secondary System
Deepening
Figure 18. Dialectical double spiral which broadens
and deepens knowledge simultaneously.
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co reflexive. Consider the visual metaphor of the profiled
vase. Is the set of points which constitutes the boundary
line a subset of the area of the profiles or a subset of the
area of the vase? If we perceive the profiles in the fore-
ground then the boundary is a subset of the profiles. If we
perceive the vase in the foreground then the boundary is a
subset of the vase. However, with the metaphoric integra-
tion of the profiled vase the boundary line is neither a
subset of the vase nor a subset of the profiles. Rather the
indeterminate boundary lines become superimposed in a
second-order, co-reflexive superspace which Rothenberg
(1979a, p. 268) characterizes as homospatial thinking. At
this higher level the vase and profiles are metaphorically
united through the mutually opposing intersection of their
contrasting differences and not merely in spite of their
differences as in the mutually consistent intersection of
overlapping sets.
At this point we may further note the perplexity which
"reflexivity " (self-reference) caused Russell in his attempt
to construct a universal set theory to encompass all of
mathematics. According to Hofstadter (1979, p. 20) the
basic paradox stems from the inherent ambiguity of "run-of-
the-mill sets" and "self-swallowing sets." The run-of-the-
mill sets" are the vast majority of sets which are not
members of themselves. For example, the set of walruses is
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not a walrus. However, some sets are self-swallowing since
they contain themselves such as the set of all sets or the
set of all things except walruses. Clearly a set is either
a "run-of-the-mill set" or a "self-swallowing set" but not
both. However, when we consider the logical possibility of
the "set of all run-of-the-mill sets" we are confronted with
a paradox. This set is neither a "run-of-the-mill set" nor
a "self-swallowing set." If it is a "run-of-the-mill set"
then it cannot contain itself and if it is a "self-swallow-
ing set" then how can it be the "set of all run-of-the-mill
sets." Russell eliminated the hierarchical inconsistency of
this paradox by fiat of the Theory of Logical Types which
essentially states that a class cannot be a member of it-
self, that is, a class cannot be self-reflexive. The Theory
of Logical Types appears to have eliminated the known para-
doxes of set theory but only at the expense of self-
reflexiveness and the original goal to reduce all mathema-
tics to set logic. For instance imaginary numbers incorpo-
rate self-reflexivity . Many mathematicians have criticized
the Theory of Logical Types for its lack of logical necessi-
ty and the questionable complications it creates (Kline,
1980, pp. 222-229). Even Russell, according to Brown, later
in his career admitted the arbitrariness of position. "The
Theory (Theory of Logical Types) was, he said, the most
arbitrary thing he and Whitehead had ever had to do, not
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really a theory but a stopgap ..." (Spencer-Brown, 1972,
p. ix)
.
However, as it stands classical set theory does not
allow for "reflexivity" and thus cannot explain metaphoric
structures which thrive on it.
The co-reflexive superspace of metaphor can be vividly
portrayed in terms of the functional process of constructing
a hologram. The hologramic image of for instance a "red"
apple is constructed by splitting a laser beam into two
beams with a half -mirror and allowing one of the diffused
beams, the reference beam, to go straight to the photo-
graphic plate and the other diffused beam, the working beam,
to detour by reflecting off the "red apple" and then onto
the photographic plate. The two laser beams intersect at
the photographic plate creating an interference wave pattern
that is recorded on the photographic plate. By illuminating
the photographic plate with a normal laser beam a three
dimensional hologram of the red apple may be constructed in
midair. The construction of the metaphoric image is similar
to the resulting interference wave pattern created by the
intersection of the reference and working beam. However, in
the construction of the metaphoric image there is no abso-
lute reference beam by which to independently contrast the
working beam. By viewing the primary system through the
perspective of the secondary system and the secondary system
through the perspective of the primary system two working
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beams become co-ref lexively coordinated through a focal
metaphoric image which recoordinates each perspective
through the tensive intersection of their interference
pattern. The holographic metaphoric image constructs the
greatest common coherence through a synchrony of contrasting
views while monocular images at best represent the least
common inconsistency of additive monocular views. The meta-
phoric image surpasses formal representations as much as a
three-dimensional holographic construction surpasses a col-
lection of two-dimensional snapshots of the same object
pasted together. No additive amount of two-dimensional
snapshots can in itself construct the greater dimension of
the holographic image.
Bohm (1980)
,
Pietsch (1981) and Pribram (1981) have
proposed holographic models of the mind which have profound
psychological implications. In reply to Lashley's search
(1960) for the missing memory engram Pribram (1966) has
employed the holographic model to explain the holistically
distributed nature of memory traces in the brain. Lashley
despaired of finding a localized memory trace because of the
resilience of learned behavior to brain damage. According
to Pribram the hologram has the special property that it,
".
. . can be injured or cut up into small pieces, and an
image can still be reconstructed from any of the pieces
—
thus the name hologram; every part contains sufficient
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information to characterize the whole" (Pribram, 1981, p.
147). The holographic property of "self -ref lexivity
"
,
that
is, each part reflects the whole has allowed the mathema-
tically precise construction of a new technological reality,
the hologram, which is highly suggestive of the metaphorical
reality that the universe is contained in a grain of sand.
Because of the co-reflexive property of the modified holo-
graphic model we are now able to coherently account for the
compact, vivid richness of metaphoric images. This compact
vividness is not a preformed "seed" part containing the sta-
tic whole in miniature but is a dialectical "seed" part
which recursively constructs the dialectical whole through a
recoordination of the co-reflexive tendency toward greater
coherence
.
Metaphoric Example of Escher's
"Day, Nignt" Print
Since metaphoric reframing cannot be adequately expli-
cated in rationalistic terms less than its own we shall sum-
marize our comments thus far in terms of two metaphors which
explicitly reveal the latent structure and process of meta-
phor in general. Consider the visual metaphoric image of
Escher's "Day, Night" print (Locher, 1971, p. 14) (see
Figure 19) . This visual metaphor explicitly exemplifies the
co-reflexive coordination of opposites. The right and left
sides of the print are co-reflexive negative and positive
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Figure
19.
Escher's
"Day,
Night"
print.
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mirror images of each other. However, this is not a simple
dichotomous mirroring of inverse images. Rather the dichot-
omy of night and day is brought into metaphoric unity
through the co-reflexive tesselation of night birds flying
into daybreak and day birds flying into night fall. The
hidden "twilight" expands into the metaphoric flight of
night and day birds separated yet united through their co-
reflexive intersection.
Consider the left to right diagonal movement of the
day birds emerging from the light patches of the field
tesselating through the night birds and finally ascending
into the night fall sky. Through this reflexive movement of
day birds the familiar daylight earth is transformed into
the strange unknown heights of the night fall sky. This
results in the strange familiarity of day break birds
streaking through the night fall sky. Next consider the
right to left diagonal movement of the night birds emerging
from the dark patches of the field tesselating through the
day birds and finally ascending into the daybreak sky.
Through this reflexive movement the strange hidden dark
earth is transformed and transported into the familiar sight
of the day sky. This results in the familiar strangeness of
nightfall birds streaking through the daybreak sky.
But where is the twilight of the meeting of these two
diagonally intersecting flights? Is the twilight in the
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ascending movement of the daybreak birds uniting with the
nightfall sky or the ascending movement of the nightfall
birds uniting with the daybreak sky. Dialectically we coor-
dinate our understanding of these two co-reflexive move-
ments. At the "either/or" level of perception we are equi-
vocally torn between the conflicting alternation of two
mutually exclusive movements. At one moment we are at-
tracted to the strange familiarity of the day birds flying
into the night to the mutual exclusion of the night birds
flying into the day. Next in discontinuous alternation we
are attracted to the familiar strangeness of nightfall birds
flying into the daybreak to the mutual exclusion of the day
birds flying into the night. The inconsistency of the
"either/or" level drives us to the relative consistency of
the "both/and" level. At the "both/and" dialectical level
of perceptual coordination we continuously oscillate the
relative dominance of the two successive movements. At
first the daybreak birds may predominate with the nightfall
birds remaining subdominant. Then in continuous succession
we reverse the relative dominance with the nightfall birds
predominating and daybreak birds subdominant. However, this
relative oscillation of dominance is inadequate to fully
express the simultaneous coordination of the co-reflexive
twilight. The unity of the co-reflexive twilight is neither
in the relative dominance of the daybreak birds nor the
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nightfall birds but rather both are synchronized through the
co-reflexive intersection of the "twilight birds." The
"twilight birds" constitute a new second-order metaphoric
reframing of the dialectical opposites of night and day, and
earth and sky. Through the pregnant intersection of con-
trasting movements the "twilight birds" metaphorically unite
the enriching differences without losing their distinctive-
ness. What was hidden to the "day" and "night" perception
is constructively revealed through the "twilight" of their
metaphoric intersection. The "twilight birds" are neither
"literally" on the paper nor "absolutely" in the mind of the
observer but are a metaphoric intersection of both ( Romany
-
shyn
,
1981). This metaphoric perception of the "twilight
birds" is just as real as our metaphoric perception of
binocular depth which reveals a greater dimension hidden to
either eye alone or when additively combined.
Metaphoric Example of Mooney's
"Fitting One" Poem
Next we shall consider Mooney's poem of the "Fitting
One" (Mooney, 1969, pp. 72-73)
.
This poem exemplifies the
co-reflexive coordination of the opposites of earth and sky
knit together through a metaphoric tree.
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The Fitting One
as it is with a tree
whose fitting task
it is
to interknit the earth and sky
in one will drawn togetherness
of soil and sun
as, from the deepest root,
a bit of earth is chosen
taken, transformed, transported far
into the topmost tendril tip
to texture there
a newborn leaf,
joining into sky;
a motion matched,
in fitting need,
as from the highest leaf
a bit of sun-lit air is chosen,
taken, transformed, transported far
into the deepest fibrit tip
to textine there
a newborn root,
join into earth
to make the living tree
symbol of
The Fitting One
that inter-living earth and sky
gives birth to wholeness on the way
and gives me a birthplace too,
for emerging life in me,
as I stand among the trees
and let them knit
a universe
on a Sunday afternoon.
Through the metaphor of the "inter-living tree" the co-
reflexive opposites of earth and sky, soil and sun, and new-
born root and leaf are all drawn together into the "Fitting
One." A bit of earth is taken, transformed, transported
into the topmost tendril to texture a newborn leaf joining
the sky. Through this ascending reflexive movement the
familiar ground of earth is assimilated and transported to
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the strange unknown heights to become accommodated to the
open sky. This reflexive movement results in the assimilat-
ing accommodation of a newborn leaf. Co-ref lexively coordi-
nated with the ascending movement joining earth with sky is
the descending movement joining sky with earth. A bit of
sunlet air is taken, transformed and transported to the
deepest fibril tip to texture a newborn root. Through this
descending reflexive movement the strange unknown heights of
the open sky are accommodated and transported to familiar
ground of earth to become assimilated. This results in the
accommodating assimilation of a newborn root.
Where is the creative growth of the living tree that
metaphorically knits earth and sky? Is it in the earth, the
roots, the ascending movement or the sky, leaves, descending
movement? Where does the earth and sky meet; the roots and
leaves join, the ascending and descending movements inter-
penetrate? It is through the co-reflexive ascending and
descending movements that we dialectically coordinate the
central act of creativity. The central act of creativity is
not an "ordination of place" but rather a "coordination
which takes place .” At the "either/or" dialectical level of
coordination the co- reflexive opposites are mutually ex-
cluded. We are equivocally torn between the mutually exclu-
sive movements of either the ascending movement or the
descending movement. Hence the creative growth appears to
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draw on either the material sustenance of the earth or the
sun-lit air of the sky in discontinuous alternation. The
conflicting inconsistency of the "either/or" level drives us
to the consistency of the "both/and" level. At the "both/
and" dialectical level of coordination the opposites are
relatively coordinated. Both the ascending movement and the
descending movement oscillate relative dominance through
time. Hence at time one the ascending movement may be
predominant and the descending movement subdominant and at
time two the descending movement predominant and the ascend-
ing movement subdominate. However the "both/and" level is
insufficient to sustain creative growth for it lacks the
higher order wholeness of the simultaneous coordination of
co-reflexive opposites. At the "both/and" level there is a
symmetrical competition for the unity of metaphoric integra-
tion. However, at the "neither/nor" dialectical level of
metaphoric coordination neither the ascending movement nor
the descending movement is successively dominant. Rather
both become synchronously coordinated through the focal
"inter-section" of the "inter-living tree. " What was a
competition between the fittest movements becomes the finest
possible fit of the "Fitting One." The "Fitting One" is
neither a simple monism nor a dualism but rather a co-
reflexive nonduality. The "Fitting One" is the "inter-
living tree" which metaphorically integrates both earth and
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sky into a higher order unity through the aesthetically con-
trasting contribution of both.
Definition of the Metaphoric Dialectic
Thus far we have explicated the process of metaphoric
reframing in terms of the visual gestalt of "twins kissing a
flower vase," the literary expression of "society is a sea,"
the mathematical expression of an "imaginary number," the
paradoxical expression of an "imaginary co-reflexive con-
versation," the technological expression of the "holographic
construction" of intersecting perspectives, the graphic
expression of a "dialectical double spiral," the visual
print of the "twilight bird" and the poetic expression of
the "inter-living tree. " Utilizing this new information we
may now further elaborate our preliminary definition of
metaphoric reframing. Metaphoric reframing as a dialectical
process is the "horizontal" coordination of mutually exclu-
sive first-order opposites which are equally essential to a
fuller "vertical" recoordination of their second-order inte -
grated differences . Moreover, this metaphoric reframing
develops through five dialectical levels of coordinating the
central co-reflexive act of creativity toward greater levels
of coherence.
I. Global Coordination of the Co-reflexive Act
At this preliminary level the co-reflexive act is a
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^i-ffuse global differentiation of the subject from the
environment (e.g., the person perceives the anomalous
profiled vase" as a global entity diffusely differen-
tiated from the background)
.
11 • Absolute Differential Coordination of the Co-reflexive
Act
:
At this level the co-reflexive act becomes absolutely
differentiated into disjoint polar opposites with a
fixed dominant pole indifferent to the other (e.g.,
the person singly fixates on the image of the "vase"
to the neglect of the background image of the "pro-
files " ) .
III. "Either/Or" Coordination of the Co-reflexive Act :
At this level the co-reflexive act becomes lateralized
into mutually exclusive opposites with "either" the
primary "or" secondary system predominantly opposed to
the other. The coordination at this level is a dis -
continuous alternation of incompatible opposites
without central coordination. Hence there is a ten-
dency to ambivalently fixate on "either" one "or" the
other of the mutually exclusive opposites (e.g., the
person perceives the "profiled vase" as a discontinu-
ously opposed shifting between "either" a vase fixa -
tion "or" a profile fixation) .
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IV * "Both/And 11 Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act :
At this level the co-reflexive act of mutually exclu-
sive opposition becomes relatively coordinated with
"both " the primary "and" secondary systems continuous -
ly shifting the relation of predominance/subdominance.
The coordination at this level is a contiguous sequen-
tial movement of relative opposites temporally oscil-
lating central coordination. Hence there is a tenden-
cy to sequentially shift fixation in a linearly con-
tinuous movement (e.g., the person may perceive the
"profiled vase" as merely an abstract composite of
lines on the paper or may extend this perception to
rationally include a continuous composite of interven-
ing positions between the faces and vase)
.
V. "Neither/Nor" Metaphoric Coordination of the Co-
reflexive Act
At this level the co-reflexive act of complementary
opposition becomes synchronously coordinated with
"neither" the primary "nor" the secondary systems pre-
dominant but rather simultaneously recoordinated. The
coordination at this level is a simultaneous movement
of co-reflexive opposites synchronizing central coor-
dination. Hence there is a tendency to simultaneously
de fixate through a nonlinear, second-order vertical
movement. This is the "creative leap" commonly
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associated with the creative process. At this second-
order level of recoordination genuinely new construc-
tions which focally integrate differences without
losing their distinctiveness become possible. Fur-
thermore, the novel construction of the "neither/nor"
level may serve as the beginning "global" coordination
of another series of dialectical movements (e.g., the
"profiled vase" is "neither" vase foreground/profiles
background "nor" profiles foreground/vase background
but rather is simultaneously reintegrated through a
second-order synchrony of "twins kissing a flower
vase." This in turn opens up the possibility of new
possibilities at a higher level of dialectical ex-
ploration) .
Visual Display of the Metaphoric Dialectic
We may visually summarize these five levels of the
metaphoric dialectic as the progressive construction of a
hierarchically reintegrated metaphoric space (see Figure
20). The first level is a global coordination which dif-
fusely differentiates the foreground from the background.
In the "figure" of level one the dotted circle indicates the
diffuse differentiation of the foreground from the back-
ground. The second level is an absolute differentiation
which polarizes the global coordination of the previous
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I. Global Coordination
II. Absolute Differential
Coordination
III. Either/Or Coordination
IV. Both/And Coordination
V. Neither/Nor Coordination
Figure 20. Visual display of the metaphoric dialectic.
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level into static disjoint poles with a fixed dominance.
The figure" of level two is indicated by the homologous
polar halves of a circle. The third level is an "either/or"
coordination of temporally discontinuous, mutually exclusive
opposites. At this level the opposites are discontinuously
lateralized into negative mirror images of right and left.
The "figure" of level three is indicated by the lateraliza-
tion of the homolateral sides of "q " with "d" and "p" with
"b" into mirror reflections of each other. The fourth level
is a "both/and" coordination of temporally continuous,
complementary opposites. At this level the opposites are
diagonally cross-integrated through a continuous oscilla-
tion. The "figure" of level four is indicated by the con-
tralateral criss-crossing of the "q" with the "b" and the
"p" with the "d. " The fifth level is a "neither/nor" meta-
phoric coordination which temporally collapses the previous
level into a second-order simultaneous reintegration of co-
reflexive opposites. This final level hierarchically rein-
tegrated all the previously differentiated opposites at a
higher level of global unity. The "figure" of level five is
indicated by the collapsing of the contralaterals to the
center of their intersections to construct a circular rein-
tegration of their differences.
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The Metaphoric Dialectic of
Creeping Coordination
Perhaps we may most personally summarize the five
dialectical levels of coordination with the prototypical
exemplar of the baby's developmental coordination from
creeping to walking (Cohen, 1979) (Le Winn, 1969, pp. 96-
107) .
I
.
Global Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act:
The baby's creeping movement begins with the lifting
of the abdomen from the ground to a stationary balance
and the global coordination of random undulations of
the spine.
II
.
Absolute Differential Coordination of the Co-reflexive
Act :
At this level the baby demonstrates a "homologous"
creeping pattern which polarizes the forward movement
of the hands from the forward movement of the feet.
The baby extends the hands and then the feet in a frog
like movement.
III. "Either/Or" Coordination of the Co-reflexive Act :
At this level the baby demonstrates a "homolateral"
creeping pattern which lateralizes the body's forward
movement into a discontinuous alternation of the right
and left side. The baby moves either "the right hand
and the right foot" or "the left hand and left foot.
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IV. "Both/And" Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act :
At this level the baby demonstrates a "contralateral"
creeping pattern which continuously cross-alternates
both the "right hand/left foot" and the "left hand/
right foot."
V. "Neither/Nor Coordination of the Co- reflexive Act ;
At this level the baby makes a "creative leap" from
the prone position to the vertical position. The baby
neither cross-alternates the "right hand/left foot"
nor the "left hand/right foot" but simultaneously
pushes himself up into the vertical standing position.
If he can keep his coordinated balance at this second-
order level a whole new world of possibilities is
opened with the freeing of his hands and the higher
vantage point.
In a study of children's cognizance of how they walk
on all four Piaget's (1976, pp . 1-11) interviews reveal that
"walking" children's developmental description of their
"creeping" patterns recapitulates the baby's actual creep-
ing" development. At the age of four most children de-
scribed their "creeping" as a homologous "Z" pattern. At
the age of five and six the children primarily described
their creeping as a homolateral "N" pattern. Finally at the
age of seven to eight the children primarily described their
creeping as a contralateral "X" pattern.
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The Star Structure of the Metaphoric Dialectic
We propose that the baby’s developmental coordination
of creeping patterns through physical space exemplifies a
common metaphoric dialectic also shared by the child's
developmental coordination of mental patterns through mental
space. Furthermore just as the baby's movements in space
are generally initiated by the senses in the head, which
create or manifest the purpose of the movement, the guiding
purpose of the metaphoric dialectic is the attraction to the
greater context of meaningful coherence. The greater con-
text of meaningful coherence intermediates the co-reflexive
interplay of opposites toward greater levels of unity
through diversity which are not reducible to the bland con-
sistency of direct comparison. The integrative purpose of
the greater context is the child's nonconscious intention to
relate with the environment in more meaningful coherent ways
which resolve the first-order oppositional limitations at a
second-order aesthetic level of the synchrony of opposites.
To the criss-cross figure of the co-reflexive intersection
of oppositional differences we add an apex for the greater
context of meaningful coherence (integrative purpose) by
which the inherent indeterminacy of the co-reflexive inter-
section can be determined and directed. The resulting "star
structure" indicating the child's developmental coordination
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s^all be used as the prototypical symbol of the metaphoric
dialectic (see Figure 21)
.
In summary the metaphoric dialectic acts as a double
spiral which broadens and deepens the field of the interac-
tional world with genuine novelty and an explicable order of
aesthetic certainty (coherence) and contextual sensitivity.
Moreover, we propose that the metaphoric dialectic is the
irreducible tensive heart beat of the creative process. It
dialectically coordinates mutually exclusive first-order op-
posites which are equally essential to a fuller second-order
coherent understanding. It is a dynamic process which
delineates the coordination of opposites in the process of
becoming recoordinated. This recoordination of opposites is
a second-order recreating of new possibilities by reframing
the field of inquiry. This reframing of the field of
inquiry invites and directs the formulation of new questions
and hypotheses for further elaboration and evaluation. The
metaphoric dialectic is not reducible to well-defined logi-
cal, analogical or literal formulations. These rationalis-
tic formulations play a complimentary but secondary role of
elaboration and evaluation to the primary creative role of
the metaphoric dialectic. In the next chapter we shall
apply the metaphoric dialectic to various examples of crea-
tive problem resolving.
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Head
Figure 21. Prototypical "star structure" of locomo-
tive coordination and metaphoric dialectic.
CHAPTER V
INTERPRETIVE APPLICATION OF THE METAPHORIC DIALECTIC
TO CREATIVE PROBLEM RESOLVING
In order to indicate the utility and generality of the
metaphoric dialectic we shall apply it to seven different
problems which represent a wide range of activities for both
adults and children. For the most part these problems are
taken from naturalistic settings as opposed to contrived
settings which tend to control out opportunities for meta-
phoric reframing in their attempt to arrive at closed ended,
reductionistic solutions. Thus for each of the following
situations we shall retrace the genesis of the paradoxical
problem and its metaphoric reframing (resolution) : a chil-
dren's pictorial problem of how to stop a dog and cat from
fighting, a children's computer problem of how to draw a
circle with turtle geometry, a child's communication problem
of how to resolve a conflicting verbal message, an adult
community development problem of how African villagers and
western community developers resolve their conflicting
expectations and develop the community together, an adult
industrial problem of how researchers produce more effective
synthetic paint brushes, an adult housing problem of how
squatters and housing authorities with conflicting expecta-
tions improve housing, and Darwin and Salk's biological
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problem of how to adequately conceptualize the conflicts of
evolution.
De Bono's Problem
The first example of creative problem resolving is
taken from De Bono's Children Solve Problems (1974, pp. 13-
44). De Bono reviews a variety of pictorial solutions drawn
by children five years to thirteen years for an open ended
problem of "show how you would stop a dog and cat from
fighting." The author of this dissertation has also col-
lected with the aid of public school teachers first and
second grade solutions to this problem. The posing of this
problem already assumes an ongoing "either/or" level of dog
and cat in antagonistic conflict. Some children recoor-
dinated the "either/or" opposition of the dog and cat with
an "absolute differential" coordination of distracting them
from each other with toys and food. Other children coordi-
nated the "either/or" opposition with a "both/and" coordina-
tion of physically limiting their interaction by walls,
cages and chains. This solution allowed a restrictive co-
existence without interference. Both solutions stopped the
fighting but did not really resolve the underlying antagon-
ism of the dog and cat.
A more advanced metaphoric reframing of "either" the
dog "or" cat fighting resulted in "neither" the cat "nor"
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the dog fighting but rather a mutual friendship with inter-
dependent transactions. Examples of the "neither/nor" level
of metaphoric reframing were the dog and cat kissing, teach-
ing the dog and cat to play a friendly game of ball to-
gether, dressing the cat in a dog's mask and tail so they
would be attracted to each other, and putting a trough of
the dog's favorite food on the side of the cat and a trough
of the cat's favorite food on the side of the dog so they
would simultaneously sidle up to feed each other and become
friends. These metaphoric integrations of the opposites of
dog and cat not only stopped the fighting but transformed
their antagonism into the new second-order possibilities of
a mutual friendship with interdependence.
Papert's Problem
Next we shall consider how a child metaphorically
learns to draw a circle using Turtle Geometry (Papert, 1978,
pp. 117-118) . Turtle Geometry is an invention of Papert for
teaching elementary school children about computers and
geometry. The turtle is a mechanical toy which is pro-
grammed to trace out different paths by children using the
LOGO computer language. In the beginning the child learns
how to command the Turtle to move forward in the direction
that it is facing and how to pivot the Turtle around its
axis a number of degrees. With these commands the child can
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command the Turtle to stop and go in a countless variety of
linear geometric patterns such as "line," "triangle,"
"square," "parallelogram," etc. However there comes a time
when according to Papert
. . . the child poses the question: "How can I make the
Turtle draw a circle?" In Turtle Geometry we do not
provide "answers." Learners are encouraged to use their
own bodies to learn to find a solution. The child
begins to walk in circles and discovers how to make a
circle by going forward a little and turning a little.
Now the child knows how to make the Turtle draw a cir-
cle: simply give the Turtle the same commands one would
give oneself. Expressing "go forward a little, trim a
little" comes out in Turtle language as REPEAT [FORWARD 1
RIGHT- TURN 1] . . . once the child knows how to place
circles on the screen with the speed of light, an unlim-
ited palette of shapes, forms, and motion has been
opened. Thus the discovery of the circle (and, of
course, the curve) is a turning point in the child's
ability to achieve a direct aesthetic experience through
mathematics. (Papert, 1978, pp. 117-118)
We may further interpret this discovery of the aesthe-
tics achieved through mathematics in terms of the metaphoric
dialectic. In the beginning explorations the child "global-
ly" coordinates the computer commands of "forward" and
"turning" without clearly differentiating between them.
Thus the Turtle drawings are totally random. At the "abso-
lute differential" level of coordination the child uni-
laterally differentiates the commands of "forward" and
"turning" as isolated movements. Hence the child can draw
extended straight lines but only in random directions. At
the "either/or" level the child coordinates the negative
independence of "either" forward or turning in
193
discontinuous alternation. Hence the child can discontinu-
ously shift what is perceived as contrary directional com-
mands for the Turtle but cannot yet continuously combine
"both" the forward "and" turning commands into a coherent
linear figure. Since both movement commands belong to the
same Turtle the continued exploration of the perceived
contrary commands eventually leads to a continuous combining
and coordinating of the commands sequentially. This "both/
and" level of sequential coordination allows the child to
make coherent linear figures such as the square, rectangle,
triangle, parallelogram, etc. When the question of how to
produce a curvilinear figure such as the circle arises the
child is directed to make the circle first with their own
body. In the beginning the child merely sequentially coor-
dinates the "both" forward a little "and" turn a little
movements. Through and beyond this sequential coordination
the child eventually constructs the second-order reframing
with their body that the circle is "neither" in the forward
movement "nor" in the turning movement separately or sequen-
tially but rather it is the simultaneous coordination of
both movements in synchrony that produces the qualitative
difference between the circle and the polygon. The child
transfers this personal metaphor of moving with his body as
the turtle does to the Turtle geometry and a whole new world
of aesthetic curvilinear patterns is opened up. Furthermore
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the children s metaphoric resolution occurred within the
greater context of responding to a teacher's encouragement
that they find a personal resolution with their own body to
their self-posed question. (See Forman, Fosnot and Hoffman
(1980) for a similar developmental process of "circle"
construction using blocks.)
Cronen's Problem
Next we shall consider how a young boy metaphorically
transforms a conflicting verbal statement made by an adult
into humor. Cronen (1982, p. 98) cites a situation from
Olson (1972) in which Olson shared a close friendship with a
five year old boy who told him that he didn't like girls.
Olson responded to the contrary by saying he didn't like
boys. The small boy after a momentary perplexity enthusias-
tically replied, "You're teasing." In this episodic situa-
tion the boy metaphorically transformed the ambiguously con-
flicting message with the positive connotation of teasing.
Both the young boy's message of "not liking girls" and the
adult's conflicting message of "not liking boys" became met-
aphorically integrated and reframed as harmless humor. This
metaphoric reframing of the conflicting messages was made
possible through the understanding of the greater context of
a "close friendship" with the adult. According to Cronen
(1982, p. 107) the management of ambiguous reflexive levels
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of communication seems to require the mediation of a higher
order context sealed off from the ambiguity. Furthermore
creative responses may emerge from the shifting of levels of
communication as the young boy's response indicates.
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we
may retrace the genesis of this paradoxical message and its
metaphoric resolution. Initially at the "global" level the
boy was confused by the adult's message. Next at the "abso-
lute differential" level he experienced a tendency to ignore
or deny the incongruous message. Next at the "either/or"
level he fully confronted the conflicting messages of
"either" I, the little boy, don't like little girls "or"
you, my adult friend, don't like little boys . Next the
"both/and" coordination of the conflicting "either/or"
merely resulted in an attempted rationalized explanation or
compromise for tolerating the conflicting message but was
not sufficient for fully resolving the conflict. Finally at
the "neither/nor" level with a metaphoric reframing the
message resulted in "neither" I, the little boy, don't like
little girls "nor" You, my adult friend, don't like little
boys but rather the second-order simultaneous reintegration
of both messages as playful teasing. Thus what at first
appeared as a paradoxical message metaphorically became,
within the greater context of a "close friendship," the
means of opening up a new level of communication.
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Ewert's Problem
Next we shall consider a problem concerning community
development and how it was resolved using metaphor (Ewert,
1981, pp. 32-43) . The villagers of Zaire, Africa given a
past history of outside intervention conceived of community
development as a free gift from external sources and the
community developers as being like parents who would solve
the problems of their children, the villagers. The commu-
nity developers on the other hand conceived the goal of
development to develop internal resources and self-reliance.
However the villagers initially resisted the community
developers' goals. After one discussion the chief spoke:
Children cannot take care of themselves. A father has
to take care of them. A father tells his children what
they must do. We have cried out our inpashi (troubles)
to you. You are our father and mother. You tell us
what to do. (Ewert, 1981, p. 35)
As time progressed the conflict between the community expec-
tations and the community developers' philosophy became
acute. Several people asked "Why do you ask us our problems
if you don't give us what we need?" Another angrily de-
clared: "You are playing games with us. If you want to
play games, we will not come to your meetings and we will
not sit with you. We will not talk about our problems"
(Ewert, 1981, p. 35)
.
The villagers insisted, "you tell us our problem and
what we can do about them. " The community developer finally
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responded with the following metaphoric story:
A man from southern Zaire was walking down the road to
this village. Later in the afternoon, ho became very
thirsty and wanted a drink of water. Two men were sit-
ting under a tree along the road. One lived in this
village and the other was visiting from Eastern Zaire.
Whom did the traveler from southern Zaire ask for direc-
tions to the stream with good water? (Ewert, 1981, p.
36)
After a momentary silence, the village leader replied: "You
have spoken well. We have heard you. Wait here." Without
further comment the group of villagers adjourned into an in-
formal discussion in another part of the village without the
community developer. Later they returned with a list of
their own problems to discuss further: the difficulty of
carrying water from a distant stream, the epidemics of New-
castle disease that regularly killed their chicken flocks,
and the lack of agricultural tools in the community. As
Ewert states, "the initial demands to ‘give us your program'
were replaced with a discussion of how locally defined needs
could be met" (Ewert, 1981, p. 36).
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we
may retrace the genesis of the community development prob-
lem. In the beginning at the "global" level the villagers
passively accepted their community development problems
without clearly differentiating the factors over which they
had control. With the coming of the community developers
the problem of how to work on community development advanced
to the "absolute differential" level. At this level the
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villagers perceived their problem in terms of a unilateral
dependency on the developers, that is, a child to parent
relation without considering their own internal resources
and self-reliance. Furthermore the developers initially
ignored the villagers' demands and expected cooperation. As
a result of these incongruous expectations a competitive
power struggle eventually developed at the "either/or"
level. The opposing expectations provoked an extreme later-
alization of positions into "either" the developers provide
a free program "or" the villagers become totally self-
reliant. The competitive "either/or" conflict was metaphor-
ically reframed with "neither" a free program "nor" total
self-reliance but rather with a metaphoric choice of asking
for water from someone locally or not locally which provoked
a discussion of how locally defined needs could be met.
This discussion opened up the possibility of a new level of
collaboration with greater interdependency between the
villagers and the developers. Thus within the greater
context of improving the community the developers came to
provide ongoing guidance and educational seminars for re-
solving local problems which the villages defined and worked
on themselves.
Schon 's Problem #1
With the next example Schon (1979, pp. 255-283) pro-
vides a technological example of the making of a generative
metaphor which led to the invention of a new paint brush.
According to Schon:
Some years ago, a group of product-development re-
searchers was considering how to improve the performance
of a new paintbrush made with synthetic bristles. Com-
pared to the old natural-bristle brush, the new one de-
livered paint to a surface in a discontinuous, "gloppy"
way. The researchers had tried a number of different
improvements. . . . Nothing seemed to help.
Then someone observed, "You know, a paintbrush is a
kind of pump!" He pointed out that when a paintbrush is
pressed against a surface, paint is forced through the
spaces between bristle onto the surface. The paint is
made to flow through the "channels" formed by the
bristles . . .
The researchers tried out the natural and synthetic
bristle brushes, thinking of them as pumps. They no-
ticed that the natural brush formed a gradual curve when
it was pressed against a surface whereas the synthetic
brush formed a shape more nearly an angle. They specu-
lated that this difference might account for the
"gloppy" performance of the bristle brush. How then
might they make the bending shape of the synthetic brush
into a gentle curve?
This line of thought led them to a variety of inven-
tions . . . (Schon, 1979, p. 257)
In this example the researchers were perplexed by the
differing performance of the two brushes. Merely observing
the brushes more closely and accurately was not enough to
inform them of the functional differences between the
brushes. What they needed was a new metaphoric way of view-
ing the observed differences which would reform and inform
their way of looking for functional differences . We may
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hypothetically retrace the generative steps of coming to
view the "paintbrush-as-pump" and generating genuinely new
hypotheses for testing. In the beginning at the "global"
level the rich ambiguity of the differing performances of
the paint brushes was underdetermined by the researchers'
current understanding of painting with a brush. At the
"absolute differential" level they began to differentiate
painting with a brush as "wiping" while neglecting the
alternative possibilities suggested by the richly ambiguous
performances of the paint brushes. At the "either/or" level
they pre-analytically supposed that painting with a brush
might be suggestively viewed as "pumping" or as "wiping.
"
However, the overt attempt to directly map the attributes
and relations of "pumping" onto "wiping" and vice-versa
resulted in conflicting differences irresolvable at the
"either/or" level. Furthermore, at the "both/and" level
painting with the brush as both the complementary functions
of "wiping" and "pumping" did not provoke any genuinely new
insights because it was merely the composite sum of the two
pre-existing functions. It was only with the suspended
judgement of "neither" wiping "nor" pumping along with the
second-order reintegration of both as metaphoric correlates
which enabled them to compare the two brushes and see the
functional difference in the curving of the two fibers.
Through the metaphoric reframing new perceptions were
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generated which did not exist in the familiar direct compar-
ison or the additive composite of the assumed functions.
These new metaphoric perceptions allowed them to simultane-
ously perceive both the relevance of the negative space be-
tween the fibers as channels for pumping and the solid space
of the fibers as bristles for wiping . This metaphoric
reframing of the paint brushes transformed the perplexing
differences of their performance into testable hypotheses
some of which did improve the synthetic brush. This is an
excellent example of how metaphoric reframing generates new
perceptions and questions, inviting the experimenter to
formulate and test new hypotheses.
These new questions and hypotheses were a derivative
function of the new field of possibilities opened up by the
metaphoric reframing in accordance with the greater context
of the inquiry. Within the context of an industrial plant
intent on improving its products the newly generated hypo-
theses were biased toward money-making inventions. However,
within the context of an art studio the metaphor of paint
brush-as-pump" might generate a whole new line of experimen-
tation. Regardless of the greater context of inquiry the
dialectical process of broadening and deepening the field of
inquiry is functionally the same.
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Schon's Problem #2
In the next example we shall examine Schon's presenta-
tion (Schon, 1979, pp . 268-280) of how metaphoric reframing
was used to creatively resolve a housing dilemma in the de-
veloping country of Caracas. For municipal governments and
housing agencies "squatter settlements" are "an eyesore, a
mass of debris which has been established by illegal, indeed
criminal, action, in violation of property rights, housing
codes, and zoning laws" (Schon, 1979, p. 271). However, the
public housing projects which the housing authorities pro-
vide, even though they are clean and lawful, are far too few
for the poor masses. The partisans of the squatters rights
furthermore argue that, "... self-help construction, in
the context of squatter settlements, provides an environment
of amenity, community, and economic viability" (Schon, 1979,
p. 271).
The housing authorities perceive the settlements as
debris and crime while the squatter rights partisans per-
ceive the squatter settlements as legitimate initiative.
These conflicting "perspectives" or what Schon also calls
conflicting "stories," "frames" or "metaphors" present a
dilemma
,
How is one both to protect property rights , maintain
standards of construction and sanitation, and keep total
costs within bounds, while at the same time providing
housing services to those who need them, allowing people
to get shelter at prices they can afford, accommodating
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the changing needs and capacities of families, and leav-
ing initiative and control in the hands of the users?
(Schon, 1979, p. 272)
In other words is it possible to integrate the con-
flicting frames? Schon describes a metaphoric reframing of
the conflicting frames in terms of a new program called
"sites and services."
Such a program grows out of a complex coordination of
the two perspectives held by municipal officials and by
partisans of squatter settlement. The squatter's
behavior is seen neither as criminality nor as self-
sufficiency, but as initiative that may be both sup-
ported and controlled within the constraints of a gov-
ernment program. Individual settlers are seen neither
as passive recipients of government services nor as
independent violators of governmental regulations, but
as responsible participants who can be trusted both to
repay loans and avoid being cheated on the purchase of
materials. (Schon, 1979, p. 273)
This metaphoric reframing of the conflicting frames inte-
grated both the perspectives of the housing authorities and
the squatter partisans without violating their distinctive
needs and rights. Metaphorically reframed as "sites and
services" the squatter settlement was no longer the scene of
a competitive game of municipal officials seeking to control
and punish while squatters seek to avoid control but was
transformed into, "a collaborative game in which officials
and settlers both win when houses are built and loans re-
paid" (Schon, 1979, p. 273). This new metaphoric reframing
of the original dilemma raised the new question of how can
formal government intervention best complement the informal
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support system that grows up in a squatter settlement. This
new question in turn led to a reframing of roles with the
housing authorities providing large-scale infrastructure and
the construction loans, while individual squatter families
constructed their own dwellings, and local associations
organized the processes of supply and distribution.
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we
may retrace the genesis of this paradoxical problem and its
metaphoric resolution. At the "global" level inadequate
housing for the poor began to be vaguely felt as a growing
problem without any clearly differentiated factors. At the
"absolute differential" level it became apparent that the
homeless poor were fast becoming passively dependent on
governmental housing services. At the "either/or" level
conflict between the housing authorities and the squatters
without governmental housing began to become a major prob-
lem. The government perceived the squatters as violating
property rights and creating an "eyesore" while the squat-
ters perceived the housing authorities as trying to unfairly
control them and displace them from their self-constructed
homes. Hence neither group was able to directly understand
the other perspective in terms of their own perspective be-
cause they appeared mutually exclusive and diametrically
opposed. No attempt to coordinate the conflicting positions
at the "both/and" level was reported. A coordination at the
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both/and level would have taken the form of a temporary
compromise in which the rights of both positions were re-
duced to maintain a conditional tolerance in a tension rid-
den situation. Schon writes:
The new description ( "site-and-services
" ) is also not a
"compromise," an average or balance of values implicit
in the earlier descriptions. One cannot say, for ex-
ample, that sites-and-services strikes a balance between
values attached to "government control" and to "settler
initiative"; rather, in the new description, there is a
shift in the meaning of these terms, and along with
this, a shift in the distribution of the redescribed
functions of initative and control. (Schon, 1979, p.
279)
With the metaphoric reframing in terms of "sites-and-
services" the squatters' settlement became "neither" the
scene of debris and crime "nor" uncontrolled freedom of
initiative. Rather at the "neither/nor" level the housing
authorities and settlers collaborated in an integrated pro-
gram of structured and supported initiative.
Darwin's Problem
Finally we shall consider the metaphoric image of an
"irregular branching tree" which played a germinal role in
Darwin's scientific theory of the origin of the species.
According to Gruber (1978, pp. 122-124) the metaphoric image
of an "irregular branching tree" reflected a central dual
theme which characterized Darwin's whole life work. Darwin
believed organic change was a tangled web of shifting rela-
tionships characterized by disturbing irregularity and
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imperfection. In the closing paragraph of the Origin of the
Species Darwin metaphorically imaged this shifting complex-
ity as a "tangled bank." On the other hand Darwin also be-
lieved that this complex organic change was governed by a
few simple laws of nature which gave order and progressive
perfection to the imperfections. In an early notebook prior
to the appearance of Origin of Species Darwin poetically
wrote :
The delight one experiences in such times bewilders the
mind; if the eye attempts to follow the flight of a
gaudy butter-fly, it is arrested by some strange tree or
fruit; if watching an insect one forgets it in the
strange flower it is crawling over; if turning to admire
the splendour of the scenery, the individual character
of the foreground fixes the attention. The mind is a
chaos of delight, out of which a world of future and
more quiet pleasure will arise. (Darwin, 1934)
The metaphoric image of the "irregular branching tree"
of nature expresses the "chaotic delight" of the richly
complex multi-paths of evolutionary development which Darwin
analytically exploited to conceptualize his theory of evolu-
tion. Gruber states:
In short, the branching model, the image of the irregu-
larly branching tree of nature played a pivotal role
very early in his thinking about evolution. It captures
many points: the fortuitiousness of life, the irregu-
larity of the panorama of nature, the explosiveness of
growth and the necessity to bridle it "so as to keep
number of species constant." And most important, the
fundamental duality that at any time some must live and
others die. (Gruber, 1978, p. 127).
Gruber goes on to write that it took about fifteen months
from the inception of this germinal image until Darwin
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formulated the operating principle of natural selection
which gave form to the "irregular branching tree" of life.
Although many of Darwin's earlier ideas changed over time
twenty years later when he wrote Origin of Species the "ir-
regular branching tree" remained a central theme which he
included as the only diagram in his book. Throughout the
book it is referred to as he exploits its theoretical rich-
ness .
The irreducible metaphoric image of the "irregular
branching tree" of life opened up and vividly portrayed a
vast field of inquiry for Darwin which he continued to con-
ceptually exploit throughout his life. This metaphoric
image simultaneously integrated the opposites of the "explo-
siveness of growth" and "the necessity to bridle it" and
"some must live" and "others die." Furthermore it reflected
Darwin's personal quest to find the quieter pleasures of the
mind through the chaotic delight of nature.
Gruber describes this type of metaphoric image as an
image of "wide scope," a master schema, which serves to as-
similate and give general form to a wide range of percep-
tions, actions and ideas. Gruber documents four other meta-
phoric images of wide scope, "tangled bank," "wedging,"
"war" and "artificial selection," which were used in devel-
oping Darwin's theory of evolution. Gruber speculates that
the creative scientist may generate four to five wide
images" that serve as leitmotifs for an entire life and
fifty to one hundred images which elaborate the thematic
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organizers
.
Interpreted according to the metaphoric dialectic we
may hypothetically retrace the genesis of Darwin's theory of
evolution. Initially at the "global" level Darwin became
attracted to the "chaotic delight" of the evolutionary
forces. In Rothenburg's terms (1979a) he was able to
tacitly sense the Janusian forces of evolution. At the
"absolute differential" level he began to one-sidedly dif -
ferentiate the diffuse janusian forces. Hence he began to
differentiate the factors of "the explosiveness of growth"
and "the necessity to bridle it (nature) " and "some must
live" and "others die" as dis jointly and randomly related .
At the "either/or" level Darwin constructed the homospatial
image (Rothenburg, 1979) of an "irregular branching tree"
which explicitly embodied and expressed the oppositional
relation of the evolutionary forces. At this level he began
to understand that the oppositional relation of "either" the
explosiveness of growth "or" the necessity to bridle growth
are inversely related so as to keep the number of species
constant. At the "both/and" level Darwin began to construct
a conceptual explanation of the continuous interaction of
the oppositional forces of evolution. This conceptual
explanation became the theory of natural selection in which
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the fittest survive in spite of the continuous interaction
of the oppositional forces of evolution. Darwin does not
develop his theory beyond the "both/and" level of the "sur-
vival of the fittest." Next we shall consider Salk's theory
of evolution (1973) which is constructed at the "neither/
nor" level of the "finest possible fit" of the diverse
forces of evolution.
Salk's Problem
Salk proposes a metaphoric reframing of the "both/and"
continuously interacting evolutionary forces with "neither"
the explosiveness of growth "nor" the necessity to bridle
growth but rather a second-order ecological rebalancing of
the diverse evolutionary forces. This ecological rebalanc-
ing and enrichment would occur because of the diverse evolu-
tionary forces and not in spite of them. Furthermore this
ecological rebalancing would be a construction of the
"finest possible fit" and not merely the "survival of the
fittest." Salk argues that the competitive conflicts and we
might add even the controlled interactions of nationalistic
countries are no longer adequate to cope with the population
explosion (we might also add other world problems such as
pollution, depletion of natural resources and the threat of
nuclear war) in a civilized way. We are at the critical
turning point of a second-order exponential explosion of
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population growth. We are faced with the choice of changing
our competitive and controlling values of nationalistic sur-
vival into collaborative and unconditional values of intra-
planetary sharing for the entire human species or suffer
serious ecological catastrophe. With metaphoric transforma-
tion nationalistic differences could be suspended and recon-
structed as interdependencies which create cultural enrich-
ment, symbiotic nourishment and hybrid vigor (Maruyama,
1977) (Piaget, 1973, p. 67). The evolutionary process of
metaphoric transformation for the finest possible fit be-
tween the dualities of life is indeed timely and profoundly
vital for the earth's continued ecological survival and
development.
Recapitulation
At this point we may briefly recapitulate for each
problem the paradoxical conflict and the metaphoric refram-
ing which opened up a new field of inquiry in accordance
with the greater context. For De Bono's problem (1972, pp
.
13-44) the paradoxical conflict involved the fighting of an
imaginary dog and cat. Many children metaphorically re-
framed this paradoxical conflict by proposing mutual acts of
friendship which brought the dog and cat together in harmony
such as kissing, playing a friendly game of ball, dressing
up in costumes which reflected the other, and mutually
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feeding each other their favorite food. These metaphoric
resolutions not only stopped the fighting but transformed
their mutual antagonism into the new possibilities of a
mutual friendship. These metaphoric resolutions occurred
within the greater context of responding to a teacher's
request and encouragement to resolve the conflict in their
own unique way.
For Papert's problem (1978) concerning Turtle Geometry
the initial paradox was how to coordinate the incommensurate
computer commands of "forward" and "rotation." The children
metaphorically resolved this paradox by reflecting on how
they integrate these two commands to make a circle with
their own body. By transferring this new personal metaphor-
ic knowledge to Turtle Geometry a whole new field of aesthe-
tic curvilinear patterns was opened. This metaphoric reso-
lution occurred within the greater context of responding to
a teacher's invitation to reconstructively answer with their
own body the self-posed question of how to make a visual
circle
.
For Cronen's presentation (1982) of the communication-
al problem of a young boy and an adult the paradoxical con-
flict resulted from an ambiguous sequence of messages. The
ambiguous sequence of the young boy's initial message of
"not liking girls" and the adult's response of "not liking
boys" was metaphorically reinterpreted after a moment of
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perplexity (by the boy) as playful teasing. The metaphoric
reframing of the conflicting messages was made possible
through the understanding of the greater context of "close
friendship" with the adult. This metaphoric reframing
opened up a new level of communication which deepened the
friendship
.
For Ewert's problem (1981) concerning community devel-
opment paradoxical tension resulted from conflicting expec-
tations between native villagers and external community
developers. The villagers expected a free program from the
developers and the community developers expected utilization
of native resources and self-reliance on the part of the
villagers. By one of the developers presenting an open
ended parable the villagers and developers were able to re-
frame their perception of the conflicting interaction. This
metaphoric reframing opened up a new level of collaboration
and a redefining of roles on the part of both villagers and
developers for achieving the greater contextual goal of
community development.
For Schon's problem (1979) of how to develop a more
effective synthetic paint brush the industrial researchers
were initially perplexed by the differing performance of
synthetic and natural fiber brushes. This perplexity pro-
voked a metaphoric reframing of paint brushes as "pumps."
Initially the paint brushes were perceived as "wipers." The
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P^^^^oxical tension resulting from the literal interpreta-
tion of "the wiping paint brush is a pump" was metaphorical-
ly reframed and applied to both the natural and synthetic
paint brushes. The new metaphoric reinterpretation of the
natural and synthetic paint brushes as "wiping pumps" pro-
duced new perceptions of their functional differences which
could be tested. Thus the metaphoric reframing generated
new perceptions of hypothetical differences many of which
became practical inventions. This line of research was
directed in accordance with the greater context of producing
cost efficient industrial inventions.
For Schon's presentation (1979) of the social policy
dilemma of producing adequate housing the paradoxical ten-
sion between "squatter settlements as debris and crime" and
"squatter settlements as legitimate initiative" was meta-
phorically reframed with the new social policy of "sites-
and-services . " This metaphoric reframing as "sites-and-
services" opened up a new level of collaboration and rede-
fining of mutually supportive roles for squatters and
housing authorities. This collaboration allowed them to
more effectively achieve their mutual contextual goal of
improved housing.
For Gruber's presentation (1978) of Darwin the para-
doxical problem was how to express the organic conflicts of
the "explosiveness of growth" and "the necessity to bridle
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it and "some must live" while "others die" in a theory of
evolution. These organic conflicts initially became em-
bodied in the metaphoric image of an "irregular branching
tree." This metaphoric image served Darwin as a master
schema for organizing and generating new formulations for
testing and building his theory of evolution. Eventually he
conceptualized the structure of this "irregular branching
tree" as governed by the mechanism of natural selection.
The "irregular branching tree" and his theory of evolution
reflected his personal contextual quest for transforming the
chaotic delight of nature into the quieter pleasure of the
mind.
Although Darwin provided what we would term a "both/
and" level rationalistic explanation for his own master met-
aphor of an "irregular branching tree" we would argue that
it was inadequate to fully resolve the paradoxical tension
expressed by his own master metaphor. Rather Salk (1973)
with his theory of the "finest possible fit" with the duali-
ties of evolution goes beyond Darwin's theory of the "sur-
vival of the fittest" in spite of the dualities of evolution
to provide a second-order resolution which transforms the
paradoxical tension of the "irregular branching tree" into
the creative tension of a "be-fitting" metaphoric "tree of
life." For Salk the greater context of this creative trans-
formation is the planetary ecosphere itself. Within the
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greater context of the planetary ecosphere the second-order
resolution of the paradoxical tension of evolution opens up
the possibilities of a whole new level of creative evolution
in which planetary unity is consciously generated through
the diversity of evolutionary tendencies and group differ-
ences which are wholeheartedly embraced rather than merely
rationalis tical ly tolerated or openly fought over.
In final summary the child's problem of stopping a dog
and cat from fighting, the child's problem of drawing a
circle with Turtle Geometry, the child's problem of ambigu-
ous communication with an adult, the villager and community
developer's problem of how to develop the community, the
industrial researchers' problem of producing more effective
synthetic paint brushes, the squatter and housing authori-
ties' problem of how to improve housing, and finally Salk's
problem of conceptualizing the organic conflicts of evolu-
tion all exemplify the common process of metaphorically
reframing within a greater context an initial first-order
conflict. Through this second-order metaphoric reframing
the first-order conflicts were incorporated and resolved
with a genuinely novel metaphoric reintegration. With this
metaphoric reintegration a new field of second-order possi-
bilities was opened up for further hypothetical exploration
and experimental testing. Hence we may conclude that within
a greater context of meaningful coherence the paradoxical
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conflicts of the problems were metaphorically resolved to
open up a new field of inquiry to further explore and test
the greater context. Furthermore the examples presented in
this chapter concerning metaphoric reframing exemplify the
creative process of dialectically constructing genuine
novelty through the second-order resolution of a paradoxical
tension which is otherwise irreducible by rationalistic
means
.
CHAPTER VI
INTERPRETIVE APPLICATION OF THE METAPHORIC DIALECTIC
TO PIAGET'S THEORY OF CREATIVE DEVELOPMENT
In this chapter we shall apply the metaphoric dialec-
tic to Piaget's theory of cognitive development to further
deepen and expand the basic principles of his theory. First
we shall give an overview of the five general levels of the
metaphoric dialectic with special emphasis on the Piagetian
concepts of "play" and "imitation" and "assimilation" and
"accommodation. " Secondly we shall give two detailed exam-
ples of the five general levels of the metaphoric dialectic
with elaborated recursive sublevels for the development of
"locomotion" and "conservation. " Finally we shall examine
the advanced levels of formal metaphoric operations in terms
of the Piagetian INRC group and supporting paradigms of
physics
.
Overview and Extension of Piaget's Theory
According to Piaget (1977) the central act of creativ-
ity is the equilibrating interaction of the person with the
environment. Piaget characterizes this equilibrating inter-
action as a process of the person "assimilating" the envi-
ronment to the cognitive structures of the "self" and the
cognitive structure of the "self" accommodating to the
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environment. Piaget (1977) clarifies that assimilation and
accommodation are not two distinct behaviors but two poles
of one interactive process. The assimilating pole pulls the
child in the direction of egocentric play, fantasy, wishful
thinking and dreaming while the accommodating pole pulls the
child in the direction of imitation, superficial copying and
conformity to the environment (Piaget, 1962). This bipolar
tension creates cognitive conflict in the child's interac-
tion with the environment which necessitates a constructive
equilibration toward greater levels of coherence. This
greater coherence is neither limited to the subjective dis-
tortions of assimilation nor the blind conformity of accom-
modation. Rather it is an elegant balance which is both
more real than the literal copy of imitation and more imagi-
native than the fantasy of play . As Forman states, "Play
pulls imitation away from a mindless empiricism and imita-
tion pulls play away from an objectless idealism" (Forman,
1983) . Play is the predominance of assimilation over accom-
modation and imitation is the predominance of accommodation
over assimilation. However, neither operates in the absence
of the other. Both are equally essential to the elegant
balance of their lopsided tendencies. In the terms of this
dissertation this "elegant balance" is the "genuine creativ-
ity which transforms and goes beyond both the "radical
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novelty" of pure play and the "trivial novelty" of pure
imitation
.
We shall further characterize this bipolar interaction
of the person with the environment as a co-reflexive rela-
tion in which assimilation and accommodation are mutually
exclusive tendencies but equally necessary to the develop-
ment of cognition. We may represent this relation as the
co-reflexive implication of the two sides of a "card" (see
Figure 22)
.
On one side of this card the person implies
,
"On the other side of this card (the enviromental pole) is
an assimilating implication. " Flipping the card the envi-
ronment implies
,
"On the other side of this card (the
'person' pole) is an accommodating implication." Hence ac-
commodation entails assimilation and assimilation entails
accommodation. We are caught in an equilibrating shuffle
between the assimilating accommodation (imitation) of the
person to the environment and the accommodating assimilation
(Play) of the environment to the person.
We shall further explicate the broad outline of five
general levels of development for the co-reflexive relation
of play and imitation in terms of the metaphoric dialectic.
I. Global Coordination of Co-reflexivity
The baby is born into the environment with a complex set
of primitive reflexes such as blinking, sucking, grasping,
tonic neck response, etc. These primitive reflexes
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"On the other side of
this card (the person
side) is an accommo-
dating implication."
"On the other side of
this card (the envi-
ronmental side) is an
assimilating implica-
tion . "
Figure 22. The co-implicative (co-reflexive) shuffle
of equilibration.
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constitute the global coherence of the infant's co- reflexive
interaction with the environment.
II. Absolute Differential Coordination
of Co-reflexivity
At this level the global coherence of the previous
level becomes perturbed through the child's interaction with
environment. The reflexes initiate the child's interaction
with the environment but are inadequate to fully coordinate
this interaction. The attempt to resolve the incoherence of
the inadequate reflexes serves to progressively differenti-
ate the child from his environment. This is the sensori-
motor stage where the child differentiates himself from the
object.
III. "Either/Or" Coordination of Ref lexivity
At this level the differentiated relation of self from
the environment becomes lateralized into "either" play "or"
imitation because of the press of inconsistencies and incom-
pletenesses in the interaction of the self with the environ-
ment. Environmental- inconsistencies are resolved through
pretend play and fantasy and environmental-incompletenesses
which demand more accommodation are fulfilled by imitation
and social conformity. The child discontinuous ly alternates
between a private inner world of pretend play and fantasy
and the environmental world of conformity and imitation.
Hence the child may discontinuous ly transform a pencil into
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a fantastic rocket and then be called back into the "literal
world by mommy or the demands of gravity. Of course the
goal of equilibration is neither egocentric fantasy nor a
complete yielding to the environment
. If the goal were ego-
central fantasy then we would have broken our necks trying
to fly from trees and if the goal were a complete yielding
to the environment we would never have constructed the real
rockets of our childhood dreams. Rather the child is pro-
pelled onward by the mutually exclusive alternating conflict
of assimilating play and accommodating imitation to a higher
integrative level of reciprocity between these lateralized
tendencies. This is the pre-operational level of egocentric
representative activity which equilibrates toward the
second-order resolution of concrete operations with recipro-
city (see Figure 23)
.
IV. "Both/And" Coordination of Reflexivity
At this level the pre-operative "either/or" coordina-
tion of the previous level is transformed into the concrete
operations of "both" assimilative play "and" accommodative
imitation reciprocally coordinated. The simultaneous affir-
mation of both assimilation and accommodation provokes para-
doxical conflict because of the discrepancy between the sub-
jective distortions of assimilation and the superficial copy
of accommodation. This leads to the cross-diagonal recipro-
city of both complementary tendencies. This cross-diagonal
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The Meta-Context
of 2nd order coherence
A
/ \
/ \
incompleteness)
Figure 23. The star structure of equilibration
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reciprocity creates a "figure eight" continuously alternat-
ing cycle between the accommodating assimilation of play and
the assimilating accommodation of imitation. Assimilatory
play imaginatively extends the field of interaction and
accommodatory imitation adjusts this extension to fit the
copy of the environment. Piaget states:
. . . it is clear that the new assimilation plays the
constructive role (extension of the scheme field,
introduction of new articulations, etc.) and the new
accommodation plays the compensatory role (new adjust-
ments in reciprocity, inversions of the object's unfore-
seen characteristics) . Each of these orientations is
bound up with the other in an indivisible whole.
(Piaget, 1977, pp. 39-40)
In effect the "figure eight" loop is a cybernetic loop which
imaginatively expands the child's world with play and reci-
procally grounds and deepens these enriching explorations
with the realism of imitation. "Both" imitation "and" play
are equally necessary members in the equilibratory process.
Neither alone is the cutting edge of equilibration rather
they both continuously oscillate in the equilibratory cut-
ting of development.
We may trace the developmental path of this "both/and"
organismic loop beginning with the self-completeness of
accommodatory imitation. The extreme pull toward the self-
completeness of accommodation leads to a superficial copy or
blind conformity which results in the environmental incon-
sistency of assimilation. The environmental inconsistency
of assimilation necessitates the move toward the self-
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consistency of assimilatory play. However, the extreme pull
of assimilation toward self-consistency leads to subjective
distortions which reciprocally result in the environmental
incompleteness of accommodation. The environmental incom-
pleteness of accommodation necessitates the pull back to the
self-completeness of accommodating imitation bringing the
loop full circuit. The first half of the loop is the play
phase : "self-completeness of accomodation" to "environmen-
tal-inconsistency of assimilation" to the "self-consistency
of assimilation." The second half of the loop is the
reciprocal phase of imitation : "self-consistency of assimi-
lation" to the "environmental incompleteness of accommoda-
tion" to the "self-completeness of accommodation." The
creative tension which propels the continuous alternation of
these complementary phases is the paradoxical conflict
between the affirmation of both the subjective distortion of
play and the superficial copy of imitation. The reciprocal
equilibration of these complementary tendencies results in
the coordination of concrete operations such as conserva-
tion, seriation and classification (see Figure 23)
.
V. "Neither/Nor" Metaphoric Coordination
of Co-reflexivity
At this level the "both/and ' coordination of the pre-
vious level becomes fully integrated at a second-order level
of greater balance. This greater balance is not explicable
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as a regression toward a first-order mean but rather as a
dialectical progression toward a second-order aesthetic bal-
ance of the conflicting differences. What initially began
with the seed structure of the primitive reflexes and global
coordination dialectically developed to bear fruit at a
second-order level of reintegration. At this higher level
of reintegration creative cognition is "neither" play "nor"
imitation but the synchronous reintegration of both phases
of play and imitation simultaneously.
The initial sublevel of the "neither/nor" level is
characterized by the formal operations of propositional
logic in which the mathematical opposites of both "recipro-
city" and "negation" are simultaneously "correlated" in the
nontemporal INRC group. However, the final goal of creative
development is not the bland, static consistency of proposi-
tional logic or a mathematic group as Piaget would propose
(Piaget, 1972, pp . 1-12). Development is not merely a pro-
gressive convergence toward the more "complete consistency"
of formal logic. It is also the correlated convergence to-
ward the "consistent completeness" vividly expressed in the
arts . The "neither/nor" level is a dual convergence and re-
integration of both the art of playful completeness and the
science of imitative consistency .
Godel (1970, pp. 83-111) has mathematically demon-
strated that if an axiomatic system capable of subsuming
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ordinary arithmetic is consistent then it is incomplete and
if it is complete then it is inconsistent. Both consistency
and completeness appear to be reciprocally limiting and
mutually indeterminate. Hence if an axiomatic system is
consistent then there exists an undecidable proposition "P"
which is true but for which "neither P nor ^P is provable"
within the axiomatic system itself (Godel, 1970, p. 86).
The mathematical fact that "neither P nor vp is provable" is
a violation of the logical law of excluded middle which
states that every logical proposition is either provably
true or false (Kline, 1980, p. 264). We propose that the
undecidability of "neither P nor ^P" creates an inconsis-
tency and that as Godel demonstrates, the problem of unde-
cidability can only be resolved by incorporating the new
proposition as a foundational axiom. However this process
is never complete nor finally consistent because of the in-
herent "undecidability" of all axiomatic systems. The math-
ematical proof of Godel' s limitive theorems has toppled the
best efforts of formalists such as Hilbert and Russell to
create "the consistent foundation of formal axioms" on which
to erect a towering superstructure for all of mathematics.
We propose that the ultimate criterion of creative con-
structions in mathematics and other scientific disciplines
is neither the blandness of consistency nor the boredom of
completeness but the aesthetic balance of their integrative
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coherence
. At this advanced level of metaphoric operations
the art of play and the science of imitation become syn-
chronously correlated as in Leonardo Da Vinci's artistic
drawings of the scientific flight of birds.
In order to further explore the formal metaphoric
operations which go beyond Piaget's formal operations we may
consider the self-reports of creative scientists and mathe-
maticians such as Poincare, Dirac, Schrodinger, Heisenberg,
and Einstein. Poincare states that, "Pure logic could never
lead us to anything but tautologies; it could create nothing
new; nor from it alone can any science issue" (Poincare,
1958, p. 19). Poincare further explains:
It may appear surprising that sensibility should be in-
troduced in connection with mathematical demonstrations,
which, it would seem, can only interest the intellect.
But not if we bear in mind the feeling of mathematical
beauty, of the harmony of numbers and forms and of geo-
metric elegance. It's a real aesthetic feeling that all
mathematicians recognoze, and this is truly sensibility.
. . . The useful combinations are precisely the most
beautiful . . . (Poincare, 1908, p. 59)
Elsewhere Poincare states, "Aesthetic sensibility plays the
part of the delicate sieve" (Wechsler, 1978. p. 1).
Reinforcing Poincare's trust of aesthetic judgment,
Dirac commented on Schrodinger ' s not publishing his first
version of the wave equation because it conflicted with
empirical data:
I think there is a moral to this story, namely that it
is more important to have beauty in one's equations than
to have them fit the experiment. ... It seems that if
one is working from the point of view of getting beauty
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in one's equations, and if one has really a sound in-
sight, one is on a sure line of progress. If there is
not complete agreement between the results of one's work
and experiment, one should not allow oneself to be too
discouraged, because the discrepancy may well be due to
minor features that are not properly taken into account
and that will get cleared up with further developments
of the theory. (Dirac, 1963, p. 47)
Heisenberg recalls commenting to Einstein on the uni-
fying certainty he associated with the aesthetic experience:
You may object that by speaking of simplicity and beauty
I am introducing aesthetic criteria of truth, and I
frankly admit that I am strongly attracted by the sim-
plicity and beauty of the mathematical schemes which
nature presents us. You must have felt this too: the
almost frightening simplicity and wholeness of the rela-
tionship, which nature suddenly spreads out before us.
(Heisenburg, 1971, p. 68)
Explaining his own creative thought process Einstein
states :
Words or language, as they are written or spoken, do not
seem to play any role in my mechanisms of thought. The
psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in
thought are certain signs and more or less clear images
which can be voluntarily reproduced and combined. . . .
This combinatory play seems to be the essential feature
in productive thought--before there is any connection
with logical construction in words or other kinds of
signs which can be communicated to others . . . conven-
tional words or other signs have to be sought for
laboriously only in a second stage, when the mentioned
associate play is sufficiently established and can be
reproduced at will. (Hadamard, 1945, pp . 142-143)
This "combinatory play" is not reducible to the combi-
natorial logic of Piaget's formal operations because as
Einstein reports it occurs prior to the formal application
of logic. Rather we propose that this "combinatory play"
along with the other aesthetic combinations reported were
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the result of an advanced form of metaphoric thinking in
which different concepts and images were metaphorically
combined to produce aesthetic coherence. This "combinatory
play" of different psychical entities functioned to open up
the second-order possibility of new possibilities not avail-
able to the first-order possibilities of combinatorial
logic. This is similar to Godel's proof of the inherent
unprovability of certain second-order propositions within
the first-order axiomatic system. As Bronowski states
:
. . . there is no logical way in which we can know, or
can formalize the pregnant decision. The step by which
a new axiom is added cannot itself be mechanized. It is
a free play of mind, one invention outside the logical
processes. This is the central act of imagination in
science, and it is in all respects like any similar act
in literature; it can in fact be taken as a definition
of imagination. (Bronowski, 1971, p. 127)
Thus formal metaphoric operations are "neither" the
radical imagination of flights of fancy "nor" the trivial
block building deduction of combinatorial logic but rather
the imaginative realism of constructive creativity. Hence
neither the art of play nor the science of imitation is the
sole cutting edge of this new development. Rather both form
a two edged sword which comes to a penetrating metaphoric
point. Through this metaphoric penetration new levels of
knowledge are broadened and deepened simultaneously.
The creative process begins with the wonder of the
newborn infant and ends with the wonder of an Einstein. At
each stage transition the child finds new problems to
231
explore. In the final stage of development the infant
turned Einstein finds that the new problem is "finding the
problem. This is not a problem solving process so much as
a metaphoric process of questioning and redefining the
formal assumptions of logical problem solving itself.
This advanced stage of formal metaphoric operations
inspires child-like wonder at a more profound level of so-
phistication. In the likes of Einstein we find neither the
overconfidence of the fool nor the extreme caution of the
timid but the quiet courage of one who knows he doesn't know
and stands in awe of the mysterious beauty of creation.
"The most beautiful experience we can have is the mysteri-
ous. It is the fundamental emotion that stands at the
cradle of all art and true science" (Einstein, 1979). The
goal of creative development in science is not to reduce
away the mysterious beauty of creation to a rationalistic
conception but rather to enhance the mystery with more
beautiful metaphoric theories . Metaphoric theories reveal
the simple unity of form throughout the diverse domains of
human endeavor. The constructive cross-validation of this
experience of aesthetic unity becomes the new criterion of
acceptability. The experience of aesthetic unity is the
fuller coherence which metaphorically reintegrates the
diverse views of the artist and scientist into a new poly-
ocular vision. Maruyama states that:
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. . . the Japanese think in poly-ocular vision. Ameri-
cans who believe in the existence of one truth will in-
evitably ask: if you have different views which one is
But consider the following: in the binocular
vision it is irrelevant to raise the question as to
which eye is wrong. Binocular vision works, not because
the two eyes see different sides of the same object, butbecause the differential between the two images enables
the brain to compute the invisible dimension. (Maruyama,
1977, p. 84)
Thus through the dialectical differential of the artistic
and scientific views we are better able to metaphorically
construct a glimmering reflection of the invisible beauty of
the creative process itself.
Detailed Outline of the Recursive Sublevels
of the Metaphoric Dialectic
Thus far we have considered the broad outline of the
five levels of cognitive development in terms of Piaget's
general organismic concepts of assimilatory play and accom-
modatory imitation. Next we shall consider a more detailed
delineation and exposition of the five levels. Since cogni-
tive development is defined as a general reflexive movement
each specific level of development will holographically re-
flect the whole pattern of the five levels . This is not a
simplistic self-reflexive model in which the static part
reflects the preformed whole in miniature but rather this is
a dynamic co-reflexive model in which the dialectical pro-
cess within each stage recursively reflects the dialectical
process across all the stages. (See Fischer (1980) for
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another model of recursive development.) We outline the
recursive sequence of the reflexive model as follows:
1* Global Coordination (Fruit)
11 • Absolute Differential Coordination
1. global coordination (Seed)
2. absolute differentiation
3. either/or coordination
4. both/and coordination
5. neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)
III. Either/Or Coordination
1. global coordination (Seed)
2. absolute differentiation
3. either/or coordination
4 . both/and coordination
5. neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)
IV. Both/And Coordination
1. global coordination (Seed)
2. absolute differentiation
3. either/or coordination
4 . both/and coordination
5. neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)
V. Neither/Nor Metaphoric Coordination
1. global coordination (Seed)
2. absolute differentiation
3. either/or coordination
4 . both/and coordination
5. neither/nor metaphoric coordination (Fruit)
This elaborated outline of the recursive dialectic of cogni-
tive development is a constructive pattern which broadens
and deepens each successive level toward greater levels of
constructive coherence. The beginning general level of
global coordination is the second-order fruit of the in-
fant's birth which becomes the "seed structure" for the
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first sublevel of "(I) Absolute Dif ferentation. " This "seed
structure" dialectically develops through the five sublevels
to a "second-order fruition at the "neither/nor" sublevel.
This "second-order fruition" of the previous level becomes
the "seed structure" for the next general level of global
coordination. This recursive transitional pattern of the
" second-order fruition " of the previous level becoming the
" seed structure of global coordination " at the next level
continues to develop until the final fruition at the meta-
phoric Neither/Nor (neither/nor) level.
Application of the Metaphoric Dialectic
to the Development of Locomotion
Before applying this developmental dialectic to the
detailed study of the Piagetian concepts of conservation and
formal operations we shall exemplify the five recursive
levels in terms of the child' s developmental coordination of
locomotion. Gesell et al . describe the child's development
of neuromotor coordination as a consolidative process of
"reciprocal interweaving," which is similar to the first
four levels of the metaphoric dialectic, but they do not
constructively account for the fifth level of second-order
transitions
.
The facile operation of the nervous system depends upon
balance and counteraction between antagonistic compo-
nents. . . . Bilateral, unilateral, ipsilateral and
contralateral members must be brought into parallel and
diagonal coordination. This is accomplished through a
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kind of cross
-stitching or reciprocal interweaving inthe structural growth of the networks of the nervous
system. (Gesell et al
. , 1974, p. 194).
Gesell goes on to explain that the child does not develop on
installment plan" but by the "expansion of a unitary re-
action system. " However this expansion is not a "homogene-
ous balloon-like expansion" nor a "hierarchical stratifica-
tion," but rather a "process of reincorporation and consoli-
dation with progressive corticalization. The neurologic
result is an interwoven structured texture which expresses
itself in the progressive patterns of behavior" (Gesell et
al.
,
1974
,
p. 194) .
Gesell' s general process of "reciprocal interweaving"
may be functionally explicated in terms of the metaphoric
dialectic which also constructively accounts for second-
order transitions rather than relying on critical periods of
maturation as Gesell does. Reinterpreting and extending
Gesell' s maturational principles in terms of metaphoric dia-
lectic we may say that development is neither the trivial
creativity of a "homogeneous balloon-like expansion" nor the
radical creativity of "hierarchical stratification" but
rather is a second-order process of "reincorporation" which
is constructed through the first-order consolidation of the
"reciprocal interweaving" of the child's bilateral interac-
tion with the environment. This constructive reinterpreta-
tion of Gesell in terms of the metaphoric dialectic allows
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us to constructively elaborate on the rich tapestry of the
child s reciprocal interweaving with the environment.
Drawing upon LeWinn (1969) and Cohen’s (1979) research
concerning the child's locomotive development from global
reflex movement through walking we offer the following out-
line and extend it through the second-order level of "flow-
ing" interaction. It is important to note that the first
three levels are a phylogenetic recapitulation of ontogeny.
According to LeWinn (1969, pp. 98-100), the infant's "global
undulation," "crawling" and "creeping" patterns phylogene-
tically recapitulate the movement of "fish, " "amphibians"
and "reptiles." Hence it appears we are addressing a funda-
mental principle concerning evolution as well as develop-
ment. The following outline of the child's developmental
locomotion is organized according to the five levels of the
metaphoric dialectic
:
I
.
Global undulating movements and reflex actions in
prone position
-
II. Absolute Differential Coordination (Crawling)
1. Global coordination
—
global undulating move-
ments and reflex action
2. Absolute differential coordination--homolo-
gous crawling
3. Either/or coordination—homolateral crawling
4 . Both/and coordination—contralateral crawling
5. Neither/nor metaphoric coordination—pushing
up to the knee level with stationary balance
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III- Either/or coordination (Creeping)
1. Global coordination—maintaining knee level
position with stationary balance
2. Absolute differential coordination—homolo-
gous creeping
3. Either/or coordination--homolateral creeping
4 . Both/and coordination--contralateral creeping
5. Neither/nor metaphoric coordination--pushing
up to standing position with stationary bal-
ance
IV. Both/and coordination (Walking)
1. Global coordination--pushing up to standing
position with stationary balance
2. Absolute differential coordination--homolo-
gous walking
3. Either/or coordination—homolateral walking
4 . Both/and coordination--contralateral walking
5. Neither/nor metaphoric coordination—second-
order transition to "flowing" movement
V. Neither/Nor Metaphoric coordination (Flowing)
1. Global coordination--global flowing
2. Absolute differential coordination—homolgous
flowing
3. Either/or coordination—homolateral flowing
4. Both/and coordination—contralateral flowing
5. Neither/nor metaphoric coordination--dynamic
stillness
The first four general levels represent the idealized
developmental sequence. At the first general level of
Global Coordination the infant exhibits diffuse undulating
spinal movements without mobility which are phylogeneticall^
reminiscent of fish movements. Through this movement the
infant differentiates the opposing front and back sides of
the body. At the second general level of Absolute Differen
-
tial Coordination the infant crawls with the abdomen in con-
tact with the supporting surface which is phy logenetically
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reminiscent of amphibian movements. Through this movement
the infant differentiates the opposing polarity of the upper
and lower body with the weight biased toward the lower half.
At the third general level of "Either/Or " Coordination the
infant creeps with the abdomen unsupported which is phylo-
genetically reminiscent of reptilian movement . Through this
movement the infant lateralizes the mutually exclusive right
and left sides of the body. At the fourth general level of
"Both/And" Coordination the infant learns to walk in an up-
right, bipedal cross-pattern. Through this movement the
polarized opposites of front and lower and the lateralized
opposites of right and left are diagonally cross- integrated
in sequential movement.
Within each general level the five general levels are
recursively recapitulated with five corresponding sublevels.
For example within the third general level of "Either/Or 11
Coordination for creeping the child begins with a global
coordination of stationary balance at knee level and pro-
ceeds to the absolute differential coordination of homolo-
gous creeping, then the "either/or" coordination of homo-
lateral creeping, then the "both/and" coordination of con-
tralateral creeping and finally the "neither/nor" metaphoric
coordination of pushing up to standing position with
stationary balance. For a more detailed exposition of the
sublevels of creeping in terms of the metaphoric dialectic
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see the prototypical example developed toward the end of
Chapter III. We may further note that every child does not
necessarily go through every sublevel in a lockstep se-
quence. An individual child may not exhibit all the sub-
levels but on the whole most children tend to follow this
developmental sequence. The fifth general metaphoric level
is proposed as a natural construction developing out of the
previous levels. This final level is a second-order type of
movement and as such it is not just a more sophisticated
extension of what preceded. Running would merely be a more
sophisticated extension of walking. The second-order coor-
dination is more concerned with the qualitative way the
person moves rather than the actual mechanics. This may be
exemplified with the movements of a performing dancer in
which the first-order movements are concerned with the basic
techniques and mechanics of coordination while the second-
order movement is concerned with the aesthetic flow of the
dance
.
To explain this second-order way of moving we shall
draw upon the research of Csikszentnihalay i (1975) who has
found that many people when they are totally immersed in
their activity experience an altered state of being which
they describe as "flowing." In a study of 30 rock climbers,
55 chess players, 30 rock dancers, and 40 high-school bas-
ketball players Csikszentnihalay i found through a
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questionnaire and interview format that when these people
were most enjoying their activity they were in a qualita-
tively altered state of being which they self-reported as
"flowing." The enjoyment gained from this experience of
"flowing" was ranked higher than prestige, reward or gla-
mour .
We shall briefly summarize six interdependent vari-
ables of the "flow" state (Csikszentmihalyi
, 1975, pp . 38-
48) .
1. Merging of action and awareness . In the flow
state the participant has no dualistic perspective. He is
aware of his actions but not of awareness itself. An expert
rock climber reports : "You are so involved in what you are
doing [that] you aren't thinking of yourself as separate
from the immediate activity. . . . You don't see yourself as
separate from what you are doing" (p. 39). An outstanding
chess player reports, "The game is a struggle and the con-
centration is like breathing--you never think of it. The
roof could fall in and, if it missed you, you would be
unaware of it" (p. 39).
2. Centering of attention on a limited stimulus
field . The immediate field of activity is brought into
greater focus to the exclusion of extraneous factors. A
university professor in science who climbs rocks reported,
"When I start on a climb, it is as if my memory input has
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been cut off. All I can remember is the last thirty sec-
onds, and all I can think ahead is the next five minutes"
(p. 40). Various chess experts report, "When the game is
exciting, I don't seem to hear nothing--the world seems to
be cut off from me and all there is to think about is my
game " (p . 40 ) .
3. Loss of ego . In the flow state the participant
experiences "self-forgetfulness" or the "loss of self-
consciousness" and when the flow is deepest a "transcendence
of individuality" and "fusion with the world." A majority
of participants also experience an altered sense of time in
which time is either speeded up or "does not exist" (pp. 65,
87). A rock climber reports, "One tends to get immersed in
what is going on around him, in the rock, in the moves that
are involved . . . search for handholds . . . proper posi-
tion of body— so involved he might lose the consciousness of
his own identity and melt into the rock" (p. 43) . An expert
chess player reports, "Time passes a hundred times faster.
In this sense, it resembles the dream state. A whole story
can unfold in seconds, it seems. Your body is nonexistent--
but actually your heart pumps like mad to supply the brain"
(p. 44) .
4. Control and congruence with the environment. In
the flow state this may vary from the feeling of omnipotent
control over the activity and/or opponent to feeling a
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secure sense of oneness with the activity and/or opponent.
A rock climber reports, "You become a robot--no, more like
an animal. It's pleasant. There is a feeling of total
involvement.
. . . You feel like a panther powering up the
rock" (p. 43). A few chess players report: "I get a
tyrannical sense of power. I feel immensely strong, as
though I have the fate of another person in my grasp. I
want to kill!"; "I like getting lost in an external situa-
tion and forgetting about personal crap--I like being in
control"; "Although I am not aware of specific things, I
have a general feeling of well-being, and that I am in com-
plete control of my world" (pp. 44, 45).
5. Clarity of feedback and goals . In the flow state
the participant experiences an enhanced clarity of response
in which the rightness of each movement is immediately
sensed. This clarity of response is greatly increased by
the degree of structure that the activity provides. In
sports the player immediately knows whether they have scored
or gained. In mountain climbing a wrong move can be fatal.
In chess the rules are precisely defined. A rock climber
reports, "When things are going poorly, you start thinking
about yourself. When things go well, you do things automa-
tically without thinking. You pick the right holds, equip-
ment, and it is right" (p. 86). A chess player reports, "I
feel as if I couldn't do a wrong move. Very, very happy
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feeling— I feel smarter, clever. Sadistical as it is, I
can't stop a grin from breaking out on my face" (p. 64).
6. Motivation is "autotelic
"
. In the flow state
motivation is intrinsic to the activity and in need of no
external rewards to itself. A young poet who is also a
seasoned rock climber reports
:
The mystique of rock climbing is climbing; you get to
the top of a rock glad it's over but really wish it
would go forever. The justification of climbing is
climbing, like the justification of poetry is writing;
you don't conquer anything except things in yourself.
. . .
The act of writing justifies poetry. Climbing is
the same: recognizing that you are a flow. The purpose
of the flow is to keep on flowing, not looking for a
peak or utopia but staying in the flow. It is not a
moving up but a continuous flowing; you move up only to
keep the flow going. There is no possible reason for
climbing except the climb itself; it is a self-
communication (pp. 47-48) .
A chess player reports, "Nothing comes close to chess in
providing beauty and pleasure" (p. 67)
.
In summary there are six interdependent variables
which characterize the flow experience: (1) merging of
action and awareness, (2) centering of attention on a lim-
ited stimulus field, (3) loss of ego, (4) control and con-
gruence with the environment, (5) clarity of feedback and
goals, (6) intrinsic motivation of the activity. A general
factor which is related to all six of these variables is the
relative difficulty of the activity in relation to the par-
ticipant's capability. If the activity is too demanding it
may produce stress and anxiety from worrying. If the
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activity is too easy it may produce boredom and anxiety from
lack of any challenge. The flow experience goes beyond both
the anxiety of stress and boredom to produce a meaningful
challenge which keeps the participant on the cutting edge of
their development. The flow state is a productive form of
play in which the participant's awareness is co-reflexive
with the environmental activity.
Next we shall define and exemplify the five sublevels
of the second-order coordination of the "flowing" movement
in terms of the flow experiences recorded and analyzed by
Csikszentmihalyi. Specifically we shall define the sub-
levels in terms of the locus of control involved in the co-
reflexive relation of the participant's awareness and envi-
ronmental activity.
1. Global flowing . The participant experiences a
global sense of diffuse flow without awareness or differen-
tiation of the locus of control. The participant receptive-
ly experiences the flow without directing it.
2. Homologous flowing . The participant experiences
the initial differentiation of the controlling self from the
environmental activity. The participant begins to take an
active role in directing the flow movement.
3. Homolateral flowing . The participant experiences
the locus of control in the self as opposed to the environ-
ment and/or opponent. The self and environment are related
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in an either/or" competitive relation of mutual exclusion.
The participant experiences an omnipotent sense of control
over the environment. As one rock climber reported, "You
feel like a panther powering up the rock" (p. 43)
.
4, Contralateral flowing . The participant experi-
ences the locus of control in the reciprocal interaction
between the self and environment or opponent. The self and
environment are related in a "both/and" relation of mutual
dependence and respect. One rock climber reported, "It's
self-catalyzing. . . . The moves . . . create each other.
The move you're planning to do is also the genesis of the
move you're going to do after you're done that one. It's an
indefinite interrelationship, a kind of crystalline hookup"
(p. 85)
.
Another rock climber reported, "You aren't really
the master, but are moving with something else. That's part
of where the really good feeling comes from. You are moving
in harmony with something else, the piece of rock as well as
the weather and scenery. You're part of it and thus lose
some of the feeling of individual separation" (p. 46).
5. Dynamic stillness . The participant experiences
the locus of control in neither the self nor the environment
but releases control to the simultaneous integration of both
self and environment. The deep numinous flow at this level
both "elevates and humiliates simultaneously" (Jung, 1963,
p. 154). Nicolson (1959) in her study of the "sublime"
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records the reports of mountain climbers simultaneously
experiencing both the awesome gloom and the awe inspiring
glory of the mountains. Through the dynamic stillness of
sublimity the participant experiences the transcendent
heights by virtue of an abased grounding. At this level the
flow experience is both as transcending and grounding as the
mountain itself. The participant's kinesthetic perception
becomes simultaneously infinitesimally small with the awe -
some gloom of the mountain and infinitely expansive with the
awe inspiring glory of the mountain . The temporal sensation
becomes focused into the eternality of a single moment
(Robinson, 1969, p. 9) . The self is confronted with both
its own limitations and its immense potentiality. Robinson
describes this heightened vision of the mountain climber as
the "oceanic feeling of the supreme sufficiency of the
present," "oceanic feelings of clarity, distance, union, and
oneness" (Robinson, 1969, pp. 6, 8).
Csikszentmihalyi also records comparable experiences
of the "dynamic stillness." One rock climber reported:
After one prolonged climb in bad weather without food, I
had this experience of having always climbed, always
will. Once on top I felt as if I could open my arms and
merge with the whole surroundings. I felt part of the
greater whole-oneness, (p. 92)
Another reported, "You could get so immersed in the rock, in
the moves, the proper position of the body, that you'd lose
consciousness of your identity and melt into the rock and
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the others you're climbing with" (p. 92). Another reported:
The only religious feelings I ever have stem from the
mountains. I feel that the mountains make one aware of
spiritual matters. ... I'm fortunate because I can
appreciate these places where you can appreciate nature,
the minisculeness of man and his aspirations, which can
elevate one. Cp"i 92 ) “
Another reported:
You're climbing yourself as much as the rock. ... if
you're flowing with something, it's totally still.
. . .
There's no possibility of judging from the inside of a
car whether the car is moving or the freeway. So you're
not quite sure whether you are moving or the rock is,
for the same reason, being inside yourself as you usual-
ly are. So it becomes very still . . . (p. 93)
.
In summary of the five sublevels of the flowing move-
ment the locus of control develops from a nondif ferentiated
global flow to the initial differentiation of the control-
ling self from the global flow to omnipotence of the self
over the environment to the complementarity of the self with
the environment to finally the aesthetic unity of sublimity.
It is a thesis of this dissertation that both physical
coordination and mental coordination share a common meta-
phoric dialectic. The physical coordination of physical
space is isomorphic with the mental coordination of mental
space. Csikszentmihalyi ' s research supports this thesis in
that rock climbing and chess playing share the same basic
elements of second-order flow. Furthermore, research by
Maslow (1968) (1971) into the distinctive cognitive patterns
of "self-actualizers " and " transcenders " is also congruent
with the second-order flow experience.
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Application of the Metaphoric Dialectic to the
Development of Conservation
Next we shall apply the recursive metaphoric dialectic
to the detailed study of "conservation." We shall hypothe-
tically retrace Leibnitz's childhood construction of the
conservation of a clay ball through Forman's six levels as
previously discussed in the literature review on Piaget.
From the attainment of the conservation of the clay ball at
the concrete operations we shall continue Leibnitz's devel-
opment into the young adolescence of formal operations with
the proportional conservation of a rectangular volume. At
this point we shall retrace Leibnitz's historical construc-
tion of infinitesimal calculus which goes beyond the formal
operations of the proportional conservation of rectangular
volume to the advanced formal metaphoric operations of
infinitesimal calculus which allow the formulation of the
volume of spheroids. Thus we shall span Leibnitz's develop-
ment from the childhood play with a clay ball to productive
play of a brilliant mathematician constructing the infi-
nitesimal calculus of spheroids.
I. Global Coordination (Sensori-motor stage)
At this beginning level baby Leibnitz playfully per-
ceives an absolute correspondence (resemblance) between all
the states of the clay ball. In other words he globally
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fuses or confuses the identity of the various shapes of the
clay.
II. Absolute (Sensori-motor stage)
1. Global coordination . The previous level becomes
the seed structure for the next set of recursive develop-
ments .
2. Absolute differential coordination (Forman's
Absolute Difference). Young Leibnitz's global coordination
dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
absolute differentiation. At this level little Leibnitz is
able to differentiate only the difference of "tall" to the
neglect of any correspondence with "not tall."
3. Either/Or coordination (Forman's Opposition).
Young Leibnitz's absolute differentiation of the clay ball
dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
"either" tall "or" not tall in opposition. At this level
little Leibnitz perceives the tall shape of the clay as the
mutually exclusive opposite of the not-tall flat shape of
clay
.
4. Both/And coordination (Forman's Discrete Degrees).
Young Leibnitz's either/or coordination of the clay ball
dialectically leads to the more coherent construction of
"both" tall "and" not tall in discrete degrees. At this
level little Leibnitz begins to fill in the gap between the
two mutually exclusive extremes of "tall" and "not tall
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with the discrete degrees of "a little tall." The continu-
ous overlap of the discrete degrees gradually leads to the
contradiction of how can a discrete difference be both "a
little tall" and "a little not tall" simultaneously in the
middle spherical range of the continuum.
5. Neither/Nor Metaphoric coordination (Forman's
Variation) . Young Leibnitz metaphorically resolves the
contradiction of the previous level with the transformation
of "neither" a little tall "nor" a little not tall but the
absolute and necessary correspondence of both through a
second-order continuum of variation.
II. Either/Or Coordination (Pre-operational Stage)
1. Global coordination . The absolute correspondence
of the previous level becomes the seed structure or starting
point of the next set of recursive developments. At this
global level of variation little Leibnitz has not yet dif-
ferentiated "direct functional variation" from "inverse
functional variation." The direct function is the more
height the less width. The inverse function is the more
width the less height.
2. Absolute differential coordination (Forman's
Direct Function) . Young Leibnitz's global coordination of
the clay ball dialectically leads to the more coherent
construction of absolute differentiation. At this level
little Leibnitz is able to differentiate only the function
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of direct variation to the neglect of any correspondence
with the inverse function.
3. Either/Or coordination (Forman's Inverse Func-
tion)
. Young Leibnitz's absolute differentiation of the
direct function dialectically leads to the more coherent
construction of "either" the direct function "or" not the
direct function (inverse function) in mutually exclusive
opposition. At this level little Leibnitz understands that
the functional variation of height to width is negatively
defined in opposition to the inverse function.
4. Both/And coordination . Young Leibnitz's function-
al either/or coordination of the clay ball dialectically
leads to the more coherent construction of "both" direct
functional variation "and" inverse functional variation in
discrete degrees of mutual dependence. At this level little
Leibnitz begins to fill in the mutually exclusive gap be-
tween the independent variations of the direct and inverse
function with temporally discrete perceptual judgments of
the clay ball having "both" more height and less width at
time tl "and" less height and more width at time t2 . In
other words Leibnitz can understand that the continuous
variation of the ball's direct and inverse functions are
mutually dependent through time but cannot yet make the
necessary atemporal correspondence of exact compensation.
Furthermore the continuous variation of both the direct and
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inverse function leads Leibnitz to the crossover point of
the sphere where the direct function contradictorily turns
into the inverse function.
5. Neither/Nor Metaphoric coordination (Forman's
Exact Compensation)
. Young Leibnitz metaphorically resolves
the contradiction of the previous level with the transforma-
tion of "neither" the discrete variation of the direct func -
tion "nor" the discrete variation of the inverse function
but the absolute and necessary correspondence of both
through the second-order integration of exact compensation.
In other words Leibnitz now understands that the direct and
inverse functions "reciprocally" compensate their interde-
pendent variation to conserve the quantity of the clay ball.
IV. Both/And Coordination (Concrete Operational Stage)
1. Global coordination . The absolute correspondence
of the previous level becomes the seed structure for the
next set of recursive developments. While we have outlined
the development of compensation by reciprocity parallel to
this little Leibnitz also develops the notion of compensa-
tion by inverse (negation) (Piaget, 1970, pp. 703-732)
.
The
inverse (negation) is defined as the equivalent correspon-
dence between what is negatively displaced from one part of
the clay ball and what is positively replaced some other
place on the clay ball. In the literature review we re-
ported a successful conservation learning experiment by
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Inhelder et al. (1975) which incorporated the notion of the
inverse equivalence by correspondence. Hence we have two
concrete operational indicators of compensation: (1) little
Leibnitz indicates that the transformed clay corresponds to
the original by the inverse (negation); (2) little Leibnitz
indicates that the height and width of the clay are recipro -
cally conserved. At the global level of compensation these
two parallel developments are diffusely related.
2. Absolute differential coordination
. Since compen-
sation by the inverse (negation) usually develops first it
is the first to be differentiated to the neglect of recipro-
city.
3. Either/or coordination . Young Leibnitz's absolute
differentiation of compensation by inverse (negation) dia-
lectically leads to the more coherent construction of
"either" compensation by inverse "or" not compensation by
the inverse (compensation by reciprocity) in opposition. At
this level little Leibnitz understands reciprocity is not
the inverse and that both are mutually exclusive.
4. Both/And coordination . Young Leibnitz's "either/
or" coordination of conservation dialectically leads to the
more coherent construction of "both" inverse "and" recipro -
city as mutually dependent compliments necessarily to a
fuller understanding of conservation. However he cannot yet
explain their absolute correspondence.
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5. Neither/nor metaphoric coordination
. At this
level the young adolescent Leibnitz understands that "nei-
ther inverse nor rec ip roc ity as mutual ly dependent com-
plements are adequate for to the fullest understanding of
conservation. Rather both become interdependent at the
second-order level of absolute correspondence or correlation
in the INRC group (Piaget, 1970, p. 727)
.
In other words
the young adolescent Leibnitz attains an understanding of
the proportional volume of rectangular solids. Given two
wooden blocks one with the marked off surface dimensions of
6x6 and the other an unmarked block of 4x9 dimension Leib-
nitz is able to compare the two blocks and mentally deduce
that the displaced proportions of the unmarked 4x9 block
inversely correspond to the 6x6 marked block by the recipro-
city of the multiplication formula. Thus the conservation
of proportional volume involves the absolute correlation of
both inverse (negation) and reciprocity. Piaget expresses
this in terms of the group formula I=CNR where I=the con-
served identity, C=correlation , N=negation (inverse) and
R=reciprocity (Piaget, 1970, p. 727).
V. Formal Operations
1. Global coordination . The absolute correspondence
(correlation) of the previous level becomes the seed struc-
ture for the next set of recursive developments. At this
level the proportional rectangular solids serve as first-
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order approximations of the second-order spheroids which re-
quire a calculus of the infinitesimal. The calculus of the
infinitesimal as developed historically by Leibnitz demon-
strates the "absolute correlation" of the differential and
integral operations in constructing the volume formula for
spheroids. Intuitively the differential is the directional
flow of a curve at each point and the integral is the sum of
such points extended over the projected plane of the curve.
2. Absolute differential coordination . Leibnitz
first develops the differential to the neglect of the inte-
gral .
3. Either/Or coordination . Leibnitz's absolute
differential coordination dialectically leads to the more
coherent construction of "either" the differential "or"
not the differential (integral) as negatively defined in
terms of each other. At this level Leibnitz was historical-
ly able to formulate the fundamental theorem of calculus
concerning the inverse relationship between the differential
and the integral (Boyer, 1949, p. 206). In other words the
integral was defined as the anti-differential (e.g., the
differential of x is 2x and the integral of 2x is x ) .
Although the static inverse relationship between the inte-
gral and differential was understood at this level the
dynamic reciprocal interaction of the two operations in the
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construction of the volume of a spheroid was yet to be
attained.
4. Both/And coordination
. Leibnitz's either/or coor-
dination of the differential and the integral leads to the
more coherent construction of "both" the differential "and"
the integral as mutually dependent complements necessary to
a fuller understanding of the volume of spheroids. At this
level Leibnitz comes to understand the dynamic reciprocal
interaction of both the differential and integral in the
construction of the volume of the spheroid. However,
Leibnitz's definition of the differential and integral in
terms of the "infinitesimal" and "infinity" resulted in a
historical paradox which has perplexed mathematicians till
this very day (Kline, 1980, p. 273). Leibnitz mathematical-
ly reasoned that a spheroid could be regularly packed with
rectangular solids which upon calculation would give a
first-order "discrete degree" approximation of the volume of
the spheroid. By making the rectangular solids smaller and
smaller the error of the first-order "discrete degree"
approximation could be indefinitely reduced. However, the
paradox is how is it possible for an infinite number of
infinitesimally reduced rectangular figures to amount to the
definite magnitude of a spheroid. If the rectangular fig-
ures are infinitesimally reduced to an actual zero magnitude
then even an infinite number of zeros still amounts to zero
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5. Neither/nor metaphoric coordination
. At this
level Leibnitz developed the understanding that the volume
of the spheroid is neither the discrete finite summation of
the integral nor the discrete finite degrees of the differ-
ential in a mutually dependent relation but rather both are
interdependent and absolutely correlated as the differential
is reconstructed with the second-order limit of an infini -
tesimal (relative zero) . Hence the differential and the
integral are no longer two dependent aspects reciprocally
interacting in discrete degrees but with the second-order
construction of the infinitesimal the differential and
integral become absolutely correlated as two aspects of one
identity displayed through the "form" of a spheroid . Thus
through Leibnitz's infinitesimal calculus we are able to
integrally differentiate the hyper- infinite expanse of the
infinitesimal to construct the general form-ula of spher-
oids. At this final level of conservation of volume Leib-
nitz is able to fully reconstruct the conserved form of the
multitudinous spheroid shapes of all the clay balls he
originally played with or might have played with as a baby
.
Explication of the Formal Metaphoric Operations
Next we shall examine the last three sublevels of the
formal metaphoric operations in terms of the INRC group,
temporality, variability and related paradigms of physics.
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We shall further term the last three sublevels of the gen-
eral formal level: (1) metaphoric fission (either/or coor-
dination)
, (2) metaphoric flow (both/and coordination)
,
(3) metaphoric fusion (neither/nor coordination). The
appropriateness of these labels shall become apparent as we
explicate the levels.
At the "either/or" level of metaphoric fission we may
depict the formal coordination in terms of the Piagetian
INRC group where I=identity, N=inversion or negation,
R=reciprocity
,
and C=correlation . At this level of formal
coordination the two types of reversibility, negation and
reciprocity, which were separate in concrete operations
become correlated in the INRC group. We may exemplify the
INRC group in terms of a person's "either/or" coordination
of a double reference system which Piaget claims is indica-
tive of Piagetian formal operations (Piaget, 1970, p. 727) .
Utilizing an example given by Piaget we may let one of the
relative frames of reference be the movement of a snail to
either left or right. The other relative frame of reference
is a mobile board (on which the snail moves) which can also
move to either left or right. Both the snail and the board
are positioned on a table which serves as an absolute un-
movable frame of reference. We may display the INRC group
of this double frame of reference coordination in terms of a
"square of opposition" (see figure 24) (Piaget (translator's
Figure 24. Piaget’s INRC group.
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note), 1970, p. 727. We term this diagram a "square of
opposition because of the double criss-crossing negation.
Quoting from the translator's note on an article by Piaget
i
We can define C to be the rule that reverses the move-
ment of the snail: C (L, L) = (R,L)
,
for example [where
(R,L) means the snail (first coordinate) is moving
right, and the board moving left] . Then we can define R
to be the rule that reverses the second coordinate, for
example, R(L,L)=(L,R) (this reverses the movement of the
board)
. . . . N (N reverses both movements) is the
product of R and C. (Piaget's translator's note, 1970,
p. 727)
Hence we may begin with both the snail and the board
to the right side of a mid-point on the table (R,R). By the
operation of correlativity (C) we can move the snail to the
left end of the board ( L , R) . Next by the operation of
reciprocity (R) we can move the board to the left (L,L)
.
Finally by the operation of negation (N) we may reverse both
of the previous two movements back to the identity state or
origin ( R , R) . The identity may be defined as the operation
that changes any coordinate into itself. Hence we may
formulate the previous set of movements as I=NRC. By chas-
ing around the "square of opposition" we may verify the
following formulations:
(a) RC=N, RN=C , CN=R, and all couples are commutative,
that is, RC=CR,
2 2 2(b) C=N=R=I,
(c) RNC=I
.
At the "either/or" level of metaphoric fission the
INRC group is depicted as a "square of opposition" in which
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the criss crossing diagonals are mutually exclusive nega-
tions. The application of the INRC "square of opposition"
to the double reference system is based on the assumption
that the two frames of reference are separately independent
of each other and externally referenced to an absolute
unmoveable frame of reference. Thus the INRC "square of
opposition" is descriptive of a Newtonian mechanical uni-
verse in which all movements are part of an absolute
Euclidean frame of reference to which the absolute variable
of time is independently related.
At the "both/and" level of metaphoric flow the INRC
group previously depicted as a "square of opposition" is
transformed into a "cybernetic loop of reciprocity." While
the "square of opposition" is a static system of mathemati-
cal relations the "cybernetic loop of reciprocity" is a
dynamic system of complementary relations. While the
"square of opposition" is a system of negatively independent
variables the "cybernetic loop of reciprocity" is a system
of mutually dependent variables. Consider the example of
the "profiled vase" as a double frame of reference system.
The "profiled vase" is a co-reflexive system which may be
dialectically interpreted according to three levels of
perception. We may perceptually coordinate the movement of
the "profiled vase" as an "either/or" metaphoric fission, a
263
both/and" metaphoric flow or a "neither/nor" metaphoric
fusion
.
At the level of metaphoric fission the "profiled vase"
is perceived as "either" profile "or" vase in negative
independence of each other. The movement between the pro-
file and vase is perceived as a discontinuous mirror opposi-
tion. We may represent this "either/or" metaphoric fission
in terms of the INRC "square of opposition" (see Figure 25) .
Hence we may interpret the "profiled vase" as "either"
the profiles discontinuously correlated with the vase by
negative reciprocation "or" vice-versa the vase discontinu-
ously correlated with the profiles by negative reciproca-
tion . In other words starting with the "profiles" in the
foreground we can with a static, discontinuous correlation
take the negation of the "profile" to equal the "not vase"
in the background and reciprocate the "not vase" to equal
the "vase" in the foreground (N^R^=C^) . In reflexive oppo-
sition to the previous relation we can with a static, dis-
continuous correlation take the negation of the "vase" in
the foreground to equal the "not profile" in the background
and reciprocate the "not profile" to equal the "profile" in
the foreground ( N
2
R
1
=C
1
) . The extreme opposites of this
discontinuous cycle are symbolically represented by
and n
2
R
1
=C
1
resPectively and the complete discontinuous
cycle by N
1
R
2
N
2
R
1
=C
1
C
1
=C
1
=I where 1 is the ori9 inal identity
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Figure 25.
Reciprocity.
"
(a) "Square of Opposition." (b) "Loop of
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of the profile in the foreground. Both the double frame of
reference systems of the "profiled vase" and the "snail and
board" share the equivalent "either/or" relations as de-
picted by the INRC "square of opposition."
At the level of metaphoric flow the "profiled vase" is
perceived as both" profile "and" vase in mutual dependence.
The movement between the profile and vase is perceived as a
continuous reciprocal flow. We may represent this "both/
and" metaphoric flow in terms of the INRC "loop of recipro-
city" (see Figure 25b). Two major differences between the
"cybernetic loop of reciprocity" and the "square of opposi-
tion" are that the operations of reciprocity and negation
are transposed and the dimension of time is inherent to the
"loop of reciprocity" while the "square of opposition" rep-
resents static mathematical relations with time separated
out. In terms of the "loop of reciprocity" we may interpret
the "profiled vase" as both the profiles continuously corre -
lated with the vase by reciprocal negation and the vase con-
tinuously correlated with the profiles by reciprocal nega-
tion . In other words starting with the "profiles" in the
foreground we can in a continuous "correlative" oscillation
negate the "profiles" into the background as "not profiles"
and reciprocate the "not profiles" into the foreground as
the vase (N
1
R
2
=C
2 )
and complementarily negate the "vase" in
the background as not "vase" and reciprocate the "not vase"
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into the foreground as the "profiles" (t^R^C^) returning
full cycle to the original identity. Thus the two recipro-
cal complements of the cycle are symbolically represented by
^^^2 =<
“i anc^ ^2^1
=
^'l
resPec ti vely and the full, continuous
2
cycle by N
]_
R
2
N
2
R
1
=C
1
C
1
=C
1
=I *
Although both the "square of opposition" and the "loop
of reciprocity" share the same symbolic formulations of the
INRC group their interpretations of reciprocity and negation
are transposed and the "movement" of the former is statical-
ly discontinuous while the former is dynamically continuous.
Furthermore the "variables" of the "square of opposition"
are negatively independent while those of the "loop of reci-
procity" are mutually dependent. Hence the either/or
"square of opposition" appears to be descriptive of the
relatively independent frames of reference of a Newtonian
universe and the both/and "loop of reciprocity" appears to
be descriptive of the relatively dependent frames of refer-
ence of an Einsteinian Universe.
At the "neither/nor" level of metaphor fusion the INRC
group previously depicted as a "square of opposition" and
"loop of reciprocity" is transformed into a "circle of cor-
relation." At the level of metaphoric fusion the "profiled
vase" is perceived "neither" as profile "nor" vase in con-
tinuous oscillation but rather both are absolutely corre-
lated in the reintegrated image of "twins kissing a flower
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vase. At the neither/nor" level what was previously mutu-
ally dependent and temporally oscillating in and out of the
foreground becomes interdependently fused into a single
metaphoric image with two simultaneously correlated comple-
ments, the profile and vase, both brought together in a
second-order unity. This second-order construction of meta-
phoric fusion is "neither" in the foreground "nor" in the
background but takes place through a higher order homospati-
al operation (Rothenburg, 1979a).
We may depict the construction of this higher order
relation in terms of the temporal collapse of the "loop of
reciprocity" and the second-order expansion of the new iden-
tity of the "circle of correlation" (see Figure 26a, b)
.
With the temporal collapse of the "loop of reciprocity" the
oscillating loop shrinks to the indeterminate point of
intersection where the "profiles" and "vase" may become syn-
chronously correlated in the second-order identity of "twins
kissing a flower vase." As the figure of the ""circle of
correlation" depicts the new second-order identity is a
simultaneous fusion of the three operations of negation,
reciprocity and correlation, and not merely a return to the
original first-order identity. Thus while the INRC group is
spatially and temporally "closed" under the dialectical
transformations of metaphoric fission and flow it becomes
"open" to a new meta-spacetime identity under metaphoric
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Cl
C2
Rl
Figure 26
.
(b) Expansion of
Correlation.
"
(a) Collapse of "Loop of Reciprocity."
the 2nd order identity of the "Circle of
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fusion. The visual figure of the circle of correlation is
indicative of a second-order metaphoric process which cannot
be displayed literally.
Dobbs (1972, pp . 272-292) has argued that the continu-
ous transformation between the three-dimensional counter-
parts of a reversible necker cube requires at least a four-
dimensional manifold. Furthermore he has argued that the
fourth dimension of this continuous transformation is an
"imaginary time" dimension, that is, "imaginary" in the
mathematical sense of a complex number. We suggest in an
analogous way that the continuous transformation between the
"vase" and "profiles" of the "profiled vase" requires a
higher-order dimensional manifold than either alone.
Furthermore, the metaphoric fusion of the "profiled vase"
requires a higher order manifold than the continuous trans-
formation. Hence we theorize that the "either/or" discon-
tinuous perception of the "profiled vase" requires no more
than a three-dimensional manifold, the "both/and" continuous
perception no more than a four-dimensional manifold and the
"neither/nor" metaphoric fusion no more than a five-
dimensional manifold. In addition we theorize that the
three-dimensional manifold of the "either/or" level portrays
a Newtonian universe with space and time as separate vari-
ables. Hence at the "either/or"level the alternation be-
tween the vase and profiles appears to be an infinitely
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fast, discontinuous leap between two static states. The
four-dimensional manifold of the "both/and" level portrays
an Einsteinian universe with a relative "spacetime continu-
um. " The spacetime continuum is defined by the causally
"determined" region of the Minkowski light cones (Reichen-
bach, 1958, pp . 184-185) which demarcates the limiting speed
of light for all "material objects" and thus their boundary
of visual detection. Hence at the "both/and" level the
psycho-physical pulsation between the vase and profiles is a
continuous relative movement which may not exceed the speed
of light as defined by the spacetime continuum of the light
cones. The five-dimensional manifold of the "neither/nor"
metaphoric level portrays a Bohmian quantum universe (1980)
in which objects according to Bell's theorem may be simulta -
neously correlated across long distances faster than the
speed of light (d'Espagnat, 1979, pp. 158-181) (Stapp, 1971,
pp. 1303-1320) and/or a Whiteheadian universe in which all
events participate in one organismic event (Whitehead,
1960) . The posited meta-spacetime continuum of this uni-
verse includes both the causally determined and indetermi—
nant regions of the Minkowski light cones where speed ex-
ceeds that of light (Jones, 1983, pp . 100-113) . Hence the
indeterminant point of pulsation integrating the vase and
profiles is included in the meta—spacetime where both are
simultaneously correlated in a single metaphoric image.
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In order to further exemplify the formal operations of
metaphoric fission, flow and fusion we shall apply the meta-
phoric dialectic to the developmental understanding of the
multi-referential movement system of the "natural hydrologi-
cal cycle. At the "either/or" level of metaphoric fission
we may depict the hydrological cycle in terms of the INRC
"square of opposition" (see Figure 27). At this level the
hydrological cycle is understood in terms of a static dis-
continuous set of mathematical group relations between the
independently opposed’ hydro-movement systems of the atmo-
sphere (sunclouds and rainclouds) and the earth (ocean and
mountain range) . Hence there is the understanding of the
negative relationship that what goes up must be equal to
what inversely comes down.
At the "both/and" level of metaphoric flow we may de-
pict the hydrological cycle in terms of the INRC "loop of
reciprocity." At this level the hydro-movement systems of
the atmosphere and earth are no longer discontinuously
opposed but are continuously reciprocated through time. The
hydrological cycle is perceived as a reciprocally interac-
tive cycle in which the "sun clouds" are continuously
correlated with the "mountain range" through the "cloud
stream" and "condensation" and the complementary correlation
of the "mountain range" with the "sun clouds" occurs through
the "earth stream" and "evaporation." Hence the reciprocal
Figure 27. (a) Metaphoric Fission for the Hydrocycle.
(b) Metaphoric Flow for the Hydrocycle.
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ratio of evaporation to condensation is understood as a
function of the time of interaction.
At the "neither/nor" level of metaphoric fusion we may
depict the hydrological cycle in terms of the temporal col-
lapse of the "loop of reciprocity" and the second-order ex-
pansion of the new identity of the "circle of correlation"
(see Figure 28a, b) . With the temporal collapse of the "loop
of reciprocity" the oscillating loop shrinks to the indeter-
minate point of interaction where both evaporation and
condensation are simultaneously equilibrated. The hydro-
cycle is no longer merely understood as the interactive de-
pendence of the atmospheric and earthly hydro-system but
rather both are metaphorically understood as interdependent
subsystems of a greater self-regulating system with a supra-
ordinate identity . Furthermore the conceived locus of
control of the hydrological system is neither in the atmo-
sphere nor earthly hydro-systems but rather it takes place
through the second-order interdependence of both in relation
to the greater context of the solar system. Hence the
unified hydro-system of the earth's sphere is a self-
regulating system because of its openness to the greater
context of lunar and solar influences.
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Rl
Figure 28. (a) Collapse of Metaphoric Flow for Hydro-
cycle. (b) Expansion of Metaphoric Fusion for Hydrocycle.
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Summary of the Chapter
In final summary of this chapter on development we
have attempted to deepen and extend Piaget's fundamental
concepts of "play," "imitation," "assimilation," "accommoda-
tion" and "equilibration" through the constructive applica-
tion of a metaphoric dialectic. We have provided a general
overview of the five developmental levels of the metaphoric
dialectic: (I) Global Coordination--reflex and global
interaction with the environment, (II) Absolute Differential
Coordination- -differentiation of self from the environment
with person and object permanence in the sensori-motor
period, (III) "Either/Or" Coordination—discontinuous alter-
nation between the conflicting inner world of pretend play
and the environmental world of imitation during the pre-
operational period, (IV) "Both/And " Coordination— reciprocal
interaction of play and imitation during the period of
concrete operation, (V) "Neither/Nor" Metaphoric Coordina -
tion— synchronous correlation of the science of imitation
and the art of play in the aesthetic constructions of the
advanced levels of the formal metaphoric transformations.
Beyond the general overview we have provided two de-
tailed examples of the five general levels of the metaphoric
dialectic with elaborated recursive sublevels for the devel-
opment of "locomotion" and "conservation." We have proposed
that the physical coordination of physical space and the
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mental coordination of mental space share a common meta-
phoric dialectic which becomes totally integrated in the
advanced developmental levels of second-order "flow" activ-
ity. Furthermore at this point we note the congruence
between the mountain climber's experience of "sublimity" as
a kinesthetic perception of being "infinitesimally" small
and "infinitely" expansive simultaneously and Leibnitz's
final conception of the conservation of the volume of
spheroids as the integral differentiation of the "infinite"
expanse of "infinitesimals."
Finally in consideration of the advanced formal levels
of metaphoric fission, flow and fusion we examined the
developmental indicators of the INRC group, temporality,
variability and supporting paradigms of physics. In summary
of these indicators and others for the advanced formal level
we present a table for the reader's perusal (see Table 1).
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
In this concluding chapter we will briefly summarize
and further clarify the main points of the dissertation. We
are proposing a "Metaphoric Theory" about a "metaphoric
process" of creative change which is genuinely novel in
structure and self-consistently explicable in genesis. The
concept of "metaphor" plays the dual role of both being the
explanatory subject about creative change and the object of
explanation in creative change. This is a bootstrapping
approach in which the theoretical subject is self-
consistently explicated in terms of its own objective pro-
cess. (For an example of how bootstrapping is successfully
used in atomic physics see Chew (1970).) We argue that this
bootstraping is neither a vicious circle nor an infinite
regress but rather accounts for the self-consistent adequacy
of the theory to explicate itself in its own metaphoric
terms which are irreducible to any lesser explanatory form.
The epistemological price we pay for this is to admit the
limits of rationalistic explanation and to metaphorically
embrace paradox. Bohr suggested a similar approach when he
told Heisenberg "that even when one had the final answer,
there will remain a completely paradoxical situation which
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could not be handled by any of the usual concepts" (Febru-
ary 25, 1963)
,
and, "that it was such a reasonable step to
take to introduce some paradox to the very beginning"
(July 12, 1963) (Rothenburg, 1983, p. 108). We conclude
that the goal of the study of creative change is not to re-
duce away the paradox of the creative process (Reducionism)
nor to leave it unexplicated (Holism) but rather to demon-
strate the metaphoric beauty of the paradox with a Metaphor-
ic Theory which is self-consistently explicable in its own
terms. This metaphoric beauty aesthetically resolves the
paradox by showing the greater hybridized unity of con-
traries "because of" their contrasting differences and not
just "in spite of" or from the "lack thereof."
In the theoretical study of creative change the con-
traries of Holism versus Reductionism have historically
embroiled researchers in a false dilemma. Holism allows for
a genuinely novel structure but does not explicate its gene-
sis. Reductionism explicates novelty but is a trivially
novel composite. By limiting ourselves to either Holism or
Reductionism we are caught in a false dilemma with the nega-
tive consequence of either "inexplicability" (Holism) or
"trivial novelty" (Reductionism) . Hence the choice of
either Holism or Reductionism is one-sidedly incomplete in
the explication of genuinely novel structures and further-
more fused together they are incons is tent for Holism
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characterizes the creative process as "radically discontinu-
ous while Reduct ioni sin proposes "trivial continuity."
Paradoxically neither Holism nor Reductionism taken singly
or fused together is adequate to explicate the generation of
genuinely novel structure. Bohr (Holton, 1973, pp. 115-161)
in facing an epistemologically equivalent paradox of charac-
terizing "light" as either a discontinuous particle or a
continuous wave proposed that the complementarity of the two
concepts in succession exhausts our conceptual understanding
of light. Transferring Bohr's level of analysis to the
realm of "bright ideas" we accept complementarity as a
"both/and" coordination of the contraries of "both" Holistic
discontinuity "and " Reductionistic continuity in succession
which goes beyond the "either/or" coordination of "either"
contrary taken singly "or" fused together . Beyond the
"both/and" coordination of complementarity we propose a
"neither/nor" metaphoric coordination in which "neither"
holistic discontinuity "nor" reductionistic continuity
singly or in succession is fully adequate to explicate the
generation of "bright new ideas." Rather with "neither/nor"
metaphoric coordination we introduce a second-order recon-
struction which simultaneously integrates the contrasting
differences of Holism with Reductionism in a genuinely novel
metaphoric theory. Thus paradoxically "because of" and not
merely complementarily "in spite of" or from the singular
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lack of" the contrasting perspectives of Holism and Reduc-
tionism we can aesthetically construct the greater cognitive
perspective of Metaphoric Theory.
Having clarified the epistemological status of the
"Metaphor Theory" and demonstrated how it is epistemologi-
cally more adequate than Holism and Reduction we may further
consider the "metaphoric process" which is the object of its
concern. Just as the paradoxical process of constructively
coordinating the mutually exclusive but equally necessary
oppositional theories of Holism and Reductionism to generate
a second-order simultaneous reintegration of their contrast-
ing differeces gives rise to the "Metaphoric Theory," the
paradoxical process of constructively coordinating mutually
exclusive but equally necessary first-order oppositional
differences to generate a second-order simultaneous reinte-
gration of their contrasting differences gives rise to the
"metaphoric process. " In short creativity may be defined as
a paradoxical tension in search of a metaphoric solution
both at the subjective theory level and the objective pro-
cess level. Furthermore the "explanatory function" by which
"metaphor" resolves the empirical anomalies and theoretical
paradoxes of genuinely novel learning, production, develop-
mental transition and paradigm shift is the metaphoiic
dialectic
.
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Metaphoric Example of Cinematic Perception
In the following idealized example of "cinematic per-
ception" we shall further clarify the steps in the metaphor-
ic dialectic.
I. Global Coordination
The co-reflexive tendency is expressed as the confused
differentiation of the past memory of the previous film
frames from the future anticipation of the next film frames.
In other words the cinematic film is perceived as a rapidly
moving blur.
II. Absolute Differential Coordination
Further focal coordination of the incoherent blur
leads to a more coherent perception of the sporadic sequence
of the past memory of the previous film frames as discon-
nected from the future anticipation of the next film frames.
Thus the observer begins to recognize various still frames
but perceives no coherent connection between them.
III. Either/Or Coordination
Further focal coordination of the incoherent percep-
tion of sporadic disconnectedness leads to the confronting
of the radically conflicting differences or gaps between
"either" the past memory of the previous film frames "or"
the future anticipation of the next frames in discontinuous
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succession. Thus the observer is confronted with radically
different perceptions of the same object over time which
appear to be in conflict.
IV. Both/And Coordination
Further focal coordination of the conflicting gap
between the radically different perceptions of the same
object leads to the more coherent perceptual coordination of
"both" the past memory of the previous frames "and" the
future anticipation of the next film frames as a continuous
sequence of gradually varied still frames of the object of
perception. Thus the object of perception becomes defined
as a static continuum of accumulated still frames. The
intensive rationalistic analysis of this level leads to a
paralysis which sacrifices dynamic movement for the pseudo-
precision of an infinitely divisible sequence of still
frames
.
V. Neither/Nor Metaphoric Coordination
Further focal coordination of the incoherent static
differences of the sequence of still frames leads to the
more coherent perceptual coordination of "neither" the past
memory of the previous frames "nor" the future anticipation
of the next frames as an infinitely divisible sequence of
still frames but rather the synchronous coherence of their
contrasting differences in the "continuous present.
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Through the synchronous coherence of the "continuous pre-
sent" a dynamic focal image is constructed which was para-
doxically motionless to the previous level of static percep-
tion. While the continuity of the "both/and" level is a
static first-order continuity rationalistically constructed
in retrospect the continuity of the "neither/nor" level is a
second-order continuity repeatedly reconstructed in the per-
petual present. Through the ever shifting intersection of
the past and future the "continuous present" generates a
dynamic image which the infinite division of still frames
recedes from the further it statically divides. (For a
detailed discussion of the "continuous present" in litera-
ture see Kawin (1972).)
Currently much of American developmental theory is
reductionis tically interpreted at the "both/and" level where
developmental transitions are isolated and smoothed out into
an infinitely divisible continuum of still frames in futile
hope of statically framing the dynamic moment of transition.
The rationalistic analysis of the "both/and" level only
leads to a paralysis of the dynamic creative process itself
while the "neither/nor" metaphoric coordination embraces the
dynamic creative process by taking on its dynamic form of
expression through metaphor. Furthermore the "both/and
level of analysis assumes there is a continuous one-to-one
point correspondence between the still frames while the
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neither/nor" metaphoric level of understanding represents a
continuous restructuring of the frames through their con-
trasting differences which can only be coupled as wholes.
Thus the attempt to overlay a reductionistic "both/and"
continuum of graduated variations on the metaphoric dialec-
tic for greater rationistic precision only defeats its
creative purpose to break down the shackles of rationalism
and break through to the dynamic creative process which
unites the allusive "charm" of the artist' s painting with
the allusive "charm" of the physicist's representation of
the subatomic particle. Any subdivision of the metaphoric
dialectic only leads to a recursive sublevel of the meta-
phoric dialectic itself. The metaphoric dialectic recursive-
ly reflects itself in each of its sublevels similar to the
way a hologram reflects itself in each of its parts. The
"both /and" level of analysis is only one step in the ongoing
metaphoric dialectic.
Metaphoric Example of the Blind Man' s Cane
Next we shall consider the fundamental source of oppo-
sitional differences in the creative process. As Bohr
(Miller, 1978, p. 95) proposes the general difficulty in the
formation of human ideas is inherent in the indeterminate
distinction between the "subject" and "object." This is
clearly the case in understanding the atomic domain where
286
"subjective" measurements indeterminately interact with
"objective" readings limiting the precise measurement of
both momentum and position simultaneously, and where two
^ifferen t "subjective" measurements of the same phenomena of
light lead to the mutually exclusive but complementary
"objective" readings of the continuous wave and the discon-
tinuous particle. We shall use Bohr's (Holton, 1973, p.
134) vivid example of the "blind man's cane" to show the
indeterminate yet metaphoric relation of our subjective self
to the objective world. The blind man, the cane, and the
world form one entity. The dividing line between the sub-
ject and the object is not fixed. Consider the following
levels of coordination for the shifting of the indeterminate
dividing line.
I, Global Coordination
The dividing line between the "subjective" blind man
and the "objective" world fumblingly shifts back and forth
between the diffuse positions of a loose subjective grasp of
the top of the cane as a separate explorable object to the
tight grasp of the cane which extends the dividing line of
subjective sensing to the objective bottom of the cane. The
blind man playfully fumbles around with the cane.
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II. Absolute Differential Coordination
The dividing line between the "subjective" blind man
and the "objective" world sporadically shifts between the
disconnected fixations of an "absolutely" loose subjective
grasp of the top of the cane as a separate object to the
"absolutely" tight grasp of the cane which extends the di-
viding line of subjective sensing to the objective bottom of
the cane. The blind man stumbles around disjointedly con-
nected with the world through the cane.
III. Either/Or Coordination
The dividing line between the blind man and the world
discontinuously shifts between the mutually exclusive posi-
tions of an "absolutely" loose subjective grasp of the top
of the cane as a separate object of the world buffering
obstacles to the "absolutely" tight grasp of the cane which
extends the dividing line of the subjective sensing to the
objective bottom of the cane. The blind man is jarringly
poked by the objective reaction of the cane as he subjec-
tively pokes about the world.
IV. Both/And Coordination
The dividing line between the blindman and the world
continuously shifts between the successive positions of a
"relatively" loose subjective grasp of the top of the cane
as a separate object of the world which protectively buffers
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^9^inst obstacles and the "relatively" tight grasp of the
cane which extends the dividing line to te objective bottom
of the cane. In a successive touch and go of subjectively
sensing with the cane and objectively carrying the cane and
using it as a buffer the blind man tenuously probes the
world
.
V. Neither/Nor Metaphoric Coordination
The dividing line between the blind man and the world
is neither in the relatively loose grasp of the cane with
the dividing line at the top nor in the relatively tight
grasp of the cane with the dividing line at the bottom of
the cane but is in the "metaphoric" grasp of "relaxed firm-
ness" where the indeterminacy of the dividing line is con-
tinually redetermined through a searching probe of the
world. Through the "metaphoric" grasp of "relaxed firmness"
the blind man continually re-orients his searching probe of
the world to synchronously integrate his subjective aware-
ness "in" the cane with his objective awareness "about" the
cane. Ironically the shifting indeterminacy of the dividing
line between subjective/objective awareness necessarily
creates both the blind man's vulnerability to fall and his
openness to an expanding world of metaphoric probing.
We propose that we too are "blind" in that we can
never know the world directly. We are indirectly connected
to the world through our metaphoric probing. Just as the
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blind man's cane is neither inseparably related to the world
(subjective monism) nor separately independent of the world
(objective dualism) we are metaphorically coupled with the
world (metaphoric nondualism) in an indeterminate relation-
ship requiring continual reconstruction to bring the two
together in a harmonious synchrony. What we subjectively
expect and objectively observe constitutes an ongoing devel-
opmental conflict which is reducible to neither an idealis-
tic utopia nor a direct perception of the absolute world.
Rather the paradoxical indeterminacy of our "subject/object"
relationship with the world continually provokes new meta-
phoric reconstructions of reality's rich tapestry of unity
through diversity. This is the central act of creativity
through which we are metaphorically linked to all of crea-
tion as co-creators.
Generative Principles for Creative Teaching
We shall conclude this chapter with three general
principles for creative teaching which guide the child
through the five levels of the metaphoric dialectic toward
the greater cognitive perspective of unity through diversity
Forman and Kuschner (1977) have recommended, "... that the
teacher parallel plays near a self-directed child for a
while, get a sense of the child's objectives, give the child
sufficient opportunity for a run of successful variations in
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his/her spontaneous play, and then slip the child a comment
or an implement that, when incorporated by the child in the
child's play, creates surprise or paradox" (Forman and
Fosnot, 1982, p. 203). Generalizing on this recommendation
we propose the following three guiding principles
:
1. Meet the child at his/her world view . With this
principle the teacher develops a rapport with the child to
match the learning activity with the child's developmental
level according to the steps of the metaphoric dialectic.
In order to meet the child at his/her world view the teacher
listens to and observes the child's needs, interests, ques-
tions and activities. The teacher learns to speak the
child's language, to see through his/her eyes and to mirror
his/her actions when appropriate. The teacher incorporates
the child's interests and questions into the learning activ-
ity. Through the above interaction the teacher informally
diagnoses the child's cognitive level and matches it with
appropriate learning activities. Usually the learning
activities will be open ended activities with general themes
which allow the child to enter into the activity at his/her
own cognitive level. These open ended activities may fur
ther serve as a diagnostic of the child s interests and
cognitive level according to the metaphoric dialectic.
2. Further enrich the child's world view . With this
principle the teacher allows and encourages the child to
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fully explore all the diverse first-order variations on
his/her particular subject of interest. The teacher may
introduce open ended activities with general themes to allow
diverse variations on the theme. The teacher emphasizes the
similarities between the diverse variations. The teacher
may encourage variations within a thematic activity by using
different mediums for expressing the same theme with song,
dance, drawing, painting, or building. The teacher may
encourage variation within a medium by allowing the use of
continuously transformable substances such as play dough,
water, or sand which take on an infinite variety of shapes
and sizes. Through pretend games the teacher may help the
child imagine multiple functions for an object such as a
stick or have the child take on multiple imaginary roles.
Through diverse grouping of children the teacher may encour-
age variations across a theme by following up the thematic
activity with similar thematic activities which flow out of
the first activity. With this principle the teacher is
helping the child to stretch his/her repetoire and under-
stand the first-order similarities between the diverse
variations on a theme.
3. Lovingly challenge the child's world view . With
this principle the teacher shifts from emphasizing the simi-
larities among the diverse variations to focusing on the
conflicting differences in the diverse variations of a
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theme. Through the conflicting differences the teacher,
within the greater context of trust and cooperation estab-
lished with the first two principles
,
induces cognitive
conflict and allows the child through a guided process to
reconstruct the first-order conflicting variations with the
greater cognitive perspective of a second-order metaphoric
integration. This second-order metaphoric integration al-
lows the child to perceive the greater unity of the theme
through its contrasting differences which was hidden to the
homogeneous first-order similarity of relative differences.
The teacher may present the child with an unexpected discre-
pancy, a moral dilemma or a controversial issue of personal
interest and through Socratic dialogue expose the inconsis-
tencies in the child's thinking and provide counterviews and
counterexamples to his/her incomplete one-sided thinking.
The teacher may allow and encourage the child to construct
his/her own theories and to make predictions and test out
his/her predictions with observations and thus to explore
the limits of his/her own theories and the need for continu-
ally reconstructing them. Through diverse groupings of
children according to cognitive level, interests, cultural
background, etc. the teacher may induce conflicting view-
points which in the context of resolving a common problem of
mutual concern may lead to a greater cognitive perspective
which is perceived because of the contrasting views and not
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merely in spite of them. With this principle the child is
lovingly challenged to confront cognitive conflict both in-
dividually and socially and to metaphorically resolve it
through the greater cognitive perspective of unity through
diversity . The important point to remember in working with
this principle is that challenging the child's world view
outside the context of trust, cooperation and mutual concern
may be destructive rather than constructive (Johnson, 1974).
The greater context of trust, cooperation and a mutual con-
cern provides an integrative purpose for metaphorically re-
solving the paradoxical conflicts which are inherent to
creative change (Johnson and R. Johnson, 1975) . Hence in
the model of education we are proposing education is neither
a mere transmitter of the child's world view nor a radical
subverter of the child's world view, but rather a benevolent
transformer of the child's World view.
In final conclusion we have demonstrated that the
Metaphoric Theory is an epistemologically adequate theory
for resolving the paradox of creative change and that it has
many promixing educational applications which the author
invites other researchers to explore with him.
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